

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Summer 1984

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Michael M. Harrison — Mitterrand's France in the Atlantic System

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Contents

Will More Countries Become Democratic?
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON 193

Mitterrand's France in the Atlantic System: A Foreign Policy of Accommodation
MICHAEL M. HARRISON 219

The Politics of Federal Block Grants: From Nixon to Reagan
TIMOTHY J. CONLAN 247

Oil Politics and Canada-United States Relations
JOCK A. FINLAYSON
DAVID G. HAGLUND 271

Political Struggle and Institutional Reorganization in Yugoslavia
PEDRO RAMET 289

Congressional Reapportionment in the 1980s: Types and Determinants of Policy Outcomes
Q. WHITFIELD AYRES
DAVID WHITEMAN 303

Testing Human Bonds Within Nations: Jews in the Occupied Netherlands
HENRY L. MASON 315

Book Reviews 345

Reference Books and Source Materials Received 394

Correspondence 397

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Howard, The Causes of Wars — DONALD KAGAN 345

Fagen and **Pellicer**, eds., The Future of Central America: Policy Choices for the U.S. and Mexico — DOUGLAS A. CHALMERS 346

Robbins, The Cuban Threat — JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ 347

Blasier, The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America — ROBERT WESSON 349

Baugh, The Politics of Nuclear Balance: Ambiguity and Continuity in Strategic Policies — GARRY D. BREWER 350

Cockburn, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine — ANDREW C. GOLDBERG 351

Nerlich, ed., Soviet Power and Western Negotiating Policies, 2 vols. — GERALD SEGAL 353

Hsiung, ed., U.S.-Asian Relations: The National Security Paradox — STEPHEN PELZ 355

Lau, Society and Politics in Hong Kong — JAMES D. SEYMOUR 356

Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Future — DONALD M. SNOW 357

Beres, Mimicking Sisyphus: America's Countervailing Nuclear Strategy — RICHARD H. BALD 358

Henderson, The Birth of NATO — H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD 360

Domhoff, Who Rules America Now? A View for the '80s — LEWIS A. COSER 361

Behn and **Vaupel**, Quick Analysis for Busy Decision Makers — HOWARD S. BLOOM 362

Edwards and **Wayne**, eds., Studying the Presidency — RICHARD M. PIOUS 364

Blasi, ed., The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't — ROBERT H. BIRKBY 365

Evans, The Truth About Supply-Side Economics — PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS 366

Urban, Why Teachers Organized — AMY BRIDGES 367

Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information — ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO 369

Ranney, Channels of Power: The Impact of Television on American Politics: **Robinson** and **Sheehan**, Over the Wire and on TV: CBS and UPI in Campaign '80; **Adams**, ed., Television Coverage of the 1980 Presidential Campaign — DORIS A. GRABER 370

Rosenberg, Beyond Separate Spheres: Intellectual Roots of Modern Feminism — CHRISTINE A. LUNARDINI 372

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reinhard, The Republican Right Since 1945 — KEVIN PHILLIPS 374

Kiewiet, Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues — PATRICK A. PIERCE 375

Downs, Rental Housing in the 1980s — E.S. SAVAS 376

Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act — RICHARD J. TOBIN 378

Eisenhower, Allies: Pearl Harbor to D-Day; **Kersaudy,** Churchill and de Gaulle — JAMES D. WILKINSON 379

Sampson, The Changing Anatomy of Britain — JORGEN RASMUSSEN 381

Ra'anan, International Policy Formation in the USSR: Factional "Debates" during the Zhdanovshchina — FRANCIS B. RANDALL 382

Hill, ed., National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation — NANCY MERIWETHER WINGFIELD 384

MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Vol. 2, The Great Leap Forward 1958–1960 — STEVEN I. LEVINE 385

Heilbut, Exiled in Paradise: German Refugee Artists and Intellectuals in America, from the 1930's to the Present — HANS W. GATZKE 386

Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966 — FRANK DINKA 387

Ballance, Ansari, and **Singer,** The International Economy and Industrial Development: Trade and Investment in the Third World — BELA BALASSA 388

Scowcroft, ed., Military Service in the United States — DAVID R. SEGAL 390

Dinnerstein, American and the Survivors of the Holocaust — ARTHUR A. GOREN 391

Berman and **Baker,** Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses — JOHN VAN OUDENAREN 393

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON analyzes the preconditions for, and the processes of, democratization to evaluate the prospects for the emergence of additional democratic regimes in the world. He does not find those prospects very bright.

MICHAEL M. HARRISON discusses the sources, content, and effects of the foreign policies of a Socialist France. He argues that ill-conceived Socialist economic policies have undermined Mitterrand's foreign policy efforts and enhanced tensions in the Atlantic system.

TIMOTHY J. CONLAN analyzes the differences in block grant politics under Presidents Nixon and Reagan. He concludes that while block grants in the 1970s were shaped mainly by the politics of individual policy arenas, during the Reagan administration grant consolidation politics have become more polarized and partisan in nature.

JOCK A. FINLAYSON and DAVID G. HAGLUND contend that the Canadian government's National Energy Program (NEP) was incorrectly perceived in Washington as part of a comprehensive and vigorous campaign against foreign ownership in all sectors of the Canadian economy.

PEDRO RAMET examines how institutional changes in monocratic systems like Yugoslavia's reflect political instability and competition among rival groups. He finds that disputes among Yugoslavia's regional elites over the federal balance of power, like the struggles between liberals and conservatives, has been carried over into disputes over institutional forms.

Q. WHITFIELD AYRES and DAVID WHITEMAN survey the congressional reapportionment plans used in the 1982 congressional elections. They find that most plans reflect a primary concern with protecting incumbents and that there was a substantial range of political forces resistant to purely partisan uses of the reapportionment plans.

HENRY L. MASON analyzes the implementation of the "final solution" in the occupied Netherlands, where it resulted in one of the highest rates of Jewish victimization in the Nazi orbit.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Will More Countries Become Democratic?

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

What are the prospects for the emergence of more democratic regimes in the world? This question has intellectual and policy relevance for the 1980s. During the 1950s and early 1960s, scholars concerned with this issue were generally optimistic that decolonization and economic development would lead to the multiplication of democratic regimes. The history of the next decade dealt roughly with these expectations, and people became more pessimistically preoccupied with the reasons for the breakdown of democratic systems. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the prospects for democracy seemed to have brightened once again, and social scientists have responded accordingly. "Transitions to democracy" became the new focus of attention. The optimists of the 1950s were rather naively optimistic; those of the 1980s have been more cautiously optimistic, but the optimism and the hope are still there. Coincidentally, the Reagan administration moved far beyond the Carter administration's more limited concern with human rights and first launched "Project Democracy" and "The Democracy Program" to promote democratic institutions in other societies, and then persuaded Congress to create a "National Endowment for Democracy" to pursue this goal on a permanent basis. In the early 1980s, in short, concern with the development of new democratic regimes has been increasing among academics and policymakers. The purpose of this article is to use social science theory and comparative political analysis to see to what extent this new, more cautious optimism may be justified.

This issue is important for at least four reasons. First, the future of democracy

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is closely associated with the future of freedom in the world. Democracies can and have abused individual rights and liberties, and a well-regulated authoritarian state may provide a high degree of security and order for its citizens. Overall, however, the correlation between the existence of democracy and the existence of individual liberty is extremely high. Indeed, some measure of the latter is an essential component of the former. Conversely, the long-term effect of the operation of democratic politics is probably to broaden and deepen individual liberty. Liberty is, in a sense, the peculiar virtue of democracy; hence, if one is concerned with liberty as an ultimate social value, one should also be concerned with the fate of democracy.

Second, the future of democracy elsewhere in the world is of importance to the United States. The United States is the world's premier democratic country, and the greater the extent to which democracy prevails elsewhere in the world, the more congenial the world environment will be to American interests generally and the future of democracy in the United States in particular. Michael Doyle has argued quite persuasively that no two liberal societies have ever fought each other.[1] His concept of liberalism differs from the concept of democracy employed in this paper, but the point may well be true of democratic regimes as well as liberal ones. Other things being equal, non-democratic regimes are likely to pose more serious challenges to American interests than democratic regimes.

Third, "a house divided against itself," Abraham Lincoln said, "cannot stand. . . . This government cannot endure permanently half-slave and half-free." At present the world is not a single house, but it is becoming more and more closely integrated. Interdependence is the trend of the times. How long can an increasingly interdependent world survive part-democratic and part-authoritarian and totalitarian? At what point does interdependence become incompatible with coexistence? For the Soviet bloc and the Western World, that point may still be some distance in the future, but tensions arising out of the growing interaction between totally different political systems are almost inevitably bound to increase. At some point, coexistence may require a slowing down or halting of the trends toward interdependence.

Fourth, the extension or decline of democracy has implications for other social values, such as economic growth, socioeconomic equity, political stability, social justice, and national independence. In societies at one level of development, progress toward one or more of these goals may be compatible with a high level of democracy. At another level of socioeconomic development, conflicts may exist. The question of the appropriateness of democracy for poor countries is, in this context, a central issue. But even highly developed societies may achieve their democracy at some sacrifice of other important values, such as national security.

In addition, if it is desirable to extend the scope of democracy in the world,

[1] Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (1983): 213ff.

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obviously it is necessary to know what conditions favor that in the late twentieth century. Empirical analysis is necessary to answer the question: What policies should governments, private institutions, and individuals espouse to encourage the spread of democracy? To what extent do efforts such as those of the Reagan administration have an impact, positive or negative, on the state of democracy in the world, and at what cost in terms of other social values and national goals?

The first step in evaluating the prospects for democracy is to define the dependent variable with which we are concerned. Definitions of democracy are legion. The term has been applied to areas and institutions far removed from politics. It has also been defined as an ideal impossible of human achievement. For Peter Bachrach, for instance, a democratic system of government has for its paramount objective "maximization of the self-development of every individual." Robert Dahl says a democratic political system is one which is "completely or almost completely responsible to all its citizens."[2] Such definitions may be relevant to normative political theory, but they are not very useful for comparative empirical analysis. First, they are often so vague and general that it is virtually impossible to apply them in practice. How does one judge whether a political system is attempting to maximize the self-development of individuals or is completely responsive to all its citizens? Second, democracy may also be defined in such broad terms as to make it identical with almost all civic virtues, including social justice, equality, liberty, fulfillment, progress, and a variety of other good things. Hence it becomes difficult if not impossible to analyse the relationship between democracy and other social goals.

For comparative analysis a more empirical and institutional definition is desirable, and this paper follows in the tradition of Joseph A. Schumpeter. A political system is defined as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. So defined, a democracy thus involves the two dimensions—contestation and participation—that Dahl sees as critical to his realistic democracy or polyarchy.[3]

The Record of Democratic Development

The historical emergence of modern democratic regimes falls into four phases. What could reasonably be called a democratic political system at the national

[2] Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), 24, 98ff.; Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 2. For a useful analysis of "rationalist" and "descriptive" concepts of democracy, see Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Democratic Elections, Democratic Government, and Democratic Theory," in David Butler, Howard R. Penniman, and Austin Ranney, eds., *Democracy at the Polls* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981), 325–48.

[3] Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 4–9. See also Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*,

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level of government first appeared in the United States in the early nineteenth century. During the following century democratic regimes gradually emerged in northern and Western Europe, in the British dominions, and in a few countries in Latin America. This trend, which Alexis de Tocqueville had foreseen in 1835 and which James Bryce documented in 1920, appeared to be irreversable if not necessarily universal. Virtually all significant regime changes were from less democracy to more democracy. Writing at the end of this period, Bryce could well speculate as to whether this "trend toward democracy now widely visible, is a natural trend, due to a general law of social progress."[4]

The trend was reversing, however, even as he wrote. The year 1920 was in many aspects the peak of democratic development among the independent nations of the world.[5] During the following two decades, democracy or democratic trends were snuffed out in Germany, Italy, Austria, Poland, the Baltic states, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Argentina, Brazil, and Japan. The war fought to make the world safe for democracy seemed instead to have brought its progress to an abrupt halt and to have unleashed social movements from the Right and the Left intent on destroying it.

The aftermath of World War II, on the other hand, marked another dramatic, if brief, spurt in the multiplication of democratic regimes. With the support of its allies, the United States imposed democracy on West Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan (where it took root), and attempted to do so in South Korea (where it did not). Coincidentally, the process of decolonizaton got underway with newly independent countries usually adopting at first the political forms of the imperial powers. In at least some cases, such as India, Israel, Ceylon, and the Philippines, the forms of democracy were accompanied by the substance also. Other countries, such as Turkey and some Latin American states, moved to emulate the political systems of the victorious Western powers. By the early 1950s, the proportion of democracies among the world's independent states had reached another high.

The fourth period in the evolution of democratic regimes, from the early 1950s to the 1980s, differs from the other three. In each of them, there was an overwhelmingly dominant trend, either toward the extension of democracy (1820–1920 and 1942–1953), or toward its reduction (1920–1942). In each period there were very few, if any, significant regime shifts against the dominant trend. The thirty years from the early 1950s to the early 1980s, however, were not characterized by a strong move in either direction. The trends were mixed. As we have seen, the number of democratic regimes seemed to expand in the 1950s and early

2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947), 269: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."

[4] James Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1921), 1:24.

[5] The proportion of independent states that were democratic was roughly 19 percent in 1902, 34 percent in 1920, 32 percent in 1929–30, and 24 percent in 1960. See G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Contemporary Democracies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 238.

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1960s, to shrink in the middle-late 1960s and early 1970s, and then to expand again in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Overall, however, the net record of change in the state of democracy in the world was not very great. It would be difficult to argue that the world was more or less democratic in 1984 than it had been in 1954. Indicative of this relative stability, albeit for a much shorter period of time, are Freedom House's estimates of the proportion of the world's population living in "free" states. In the first such estimate, in January 1973, 32.0 percent of the world's population was found to live in "free" states. In the next year, the percentage increased to 36.0 percent. During the following ten years, except for the two years India was under emergency rule (when it was 19.8 percent and 19.6 percent), the proportion of the world's population living in free states never went above 37.0 percent and never dropped below 35.0 percent. In January 1984 it was 36.0 percent, exactly where it had been ten years earlier.[6]

The overall stability in the extent of democracy does, however, conceal some important developments in both directions. With a few notable exceptions, almost all colonies that achieved independence after World War II shifted from democratic to nondemocratic systems. In contrast, a few countries moved in the opposite direction. These include Spain, Portugal, Colombia, Venezuela, Greece, and the Dominican Republic. Several South American countries, including two with long-standing democratic systems (Chile, Uruguay) and two with less stable populist systems (Brazil, Argentina), became bureaucratic-authoritarian states, with military governments intent upon fairly sustained rule. By the end of 1983, however, Brazil had made substantial progress back towards a democratic system, and Argentina had a democratically elected government. Many other countries (including Peru, Ecuador, Ghana, Nigeria, and Turkey) seemed to oscillate back and forth between democratic and undemocratic systems, in a pattern traditionally characteristic of praetorian societies. In East Asia: Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines became less democratic, Taiwan remained undemocratic; the Indochinese states succumbed to a ruthless Vietnamese totalitarianism; and Thailand and Malaysia remained partially democratic. Finally, efforts to move Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland toward more democratic politics were halted directly or indirectly by Soviet action.

Any estimate of the future of democracy in the world must be rooted in an explanation of why these mixed trends prevailed between the 1950s and the 1980s, and hence whether the overall stability in the prevalence of democratic re-

[6] See "The Comparative Survey of Freedom" compiled annually for Freedom House by Raymond D. Gastil, particularly *Freedom at Issue*, no. 17 (1973):2–3; no. 70 (1983): 4; no. 76 (1984): 5. Freedom House classifies a state as "free" if it rates in first or second place on a seven-place scale for both political rights and civil liberties. The countries so classified all have the minimum features of a democratic political system, at least at the time of classification. While recognizing the importance of institutionalization, the Freedom House survey does not attempt to measure the extent to which democracy has become institutionalized. Thus, its 1984 survey, published at the very beginning of 1984, rated both New Zealand and Nigeria as "free," although the latter had presumably left the category as a result of the coup on New Year's Day.

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gimes in the world will continue. Ancient and modern political analysts have many theories to explain the rise and fall of democratic regimes. To what extent do these various and conflicting theories explain what happened and did not happen after World War II and what could happen in the 1980s?

Thinking about the reasons for the emergence of democratic regimes has typically had two foci. One approach has focused on the preconditions in society that favor democratic development. A second approach has focused on the nature of the political processes by which that development has occurred. Each will be considered in turn.

Preconditions of Democratization

In 1970, Dankwart Rustow published a penetrating article on "transitions to democracy," in which he criticized studies that focused on "preconditions" for democratization because they often tended to jump from the correlation between democracy and other factors to the conclusion that those other factors were responsible for democracy. They also tended, he argued, to look for the causes of democracy primarily in economic, social, cultural, and psychological, but not political, factors.[7] Rustow's criticisms were well taken and helped to provide a more balanced view of the complexities of democratization. It would, however, be a mistake to swing entirely to the other extreme and ignore the environmental factors that may affect democratic development. In fact, plausible arguments can be and have been made for a wide variety of factors or preconditions that appear to be associated with the emergence of democratic regimes. To a large extent these factors can be grouped into four broad categories—economic, social, external, and cultural.

Economic Wealth and Equality

In his critique, Rustow gave special attention to an influential article published by Seymour Martin Lipset a decade earlier. In that piece, Lipset highlighted the seeming correlation between high levels of economic development and the prevalence of democratic political systems among European, English-speaking, and Latin American nations. The "more well-to-do a nation," he postulated, "the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy."[8] His study stimulated a flood of further analyses that criticized, qualified, and refined his argument. Whatever the academic hairsplittings, however, his basic point seemed to make sense. "There is," as another scholar put it in 1960, "a positive correlation between economic development and political competitiveness."[9] A quarter century later, that

[7] Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2 (1970):337ff.

[8] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (1959): 75.

[9] James S. Coleman, "Conclusion," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), 538.

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correlation still seemed to exist. In 1981, for instance, a comparison of the World Bank's ratings of countries in terms of economic development with Freedom House's ratings of them in terms of liberty showed these results—two of thirty-six low-income countries were classified "free" or democratic, fourteen out of sixty middle-income countries were so classified, and eighteen out of twenty-four countries with industrial economies were so classified.[10] As one moves up the economic ladder, the greater are the chances that a country will be democratic.

The correlation between wealth and democracy is thus fairly strong. How can it be explained? There are three possibilities. First, both democracy and wealth could be caused by a third factor. Protestantism has, for instance, been assigned by some a major role in the origins of capitalism, economic development, and democracy. Second, democracy could give rise to economic wealth. In fact, however, high levels of economic wealth require high rates of economic growth and high rates of economic growth do not correlate with the prevalence of democratic political systems.[11] Hence, it seems unlikely that wealth depends on democracy, and, if a connection exists, democracy must depend on wealth.

The probability of any causal connection running from wealth to democracy is enhanced by the arguments as to why this would be a plausible relationship. A wealthy economy, it is said, makes possible higher levels of literacy, education, and mass media exposure, all of which are conducive to democracy. A wealthy economy also moderates the tensions of political conflict; alternative opportunities are likely to exist for unsuccessful political leaders and greater economic resources generally facilitate accommodation and compromise. In addition, a highly developed, industrialized economy and the complex society it implies cannot be governed efficiently by authoritarian means. Decision-making is necessarily dispersed, and hence power is shared and rule must be based on consent. Finally, in a more highly developed economy, income and possibly wealth also tend to be more equally distributed than in a poorer economy. Since democracy means, in some measure, majority rule, democracy is only possible if the majority is a relatively satisfied middle class, and not an impoverished majority confronting an inordinately wealthy oligarchy. A substantial middle class, in turn, may be the product of the relatively equal distribution of land in agrarian societies that may otherwise be relatively poor, such as the early nineteenth century United States or twentieth century Costa Rica. It may also be the result of

[10]World Bank, *World Development Report 1981* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 134–35; and *Freedom at Issue*, no. 64 (1982): 8–9. See also Seymour Martin Lipset's update of his earlier analysis, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics,* 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 469–76.

[11] This is not to argue that authoritarian regimes necessarily have higher economic growth rates than democratic ones, although they may. See Robert M. Marsh, "Does Democracy Hinder Economic Development in the Latecomer Developing Nations," *Comparative Social Research* 2 (1979): 215–48; G. William Dick, "Authoritarian Versus Nonauthoritarian Approaches to Economic Development," *Journal of Political Economy* 82 (1974): 817–27; and Erich Weede, "Political Democracy, State Strength and Economic Growth in LDCs: A Cross-National Analysis" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., September 1983).

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a relatively high level of development, which produces greater income equality in industrial as compared to industrializing societies.

If these arguments are correct, economic development in the Communist world and the Third World should facilitate the emergence of democratic regimes. Yet one must be skeptical as to whether such an easy conclusion is warranted. In the first place, there is the question as to what level of economic development is required to make possible the transition to democracy. As Jonathan Sunshine has conclusively shown, the countries of Western Europe generally became democratic when their per capita gross domestic products were in the range of $300–$500 (in 1960 dollars). By 1981, perhaps two-thirds of the middle-income developing countries had reached or exceeded that level of development. Most of them, however, had not become democratic. If the economic theory holds, the level of economic development necessary to facilitate the transition to democracy must be higher in the late twentieth century than it was in the century prior to 1950.[12] In addition, different countries may still transit to democracy at widely varying levels of development. Spain, after all, did grow extremely rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s and did become democratic after the death of Francisco Franco in the mid-1970s. Could this have happened without the industrialization, urbanization, and development of the middle class that were central to Spanish economic growth? Quite probably not. Lopez Rodo was at least partially right when he had earlier predicted that Spain would become democratic when its per capita income reached $2,000 per head.[13] But then what about Portugal? It made a simultaneous transition to democracy, without having experienced the massive economic development of Spain and while still at a much lower level of economic well-being.

In addition, what about the experience of the southern cone states of Latin America? They too went through major processes of economic development and yet turned away from democracy, a phenomenon that led Guillermo O'Donnell to develop his theory of bureaucratic authoritarianism that posited just the opposite of the Lipset wealth-democracy theory. Instead, O'Donnell argued that economic development and particularly the strains produced by a heavy emphasis on import substitution led to the emergence of new, stronger, and more lasting forms of authoritarian rule.[14]

There is also the experience of the East Asian newly industrializing countries. In the 1960s and 1970s, these countries not only had the highest economic growth rates in the world, but they also achieved those rates while in most cases

[12] Jonathan Sunshine, "Economic Causes and Consequences of Democracy: A Study in Historical Statistics" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1972), 115ff.

[13] John F. Coverdale, *The Political Transformation of Spain after Franco* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 1.

[14] Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute for International Studies, 1973), 3–15, 113–14. For analysis of this theory, see David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).

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maintaining very equitable systems of income distribution. Yet none became more democratic and two of the most notable economic achievers, Korea and Singapore, became less so.

At the same time, the economic theory may still serve a purpose in terms of focusing attention on those countries where transitions to democratic or other types of modern political systems are most likely to occur. As countries develop economically, they can be conceived of moving into a zone of transition or choice, in which traditional forms of rule become increasingly difficult to maintain and new types of political institutions are required to aggregate the demands of an increasingly complex society and to implement public policies in such a society. In the 1981 World Bank ordering of countries by level of economic development, the zone of choice might be conceived as comprising the top one-third of the middle-income countries, that is, those running from Number 77 (the Republic of Korea) up to Number 96 (Spain). To these should be added Taiwan, which in terms of per capita income fits in the middle of this group. Of these twenty-one countries:

> 7 were democracies, including 4 (Spain, Venezuela, Portugal, Greece) that transited to democracy after World War II, 2 that became democratic on independence (Israel, Trinidad and Tobago), and 1 that had sustained democracy for many years (Costa Rica);
>
> 4 were the bureaucratic-authoritarian (B-A) states of the southern cone (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay);
>
> 4 were the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of East Asia (the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong);
>
> 2 were Communist (Rumania and Yugoslavia);
>
> and the remaining 4 (Algeria, Mexico, Iran, and South Africa) were resource rich, ideologically diverse, and politically undemocratic.

Two years later, this group of countries, now labeled by the World Bank as "upper middle income countries" had been reduced by the graduation of Spain into the category of "industrial market economies," but had been enlarged by the movement upward of Malaysia, Lebanon, and Panama, and by the Bank's transfer into it of Iraq from the category of "high income oil exporters."[15]

If the wealth theory of democracy were valid, one would predict further movement toward democracy among the twenty-odd states in this group, perhaps particularly on the part of the East Asian NICs and the B-A states of South America. Experience suggests, however, that what is predictable for these countries in the transition zone is not the advent of democracy but rather the demise of previously existing political forms. Economic development compels the modification or abandonment of traditional political institutions; it does not determine what political system will replace them. That will be shaped by other

[15] World Bank, *Development Report 1981*, 134–35, and *World Development Report 1983* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 148–49.

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factors, such as the underlying culture of the society, the values of the elites, and external influences.

In the late 1950s, for instance, both Cuba and Venezuela were reaching the level of economic development where the traditional sort of military despotism to which each had been subjected for years (Fulgencio y Batista Zaldivar, Marcos Pérez Jiménez) was no longer adequate for the needs of the society. These military despotisms came to their ends in 1958 and 1959. Batista collapsed in the face of an armed revolutionary movement that rapidly seized and consolidated power, nationalized private property, and installed a pervasive Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. The Pérez Jiménez regime collapsed as a result of the withdrawal of support by virtually all the major groups of Venezuelan society. That collapse was accompanied, however, by the negotiation of a series of pacts among Venezuelan leaders representing the major political and social groups that set the framework for a democratic political system.[16] By the late 1950s, the days of traditional personalistic despotism in Cuba and Venezuela were numbered; what was not fixed was what would replace them. Fidel Castro chose to lead Cuba in one direction; Rómulo Betancourt chose to lead Venezuela in a very different one. Fifteen years later in somewhat comparable circumstances King Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suárez in Spain and António Ramalho Eanes in Portugal made similar choices on behalf of democracy. In another case, by the mid-1970s the rapid economic development of Iran had clearly undermined the basis for the shah's regime. The shah did not attempt to develop a broader, more participatory set of democratic institutions. His inaction, combined with the decision or lack of decision by the military leaders and the political skill of the mullahs, opened Iran to a religious revolution. Different and earlier decisions by Iranian leaders in the 1960s and 1970s might have moved Iran in a more democratic direction.

If the concept of a transition zone is valid, economic development produces a phase in a nation's history where political elites and the prevailing political values can shape choices that decisively determine the nation's future evolution. The range of choice may be limited. In 1981, for instance, all countries with per capita gross national products of $4,220 or more (aside from the small oil-exporting states and Singapore) were either democratic or Communist. Conceivably, transition zone countries could make other choices. Iran is obviously in the fanatic pursuit of a different course; possibly the East Asian NICs and the Latin American B-A regimes may find other alternatives. To date, however, those countries that have come through the transition zone have almost always emerged as either democracies or as Communist dictatorships.

Social Structure

A second set of often-discussed preconditions for democracy involves the extent to which there is a widely differentiated and articulated social structure with rela-

[16] See Terry Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela" (Latin American Program Working Paper 107, The Wilson Center, 1981).

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tively autonomous social classes, regional groups, occupational groups, and ethnic and religious groups. Such groups, it is argued, provide the basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control. Societies that lack autonomous intermediate groups are, on the other hand, much more likely to be dominated by a centralized power apparatus—an absolute monarchy, an oriental despotism, or an authoritarian or totalitarian dictatorship.[17] This argument can be made on behalf of groups and pluralism in general or on behalf of particular groups or types of pluralistic structure which are singled out as playing a decisive role in making democracy possible.

According to one line of argument, pluralism (even highly stratified pluralism) in traditional society enhances the probability of developing stable democracy in modern society. The caste system may be one reason why India has been able to develop and to maintain stable democratic institutions.[18] More generally, the argument is made that societies with a highly developed feudalism, including an artistocracy capable of limiting the development of state power, are more likely to evolve into democracies than those that lack such social pluralism. The record of Western Europe versus Russia and of Japan versus China suggests that there may well be something to this theory. But the theory fails to account for differences between North America and South America. Tocqueville, Louis Hartz, and others attribute democracy in the former to the absence of feudalism. The failure of democracy in South America has, conversely, often been attributed precisely to its feudal heritage, although the feudalism that existed there was, to be sure, highly centralized.[19]

The theory that emphasizes traditional pluralism is, in a sense, the opposite of the one that emphasizes wealth as a precondition of democracy. The latter makes democracy dependent on how far the processes of economic development and modernization have gone. The traditional pluralism theory, in contrast, puts the emphasis on where the process started, on the nature of traditional society. Was it, in Gaetano Mosca's terms, primarily a "feudal" or a "bureaucratic" society? If pushed to the extreme, of course, this theory implies societal predestina-

[17] Those who hold a more Rousseauistic conception of democracy will, of course, tend to see intermediate groups as obstacles to the realization of true democracy. For a balanced analysis of these issues, see Robert A. Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). For a general argument for intermediate groups as a bulwark against totalitarianism, see William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959).

[18] See Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 15–154.

[19] For elaboration of these themes, see, among others: Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955), and idem, ed., *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1964), especially Richard M. Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America"; James M. Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberio-Latin Tradition," *World Politics* 25 (1973): 206–35; Claudio Veliz, *The Centralist Tradition of Latin America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).

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tion: it is all determined in advance that some societies will become democratic and others will not.

The most significant manifestation of the social structure argument, however, concerns not the existence of a feudal aristocracy, but rather the existence of an autonomous bourgeoisie. Democracy, the Marxists argue, is bourgeois democracy, reflecting the interests of that particular social class. Barrington Moore has restated the proposition succinctly in a more limited formulation: "No bourgeois, no democracy."[20] This argument would seem to have much to commend it. The failure of democracy to develop in Third World countries despite their economic growth can, perhaps, be related to the nature of that growth. The leading roles have been played by the state and by multinational enterprises. As a result, economic development runs ahead of the development of a bourgeoisie. In those circumstances where a bourgeoisie has developed, however, the prospects for democracy have been greater. The move to democracy in Turkey in the 1940s coincided with the move away from the étatisme of Kemalism and the appearance of a group of independent businessmen. More significantly, the ability of a developing country to have an autonomous, indigenous bourgeoisie is likely to be related to its size. Countries with small internal markets are unlikely to be able to sustain such a class, but large ones can. This may be one factor explaining why India (with one short interlude) has sustained a democratic system, and why Brazil, which is also developing a vigorous indigenous bourgeoisie, steadily moved away from bureaucratic authoritarianism in the 1970s and early 1980s. In South Africa, businessmen have been among those most active in attempting to ameliorate apartheid and broaden democracy in that country.

The seemingly important role of an autonomous bourgeoisie for the development of democracy highlights the question of the relation between economic system and political system. Clearly political democracy is compatible with both a substantial role in the economy for state-owned enterprises and a substantial state welfare and social security system. Nonetheless, as Charles Lindblom has pointed out (in a volume that otherwise highlights the conflict between the business corporation and democracy), all political democracies have market-oriented economies, although quite clearly not all market-oriented economies are paired with democratic political systems.[21] Lindblom's message would seem to be like Moore's—a market-oriented economy, like a bourgeoisie, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of a democratic political system.

Why should this be the case? At least two reasons suggest themselves. Politically, a market economy requires a dispersion of economic power and in practice almost invariably some form of private property. The dispersion of economic power creates alternatives and counters to state power and enables those elites

[20] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 418.

[21] Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 161–69.

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that control economic power to limit state power and to exploit democratic means to make it serve their interests. Economically, a market economy appears more likely to sustain economic growth than a command economy (although the latter may, as the Soviet and East European cases suggest, do so for a short period of time), and hence a market economy is more likely to give rise to the economic wealth and the resulting more equitable distribution of income that provide the infrastructure of democracy.

A third source of autonomous social pressure in a democratic direction may be provided by labor unions. Historically, unions played this role in Western Europe and the United States. In the contemporary world, unions have also had a role in the struggles against the racist oligarchy in South Africa, against military rule in the southern cone, and against the Communist dictatorship in Poland. At the same time, the experience of these cases also suggests the limits on the extent to which, in the absence of affiliated political parties, labor unions can affect political change.

Under some conditions, communal (that is, ethnic, racial, or religious) pluralism may be conducive to the development of at least limited forms of democracy. In most cases of communal pluralism, democracy can operate only on a consociational rather than a majoritarian basis.[22] And even when it is organized on a consociational basis, it will often break down as a result of social mobilization that undermines the power of elites or as a result of the intrusion of external political and military forces (as in Cyprus or Lebanon). Even in the best of circumstances, consociational democracy can often only remain stable by in effect becoming consociational oligarchy (as in Malaysia), that is, by sacrificing contestation in order to maintain representation.

External Environment

External influences may be of decisive importance in influencing whether a society moves in a democratic or non-democratic direction. To the extent that such influences are more important than indigenous factors, democratization is the result of diffusion rather than development. Conceivably, democracy in the world could stem from a single source. Clearly it does not. Yet it would be wrong to ignore the extent to which much of the democracy in the world does have a common origin. In 1984, Freedom House classified fifty-two countries (many of them extremely small) as "free."[23] In thirty-three of those fifty-two countries, the presence of democratic institutions could be ascribed in large part to British and American influence, either through settlement, colonial rule, defeat in war, or fairly direct imposition (such as in the Dominican Republic). Most of the other

[22] See primarily the works of Arend Lijphart, particularly *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975) and *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Evaluation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

[23] *Freedom at Issue*, no. 76 (1984): 8–9.

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nineteen "free" countries where democracy had other sources were either in Western Europe or in South America. The extension of democracy into the non-Western world, insofar as that has occurred, has thus been largely the product of Anglo-American efforts.

Ever since the French Revolution, armies have carried political ideologies with them. As we have indicated, where American armies went in World War II, democracy followed (in four cases enduringly, in one case temporarily). Where Soviet armies went, communism followed. Military conquest is clearly one way of extending democracy and other political systems. Historically, however, Western colonialism has been the most important means of diffusing democratic ideas and institutions. The enduring results of such colonialism have, however, been rather limited. As of 1983, no former French, U.S., Dutch, Portuguese, or Belgian colony was rated "free" by Freedom House. Several former British colonies were. Myron Weiner has, indeed, emphasized that *"every single country in the third world that emerged from colonial rule since the second world war with a population of at least one million (and almost all the smaller countries as well) with a continuous democratic experience is a former British colony."*[24] British rule seemingly had a significantly different impact from that of other colonial powers. Only six countries meet Weiner's condition, however, and a much larger number of former British colonies have *not* sustained democracy. The question then becomes how to distinguish among former British colonies. One possibility is that the duration of democratic institutions after independence is a function of the duration of British rule before independence. The colonies where democratic institutions appear to have taken the firmest root are those such as India, Sri Lanka, and the West Indian Anglophone states, where British rule dates from the eighteenth century. The record of former British colonies in Africa, on the other hand, where British rule dates only from the late nineteenth century, is not all that different from that of the former African colonies of other European powers.

In large measure, the rise and decline of democracy on a global scale is a function of the rise and decline of the most powerful democratic states. The spread of democracy in the nineteenth century went hand in hand with the Pax Britannica. The extension of democracy after World War II reflected the global power of the United States. The decline of democracy in East Asia and Latin America in the 1970s was in part a reflection of the waning of American influence.[25] That influence is felt both directly, as a result of the efforts of the American government to affect political processes in other societies, and also indirectly by providing a powerful and successful model to be followed.

Regional external influences can also have a significant effect on political de-

[24] Myron Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory," in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun, eds., *Comparative Elections in Developing Countries* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, manuscript, 26 [italics in original]).

[25] Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge: Harvard Univerity Press, 1981), 246–59.

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velopment within a society. The governments and political parties of the European Community (EC) helped to encourage the emergence of democratic institutions in Spain and Portugal, and the desire of those two countries plus Greece to join the community provided an additional incentive for them to become democratic. Even beyond the confines of the EC, Western Europe has generally become defined as a community of democratic nations, and any significant departure by one nation from the democratic norm would clearly create a major crisis in intra-European relations. In some measure, a similar development may be taking place among the countries of the Andean Pact. The departure from the Pact of Chile and the addition of Venezuela in the mid-1970s, plus the transitions to democracy in Ecuador and Peru, then laid the basis for identifying pact membership with the adherence to democratic government.

In some regions, but most notably in Latin America, regional trends may exist. By and large, Latin American governments moved in a democratic direction in the late 1950s and early 1960s, then in an authoritarian direction in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and then once again in a democratic direction in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The reasons for these regional shifts are not entirely clear. They could be a result of four factors: simultaneous parallel socioeconomic development in Latin American societies; the triggering of a trend by the impact of one "pace-setting" Latin American society on its neighbors; the impact on Latin America of a common external influence (such as the United States); or some combination of these factors.

Cultural Context

The political culture of a society has been defined by Sidney Verba as "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place."[26] Political culture is, presumably, rooted in the broader culture of a society involving those beliefs and values, often religiously based, concerning the nature of humanity and society, the relations among human beings, and the relation of individuals to a transcendent being. Significant differences in their receptivity to democracy appear to exist among societies with different cultural traditions.

Historically, as many scholars have pointed out, a high correlation existed between Protestantism and democracy. In the contemporary world, virtually all countries with a European population and a Protestant majority (except East Germany) have democratic governments.[27] The case of Catholicism, particularly in Latin countries, on the other hand, is more ambivalent. Historically, it was often argued that a natural opposition existed between Catholicism and democ-

[26] Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), 513.

[27] For the statistical correlation between Protestantism and democracy, see Kenneth A. Bollen, "Political Democracy and the Timing of Development," *American Sociological Review* 44 (1979): 572–87.

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racy. By and large, democratic institutions developed later and less surely in European Catholic countries than in Protestant ones. By and large, however, these countries also developed later economically than the Protestant countries, and hence it is difficult to distinguish between the impact of economics and that of religion. Conceivably, the influence of the latter on politics could have been mediated through its impact on economic development and the rise of an entrepreneurial class. With economic development, however, the role of the church changed, and in most Catholic countries now the church is identified with support for democracy.

Islam, on the other hand, has not been hospitable to democracy. Of thirty-six countries with Moslem majorities, Freedom House in 1984 rated twenty-one as "not free," fifteen as "partially free," none as "free." The one Islamic country that sustained even intermittent democracy after World War II was Turkey, which had, under Mustapha Kemal, explicitly rejected its Islamic tradition and defined itself as a secular republic. The one Arab country that sustained democracy, albeit of the consociational variety, for any time was Lebanon, 40 to 50 percent of whose population was Christian and whose democratic institutions collapsed when the Moslem majority asserted itself in the 1970s. Somewhat similarly, both Confucianism and Buddhism have been conducive to authoritarian rule, even in those cases where, as in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, economic preconditions for democracy have come into being. In India and Japan, on the other hand, the traditional Hindu and Shinto cultures at the very least did not prevent the development of democratic institutions and may well have encouraged it.

How can these differences be explained? Both doctrinal and structural aspects of the religions could play a role. At the most obvious level, those cultures that are consummatory in character—that is, where intermediate and ultimate ends are closely connected—seem to be less favorable to democracy. In Islam, for instance, no distinction exists between religion and politics or between the spiritual and the secular, and political participation was historically an alien concept.[28] Somewhat similarly, Confucianism in China was generally hostile to social bodies independent of the state, and the culture was conceived as a total entity, no part of which could be changed without threatening the whole. Instrumental cultures, in contrast, are "characterized by a large sector of intermediate ends separate from and independent of ultimate ends" and hence "ultimate ends do not color every concrete act."[29] The Hindu tradition, for example, is relatively tolerant of diversity. S. N. Eisenstadt has written that "the basic religious and cultural orientations, the specific cultural identity of Indian civilization were not necessarily associated with any particular political or imperial framework. . . . "[30]

[28] See Daniel Pipes, *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 48–69, 144–47.

[29] David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 85.

[30] S.N. Eisenstadt, "Transformation of Social, Political, and Cultural Orders in Modernization,"

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As a whole, consummatory culture is thus more resistant to change, and when change comes in one significant element of the culture, the entire culture is thrown into question or is displaced and destroyed. In the instrumental culture, on the other hand, change can come gradually and incrementally. Hence, less resistance exists to the adaptation of new political forms, such as democratic institutions, and the process of adaptation can be an extended one that in itself facilitates the development of stable democracy.

With respect to the more narrowly political culture of a society, it seems reasonable to expect that the prevalence of some values and beliefs will be more conducive to the emergence of democracy than others. A political culture that values highly hierarchical relationships and extreme deference to authority presumably is less fertile ground for democracy than one that does not. Similarly, a culture in which there is a high degree of mutual trust among members of the society is likely to be more favorable to democracy than one in which interpersonal relationships are more generally characterized by suspicion, hostility, and distrust. A willingness to tolerate diversity and conflict among groups and to recognize the legitimacy of compromise also should be helpful to democratic development. Societies in which great stress is put on the need to acquire power and little on the need to accommodate others are more likely to have authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Social scientists have attempted to compare societies along these various dimensions, but the evidence remains fragmented and difficult to systematize.[31] In addition, of course, even if some beliefs and values are found to correlate with the presence of democratic institutions, the question still remains concerning the relationship among these in a developmental sense. To what extent does the development of a pro-democratic political culture have to precede the development of democratic institutions? Or do the two tend to develop more simultaneously with the successful operation of democratic institutions, possibly created for other reasons, generating adherence to democratic values and beliefs?[32]

Processes of Democratization

The classic model of democratization that has infused much discussion of the subject is that of Britain, with its stately progression from civic rights to political rights to social rights, gradual development of parliamentary supremacy and

American Sociological Review 30 (1965): 668. In contrast to the Hindu tradition, Eisenstadt writes, "the identity between political and religious communities represents a very important similarity between the Chinese and Islamic societies" (p. 663).

[31] See Pye and Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development;* Dahl, *Polyarchy,* 124–87; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); David McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1961).

[32] For arguments on the priority of democratic values, see the case Dahl makes on Argentina, *Polyarchy,* 132–40, and Jonathan Tumin's amendment of Barrington Moore in "The Theory of Democratic Development: A Critical Revision," *Theory and Society* 11 (1982): 143–64.

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cabinet government, and incremental expansion of the suffrage over the course of a century. It is basically a linear model. Dankwart A. Rustow's model, based on Swedish experience—national unity, prolonged and inconclusive political struggle, a conscious decision to adopt democratic rules, habituation to the working of those rules—also involves a relatively simple linear progression. These "ingredients," he has argued, "must be assembled one at a time."[33] These linear models primarily reflect European experience during the century ending in 1920 and the experience of some Latin American countries (such as Argentina until 1930 and Chile until 1973).

Two other models have generally been more relevant than the linear model to the experience of Third World countries. One is the cyclical model of alternating despotism and democracy. In this case, key elites normally accept, at least superficially, the legitimacy of democratic forms. Elections are held from time to time, but rarely is there any sustained succession of governments coming to power through the electoral process. Governments are as often the product of military interventions as they are of elections. Such interventions tend to occur either when a radical party wins or appears about to win an election, when the government in power threatens or appears to threaten the prerogatives of the armed forces, or when the government appears incapable of effectively guiding the economy and maintaining public order. Once a military junta takes over, it will normally promise to return power to civilian rule. In due course, it does so, if only to minimize divisiveness within the armed forces and to escape from its own inability to govern effectively. In a praetorian situation like this, neither authoritarian nor democratic institutions are effectively institutionalized. Once countries enter into this cyclical pattern, it appears to be extremely difficult for them to escape from it. In many respects, countries that have had relatively stable authoritarian rule (such as Spain and Portugal) are more likely to evolve into relatively stable democracies than countries that have regularly oscillated between despotism and democracy (such as Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Ghana, Nigeria). In the latter, neither democratic nor authoritarian norms have deep roots among the relevant political elites, while in the former a broad consensus accepting of authoritarian norms is displaced by a broad consensus on or acceptance of democratic ones. In the one case, the alternation of democracy and despotism *is* the political system; in the other, the shift from a stable despotism to a stable democracy *is a change* in political systems.

A third model is neither linear nor cyclical but rather dialectical. In this case, the development of a middle class leads to increased pressures on the existing authoritarian regimes for expanded participation and contestation. At some point, there is then a sharp break, perhaps in the form of what I have elsewhere called the "urban breakthrough," the overthrow of the existing authoritarian regime, and the installation of a democratic one.[34] This regime, however, finds it

[33] Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," 361.

[34] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 72–78.

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difficult or impossible to govern effectively. A sharp reaction occurs with the overthrow of the democratic system and installation of a (usually right-wing) authoritarian regime. In due course, however, this regime collapses and a transition is made to a more stable, more balanced, and longer-lasting democratic system. This model is roughly applicable to the history of a number of countries, including Germany, Italy, Austria, Greece, and Spain.

Most theories of political development in general and of democratization in particular see these processes as involving a number of different elements. The sequence in which those components appear may have important implications for the overall results of the process. Several theorists have suggested, for instance, that the preferable overall process of development for a country is first to define its national identity, next to develop effective institutions of authority, and then to expand political participation. The "probabilities of a political system's development in a nonviolent, nonauthoritarian, and eventually democratically stable manner are maximized," Eric Nordlinger has argued, when this sequence occurs.[35] In somewhat parallel fashion, it has been argued that the development of broad-gauged political institutions for political participation, such as electoral and party systems, must coincide with or precede the expansion of political participation if instability and violence are to be avoided. Similarly, Robert A. Dahl emphasizes the greater probability of success in transitions to democracy (or polyarchy in his terms) if the expansion of contestation precedes the expansion of participation.[36]

All these theories thus emphasize the desirability for the eventual development of stable democracy of the expansion of political participation occurring relatively late in the sequence of change. However, given the widely accepted desirability of political participation (including in totalitarian regimes) and the major increases in social mobilization (such as urbanization, literacy, and media consumption) produced by economic development, the prevailing tendencies in the contemporary world are for participation to expand early in the process of development, and before or concurrently with contestation. This may be one reason why economic development in the Third World has not stimulated the emergence of more stable democratic regimes. At present, the one notable case where contestation has clearly developed in advance of participation is South Africa. Hence, according to the Dahl thesis, the prospects for democratic development should be greater in South Africa than elsewhere in Africa.

It is often assumed that since democracy, to a greater degree than other forms of government, involves rule by the people, the people therefore play a greater

[35] Eric A. Nordlinger, "Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change," *World Politics* 20 (1968): 494–530; Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), 126ff.; Leonard Binder et al., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 310–313.

[36] Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 33–40; Huntington, *Political Order*, esp. pp. 32–59, 78–92. See also Richard A. Pride, *Origins of Democracy: A Cross-National Study of Mobilization, Party Systems, and Democratic Stability*, Comparative Politics Series, Vol. 1, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970).

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role in bringing it into existence than they do with other forms of government. In fact, however, democratic regimes that last have seldom, if ever, been instituted by mass popular action. Almost always, democracy has come as much from the top down as from the bottom up; it is as likely to be the product of oligarchy as of protest against oligarchy. The passionate dissidents from authoritarian rule and the crusaders for democratic principles, the Tom Paines of this world, do not create democratic institutions; that requires James Madisons. Those institutions come into existence through negotiations and compromises among political elites calculating their own interests and desires. They are produced when, as Rustow argued, political leaders decide "to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic procedure." The political leaders may do this because they are convinced of the ethical and political superiority of democracy and hence view democracy as a desirable goal in itself. More likely, however, they will view democracy as a means to other goals, such as prolonging their own rule, achieving international legitimacy, minimizing domestic opposition, and reducing the likelihood of civil violence, from which they will probably suffer. Hence, whatever institutions are agreed on will, in Rustow's words, "seem second-best to all major parties involved."[37] One could paraphrase Reinhold Niebuhr: the ability of elites to compromise makes democracy possible; the inclination of elites to vengeance makes democracy desirable—for the elites.

In the decades after World War II, democratic regimes have usually been introduced in independent countries through one or some combination of two processes. *Replacement* occurs when an authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown as a result of military defeat, economic disaster, or the withdrawal of support from it by substantial groups in the population. Its leaders are killed, imprisoned, flee the country, or withdraw from politics. The leaders of the now-dominant groups, which had not been actively involved with the authoritarian regime, agree among themselves to institute a democratic system. This agreement may be reached very quickly because of previous experience with democracy and because its inauguration is seen as the "obvious" solution by the relevant political elites, as in Venezuela in 1958 and Greece in 1974. Or it may come about as a result of political struggle among elites with differing views as to the future of their country, out of which the leaders committed to democracy emerge successfully (as in Portugal in 1975–76). This process may involve, as it did in the case of Venezuela, a series of carefully negotiated pacts among the relevant groups that can cover economic policy and the role of institutions (such as the church and the army), as well as the procedures for choosing a government. One critical issue on which the constitutive elites must agree is how to treat those actively involved in the previous authoritarian regime.[38]

[37] Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," 355–57.

[38] John H. Herz, "On Reestablishing Democracy after the Downfall of Authoritarian or Dictatorial Regimes," *Comparative Politics* 10 (1978):559–62.

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The alternative process for inaugurating a democratic regime might be termed *transformation*. In this case, the elites within an authoritarian system conclude that, for some reason or another, that system which they have led and presumably benefited from no longer meets their needs or those of their society. They hence take the lead in modifying the existing political system and transforming it into a democratic one. In this case, while there may well be a variety of internal and external pressures favoring change, the initiative for such change comes from the rulers. Transformation involves, as Juan Linz put it, "change through *reforma* rather than *ruptura*."[39] Notable examples include, of course, Britain in the nineteenth century, and after World War II, Turkey in the 1940s, Spain in the 1970s, and Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s. The leaders of the transformation process typically confront all the problems of the political reformer, having to maneuver skillfully between the stand-patters opposed to any democratization, on the one hand, and the committed dissident and opposition groups demanding the immediate dissolution of the authoritarian system, on the other. Essential to their success is that they be seen as keeping control, acting from a position of strength and not under duress, and dictating the pace of change.

The replacement process requires compromise and agreement among elites who have not been part of the authoritarian regime. The transformation process requires skilled leadership from and agreement among the elites who are part of that regime. In neither case is agreement necessarily required between elites who are within the regime and those opposing the regime. This situation makes replacement and transformation possible, since reaching an agreement between out-groups and in-groups is far more difficult than reaching an agreement among out-groups or among in-groups. Except for Costa Rica in 1948, it is hard to think of a case where a democratic system of any duration was inaugurated by explicit agreement between the leaders of a regime and the leaders of the armed opposition to that regime.

"As long as powerful vested interests oppose changes that lead toward a less oppressive world," Barrington Moore has argued, "no commitment to a free society can dispense with some conception of revolutionary coercion."[40] His thesis is that liberty and democracy can be inaugurated by bloody revolution and that such a course may well impose fewer costs than the alternative of gradual reform. When in world history, however, has violent revolution produced a stable democratic regime in an independent state? "Revolutionary coercion" may bring down an authoritarian regime, but, except again for Costa Rica in 1948, guerrilla insurgencies do not inaugurate democratic regimes. All revolutionary opponents of authoritarian regimes claim to be democrats; once they achieve power through violence, almost all turn out to be authoritarian themselves, often imposing an even more repressive regime than the one they overthrew. Most authoritarian re-

[39] Juan Linz, "Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration," in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 35.

[40] Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship*, 508.

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gimes are thus replaced by new authoritarian regimes, and a democratic succession usually requires minimum violence. "In the future as in the past," as Dahl concluded his study of this issue, "stable polyarchies and near-polyarchies are more likely to result from rather slow evolutionary processes than from revolutionary overthrow of existing hegemonies."[41]

The Prospects for Democracy

This brief and informal survey of the preconditions and processes conducive to the emergence of democratic regimes argues for caution in any effort to predict whether more countries will become democratic. It may, however, be useful to attempt to sum up the modest conclusions which seem to emerge from this review.

With respect to preconditions, the emergence of democracy in a society is helped by a number of factors: higher levels of economic well-being; the absence of extreme inequalities in wealth and income; greater social pluralism, including particularly a strong and autonomous bourgeoisie; a more market-oriented economy; greater influence vis-à-vis the society of existing democratic states; and a culture that is less monistic and more tolerant of diversity and compromise. No one of these preconditions is sufficient to lead to democratic development. With the possible exception of a market economy, no single precondition is necessary to produce such development. Some combination of some of these preconditons is required for a democratic regime to emerge, but the nature of that combination can vary greatly from one case to another. It is also necessary, however, to look not only at what preconditons must be present but also at the negative strength of any preconditon that may be absent. The powerful absence of one favorable condition, or, conversely, the presence of a powerful negative condition, that overrides the presence of otherwise favorable conditions, may prevent democratic development. In terms of cultural tradition, economic development, and social structure, Czechoslovakia would certainly be a democracy today (and probably Hungary and Poland also) if it were not for the overriding veto of the Soviet presence. In similar fashion, extreme poverty, extreme economic inequalities, or deeply ingrained Islamic and Confucian cultural traditions could have comparable effect in Africa, Central America, or the Middle East and East Asia.

With respect to the processes necessary to bring about democratic development, a central requirement would appear to be that either the established elites within an authoritarian system or the successor elites after an authoritarian system collapses see their interests served by the introduction of democratic institutions. The probability of stable democracy emerging will be enhanced to the extent that the transition can be a gradual one, that the introduction of contestation precedes the expansion of political participation, and that the role of violence in the transition is minimized. The probability of democratization

[41] Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 45.

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decreases sharply to the extent that political life in a society becomes highly polarized and involves violent conflict between social forces.

Possibility of Regime Changes

In terms of these generalizations, prospects for democratic development in the 1980s are probably greatest in the bureaucratic-authoritarian states of South America. Cultural traditions, levels of economic development, previous democratic experience, social pluralism (albeit with weak bourgeoisies outside Brazil), and elite desires to emulate European and North American models all favor movement toward democracy in these countries. On the other hand, the polarization and violence that has occurred (particularly in Argentina and Chile) could make such movement difficult. The prospects for a relatively stable democratic system should be greatest in Brazil. Beginning in the early 1970s, the leadership of the Brazilian regime began a process of *distensão*, gradually relaxing the authoritarian controls that had been imposed in the 1960s. By the early 1980s, Brazil had acquired many of the characteristics of a democratic system. The principal deficiency was the absence of popular elections for the chief executive, but those were generally viewed as certain to come sometime in the 1980s. The gradualness of the Brazilian process, the relative low level of violence that accompanied it, and the general recognition among elite groups of the importance of not disrupting it in any way, all seemed to enhance the prospects for democracy.

In Argentina, the economic and military failures of the authoritarian regime led to a much more dramatic and rapid transit to democracy in 1983. The probabilities of this replacement being sustained would seem to depend on three factors: the ability of the Alfonsín government to deal with the economic problems it confronted; the extent to which Peronista, as well as Radical, elites were willing to abide by democratic rules; and the extent to which military leadership was effectively excluded from power or came to identify its interests with the maintenance of a democratic regime. The two other southern cone countries with bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, Chile and Uruguay, are the two South American countries that did have the strongest democratic traditions. As of 1984, however, in neither country had authoritarian rule lost its legitimacy and effectiveness to the point where it could no longer be maintained and a replacement process could occur (as in Argentina). Nor had the leaders of either regime embarked on a meaningful transformation process to democratize their system (as in Brazil). The Brazilian and Argentine changes, however, cannot fail to have impact on political development in the smaller countries.

The probability of movement in a democratic direction in the East Asian newly industrializing countries is considerably less than it is among the Latin American B-A states. The economic basis for democracy is clearly coming into existence, and if their economic development continues at anything like the rates it did in the 1960s and 1970s, these states will soon constitute an authoritarian anomaly among the wealthier countries of the world. The East Asian countries

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generally have also had and maintained a relatively equal distribution of income. In addition, the United States, Britain, and Japan are the principal external influences on these societies. All these factors favor democratic development. On the other side, cultural traditions, social structure, and a general weakness of democratic norms among key elites all impede movement in a democratic direction. In some measure, the East Asian states dramatically pose the issue of whether economics or culture has the greater influence on political development. One can also speculate on whether the spread of Christianity in Korea may create a cultural context more favorable to democracy.

Among other less economically developed East Asian societies, the prospects for democracy are undoubtedly highest but still not very high in the Philippines. The Marcos government is not likely to attempt to transform itself, and hence efforts to create a democratic system must await its demise. At that time, American influence, previous experience with democracy, social pluralism (including the influence of the Catholic Church), and the general agreement among opposition political leaders on the desirability of a return to democracy, should all provide support for movement in that direction. On the other hand, military leaders may not support democratic norms, and the existence of a radical insurgency committed to violence, plus a general proclivity to the use of violence in the society, might make such a transition difficult. Conceivably, Philippine development could follow the lines of the dialectical model referred to earlier, in which (as in Venezuela) an initial experience with democracy is broken by a personalistic authoritarian interlude that then collapses and a new, more stable democratic regime is brought into existence by agreement among political leaders. The Philippine Betancourt, however, may well have been gunned down at the Manila airport.

Among Islamic countries, particularly those in the Middle East, the prospects for democratic development seem low. The Islamic revival, and particularly the rise of Shi'ite fundamentalism, would seem to reduce even further the likelihood of democratic development, particularly since democracy is often identified with the very Western influences the revival strongly opposes. In addition, many of the Islamic states are very poor. Those that are rich, on the other hand, are so because of oil, which is controlled by the state and hence enhances the power of the state in general and of the bureaucracy in particular. Saudi Arabia and some of the smaller Arab oil-rich Gulf countries have from time to time made some modest gestures toward the introduction of democratic institutions, but these have not gone far and have often been reversed.

Most African countries are, by reason of their poverty or the violence of their politics, unlikely to move into a democratic direction. Those African and Latin American countries that have adhered to the cyclical pattern of alternating democratic and authoritarian systems in the past are not likely to change this basic pattern, as the example of Nigeria underlines, unless more fundamental changes occur in their economic and social infrastructure. In South Africa, on the other hand, the relatively high level of economic development by African standards, the intense contestation that occurs within the minority permitted to

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participate in politics, the modest expansion of that minority to include the Coloureds and Asians, and the influence of Western democratic norms, all provide a basis for moving in a more democratic direction. However, that basis is countered on the other side by the inequalities, fears, and hatreds that separate blacks and whites.

In some small countries, democratic institutions may emerge as a result of massive foreign effort. This did happen in the Dominican Republic; in 1984 it was, presumably, happening in Grenada; it could, conceivably, happen at extremely high cost in El Salvador.

The likelihood of democratic development in Eastern Europe is virtually nil. The Soviet presence is a decisive overriding obstacle, no matter how favorable other conditions may be in countries like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Democratization could occur in these societies only if either the Soviet Union were drastically weakened through war, domestic upheaval, or economic collapse (none of which seems likely), or if the Soviet Union came to view Eastern European democratization as not threatening to its interests (which seems equally unlikely).

The issue of Soviet intervention apart, a more general issue concerns the domestic pattern of evolution within Communist states. For almost four decades after World War II, no democratic country, with the dubious possible exception of Czechoslovakia in 1948, became Communist and no Communist country became democratic through internal causes. Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, were frequently replaced by either democratic or Communist regimes, and democratic regimes were replaced by authoritarian ones. In their early phase, Communist states usually approximated the totalitarian model, with ideology and the party playing central roles and massive efforts being made to indoctrinate and mobilize the population and to extend party control throughout all institutions in the society. Over time, however, Communist regimes also tend to change and often to become less totalitarian and more authoritarian. The importance of ideology and mobilization declines, bureaucratic stagnation replaces ideological fervor, and the party becomes less a dedicated elite and more a mechanism for patronage. In some cases, military influence increases significantly. The question thus arises: Will Communist authoritarian regimes, absent Soviet control, be more susceptible to movement toward democracy than Communist totalitarian regimes?

The answer to that question may well depend on the extent to which Communist authoritarian regimes permit the development of a market-oriented economy. The basic thrust of communism suggests that such a development is unlikely. Communism is not, as Karl Marx argued, a product of capitalist democracy; nor is it simply a "disease of the transition" to capitalist democracy, to use Rostow's phrase.[42] It is instead an alternative to capitalist democracy and one whose guiding principle is the subjection of economic development to polit-

[42] Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 162.

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ical control. Even if it becomes more authoritarian and less totalitarian, the Communist political system is likely to ensure that economic development neither achieves a level nor assumes a form that will be conducive to democracy.

The United States and Global Democracy

The ability of the United States to affect the development of democracy elsewhere is limited. There is little that the United States or any other foreign country can do to alter the basic cultural tradition and social structure of another society or to promote compromise among groups of that society that have been killing each other. Within the restricted limits of the possible, however, the United States could contribute to democratic development in other countries in four ways.

First, it can assist the economic development of poor countries and promote a more equitable distribution of income and wealth in those countries. Second, it can encourage developing countries to foster market economies and the development of vigorous bourgeois classes. Third, it can refurbish its own economic, military, and political power so as to be able to exercise greater influence than it has in world affairs. Finally, it can develop a concerted program designed to encourage and to help the elites of countries entering the "transition zone" to move their countries in a more democratic direction.

Efforts such as these could have a modest influence on the development of democracy in other countries. Overall, however, this survey of the preconditions for and processes of democratization leads to the conclusion that, with a few exceptions, the prospects for the extension of democracy to other societies are not great. These prospects would improve significantly only if there were major discontinuities in current trends—such as if, for instance, the economic development of the Third World were to proceed at a much faster rate and to have a far more positive impact on democratic development than it has had so far, or if the United States reestablished a hegemonic position in the world comparable to that which it had in the 1940s and 1950s. In the absence of developments such as these, a significant increase in the number of democratic regimes in the world is unlikely. The substantial power of anti-democratic governments (particularly the Soviet Union), the unreceptivity to democracy of several major cultural traditions, the difficulties of eliminating poverty in large parts of the world, and the prevalence of high levels of polarization and violence in many societies all suggest that, with a few exceptions, the limits of democratic development in the world may well have been reached.*

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Mitterrand's France in the Atlantic System: A Foreign Policy of Accommodation

MICHAEL M. HARRISON

The installation of a Socialist government in France has posed two kinds of dilemmas for the study of foreign policy and international relations in the Atlantic system. A first set of questions concerns the continuities and discontinuities in the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic, the significance of the Gaullist legacy for shaping defense and security policy, the specifically "Socialist" characteristics of foreign policy decision-making and external behavior, and the effects Socialist economic experimentation may have on the external capabilities of the independent-minded and activist Fifth Republic. A second set of questions focuses on the effects the foreign policy of a Socialist France may have on bilateral relations with the United States and, more generally, on relations among Atlantic states in both the security and economic arenas.

During the three years of Socialist responsibility in Paris, assessments of the foreign policy behavior and implications of France have varied dramatically; many aspects of French foreign and security policy, and the new state of Atlantic relations with a Socialist regime at its core, remain puzzling and inconclusive.[1]

[1] The optimistic perspective on American relations with a Socialist France was represented in Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "The Mitterrand Challenge," *Foreign Policy*, no. 44 (Fall 1981): 57-69. A more skeptical approach is presented in Michael M. Harrison and Simon Serfaty, *A Socialist France and*

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At this juncture, however it does seem possible to establish a pattern of foreign policy behavior and to speculate on its likely effects. The argument developed here is that the Gaullist framework for shaping and directing French foreign policy has remained paramount despite particular concerns, circumstances, and failings that have accompanied the new government's rule.[2] The principal new development is the unusual convergence of Franco-American policies on East-West security affairs, particularly regarding the Soviet military threat in Europe. The Mitterrand regime's malleability in the foreign policy domain also reflects its preoccupation with domestic and international economic problems at the expense of security and military affairs, and its mishandling of the French economy that has left the country weak and less able to conceive and pursue an independent foreign policy. A notable feature of contemporary foreign policy in the Atlantic system, then, is that economic issues have become a major source of tensions and are of particular significance to a left-wing French regime that stresses economic as well as military sources of international relations.

Socialist Foreign Policy

The twin pillars of regime success and legitimacy for the Gaullist Fifth Republic have been a presidential-centered constitutional order and a foreign policy model based on the principle of independence protected by a small but effective strategic nuclear force. During the 1960s, the French Socialists maintained strong reservations about the constitution and opposed most of Charles de Gaulle's foreign policy initiatives—the debilitating wound inflicted on European integration in 1965, the withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1966, and the creation of a nuclear force. By the end of the first dozen years of the Fifth Republic, however, the French Left had participated in two presidential campaigns and thereby accepted the constitution; during the 1970s, both Socialists and Communists perceived that they had to embrace the Gaullist foreign and security policy model to gain sufficient public support to take power in the national government.[3] The leftist parties were able to accept the Gaullist model because, rather than constituting a rigid prescription for particular policies, the framework of independence and grandeur is flexible and ambiguous enough to

Western Security (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1981). See also Edward A. Kolodziej, "French Security Policy: Decisions and Dilemmas," in Michel L. Martin, ed., "Defense and Military Institutions in Contemporary France," special issue of *Armed Forces and Society* (1982): 185–222.

[2] For an analysis of the Gaullist model for French foreign and security policy, see Michael M. Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

[3] On this period, see Michael M. Harrison, "A Socialist Foreign Policy for France?" *Orbis* (1976): 1471–89; and a subsequent analysis in idem, "Consensus, Confusion, and Confrontation in France: The Left in Search of a Defense Policy," in William G. Andrews and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *The Fifth Republic at Twenty* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981).

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permit the Left as well as the Right to adapt it to suit special political and ideological concerns.

The Left's reconciliation to the Gaullist security legacy was awkward and at times painful, particularly for parties long accustomed to a simplistic posturing on issues betraying confused priorities and even some duplicity in debates within or between political parties. Nevertheless, by the 1981 elections, the Left's conversion was credible enough that foreign policy and security issues played almost no role in the campaigns, signifying that an important national consensus had been established around the Gaullist model. Indeed, to the extent that Valéry Giscard d'Estaing appeared weak and indecisive in the face of a growing East-West security crisis, the incumbent failed to measure up to the Gaullist criterion of decisive presidential leadership in foreign affairs, while by 1981 François Mitterrand and the Socialist Party [PS] often seemed better representatives of Gaullist principles and aspirations for a proud and active France in the world. The foreign policy risks of letting the Socialists govern France (with a weakened Communist Party [PCF]) had disappeared, and a Socialist-led regime was perceived by many as the vehicle for reviving France's international stature as well as its domestic economic vitality.[4]

The economic record during the first two years of Mitterrand's presidency has not confirmed such expectations, and the mixed foreign policy performance raises serious questions about the vision and competence of the Socialist government.[5] Apart from problems of substance discussed below, part of the disarray in both domestic and foreign policy can be traced to a new Socialist style of policymaking that has altered the process even if the Gaullist structure and symbols have been left intact. During the twenty-three years of center-right rule under the Fifth Republic, the principle of foreign policy authority centralized in the presidential domain remained essentially unchallenged, so that Georges Pompidou and Giscard maintained de Gaulle's tradition of tight personal power over defense as well as foreign affairs. In this context, the election of Mitterrand as president supported by an absolute majority in the National Assembly was significant beyond the fact that an ostensibly radical-left Socialist Party with distinctive domestic and foreign policy perspectives took power after so many years of center-right rule. This change of power also inaugurated a new style of decision-making that reflected the idiosyncratic leadership pattern of the president, an unprecedented pluralism of influence from diverse cabinet positions and sources outside the government, and a more significant foreign policy influence for the Socialist Party, which has altered the Fifth Republic pattern

[4] For an analysis of French public opinion on foreign policy and related issues through the time of the 1981 elections, see Michael M. Harrison, "The Successor Generation, Social Change and New Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy in France," in Stephen Szabo, ed., *The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of the Postwar European Generations* (London: Butterworths, 1983), 17–41.

[5] For an informed negative assessment of the Socialist regime, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Year One," *New York Review of Books,* 12 August 1982, 37–43.

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under which the majority party or coalition has never played an important foreign policy role.

François Mitterrand himself is the key to understanding the current pattern of foreign-policy making in France, because the contradictions and ambiguities in policy often reflect the uncertain preferences and pluralist leadership style of the president. Rather than adhering to the standard of firm, coherent presidential authority cultivated by his predecessors, Mitterrand initially carried his more unfocused approach to leading the Socialist Party into the office of the presidency.[6] As the head of a factionalized party after 1971, and as the indispensable focal point of the Socialist-Communist alliance between 1972 and 1977, Mitterrand dominated the Left in France and held it together through a talent for ambiguity and calculated indecision, tactics used to reconcile or simply divert the clash of factions and viewpoints. This aloof and patrician Socialist has employed a similar technique at the Palais d'Elysée (the president's official residence), where he has allowed a cacophony of voices from his office, from a variety of ministries, and from Socialist Party circles openly to influence and even represent French foreign policy. For example, French policy in Africa and the Third World was marked by openly divergent views expounded by the cautious Quai d'Orsay (foreign ministry), the more radical and human rights-oriented Ministry of Development and Cooperation under Jean-Pierre Cot until late 1982, and the pragmatic Elysée adviser Guy Penne. The Franco-Mexican Declaration of 28 August 1981 in support of the Sandinist regime in Nicaragua was a notable example of the new pattern of foreign-policymaking in a sensitive area; vetoed by the Foreign Ministry, it was revived and awarded the presidential imprimatur through a cabal involving the Socialist Party international affairs bureau, the inclinations of Elysée expert Regis Debray, and the influence of the president's wife.[7]

Mitterrand's tendency to listen to a variety of voices and allow them unprecedented public freedom means that there often seems to be no decisive individual or institution dominating and directing the foreign and security policy of France, even if the president retains formal authority and if the policies that finally emerge in each issue area doubtless reflect presidential priorities, and even if they are uncertain or diffident. Practice and institutional prerogatives in Fifth Republic France does, however, reveal that the president can reassert tight direction over foreign policy virtually at will. Indeed, by late 1982 there was less evident confusion in the government foreign policy line, partly because Mitterrand himself seemed to be tightening control by diverting policymaking to ses-

[6] On Mitterrand's history, see Franz-Oliver Giesbert, *François Mitterrand ou la tentation de l'histoire* (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1977). There is an abundant literature on the French Socialist Party; see, for example, Jean-François Bizot, *Au Parti des socialistes, plongée libre dans les courants d'un grand parti* (Paris: Grasset, 1975), and Neill Nugent and David Lowe, *The Left in France* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982).

[7] Information from anonymous interviews in Paris, France, in January 1982, and various press reports.

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sions of limited membership cabinet groups, the *conseils restreints* headed by the president. Such a development might remedy the defects of a leadership style that has preferred to encourage multiple and even contradictory voices and policies as a technique of placating, diverting, or seducing diverse domestic and foreign interests. During 1983, Mitterrand's personal direction of France's political-military actions in Chad and Lebanon seemed to confirm a reassertion of a more Gaullist-style presidential authority over French foreign policy, although his indecision during the March economic crisis and a steep decline in the president's public standing left the overall effect of such tactics in doubt.

A more obviously positive development for the foreign policy process under Mitterrand has been the generally beneficial role played by the Socialist Party itself.[8] This is the first time that a highly organized political party with a base of trained cadres has taken power under the Fifth Republic, and if the PS's preparation during the years in opposition has not visibly enhanced the government's competence in some ministries, there is a better record in foreign and particularly defense affairs. Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson's Quai d'Orsay has maintained a tradition of relying on the services of career personnel, many of whom have proven remarkably adept at securing influence within the new regime. Charles Hernu's Defense Ministry is more dominated by experts who were formed in the defense committee of the Socialist Party in opposition, but their high level of competence makes this one of the most effective *équipes* in the new government. Hernu himself is an especially secure and influential minister, because his political career has linked him closely to Mitterrand since the early 1960s and because he has guided the Socialist Party's defense policies since its formation in 1971.

With nearly all of its leaders and best experts lost to government ministries, the role of the effectiveness of the Socialist Part as a governing majority rather than an opposition has been in question since the victories of May and June 1981. In foreign policy and security affairs, however, the PS apparatus seems to be staking out a mission of responsible support for government policy while retaining something of the more radical image that characterized it in opposition and that is still significant to a number of militants. Rather than serving only as a transmission belt to explain and justify presidential policies, as has been the Fifth Republic norm, the PS has secured modest influence over the government's decision-making process; it presents a variation of government policy that is often to the left of the official line and, in some cases, may be considered an

[8] This development and the course of French politics in general contradicts the "decline of the parties" thesis popular among some social scientists during the 1970s. For an example of this confused approach, see Suzanne Berger, "Politics and Antipolitics in Western Europe in the Seventies," in "Looking for Euorpe," special issue of *Daedalus* 108 (1979): 27–50. For a more sensible and informed analysis of the French party system during this decade, see Frank L. Wilson, "The Revitalization of French Parties," *Comparative Politics* 10 (October 1977): 159–186, and idem, *French Political Parties under the Fifth Republic* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982).

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early sign of a change of mood or policy shift on the part of the regime.[9] The PS has a powerful spokesperson in Lionel Jospin, Mitterrand's successor as secretary-general in 1981 and his confidant, as well as his heir-apparent to the party. Jospin developed an expertise in foreign affairs and especially in Third World issues when he was responsible for these posts in the party secretariat, and as a close adviser to the president has been able to make his views heard at regular private meetings. After the loss of much talent to the ministries, Jospin's preoccupation has been to build up an expert staff in the Socialist Party selected for its competence rather than for its political purity. The PS has also been able to draw on the expanding staffs available to the Socialist majority in the National Assembly, many of whom do double duty in the assembly and the party.

In the three years since the Socialists came to power in France, the party has developed several kinds of internal and external roles related to foreign policy. First, the PS serves as a tool of domestic politics and propaganda—to explain foreign policy decisions to a sometimes disillusioned Socialist audience, to undermine currents of public opinion that might threaten government policy, and to criticize and isolate Communist Party positions. For example, with the rise of pacifist and neutralist sentiments throughout Europe, particularly in neighboring West Germany, the government has used the party to supplement its own campaign to counteract such tendencies in France and to support French as well as NATO plans for expanded nuclear weapons deployment. Sensitive to its own militants' susceptibility to anti-militarist, anti-nuclear, and pacifist ideals, the Socialist Party has been careful to cover its activism in favor of French and NATO rearmament plans with quite utopian schemes for general arms control and disarmament. Whereas the government has remained aloof from the current nuclear arms control discussions and uncommitted about future participation, the Socialist Party has produced an elaborate plan that goes beyond endorsing official policy of non-participation in current superpower negotiations.[10] It not only suggests outcomes that would be in France's strategic interest (such as prohibiting advances in anti-submarine warfare or anti-ballistic missile [ABM] deployment), it also indulges in speculation about the conditions for French participation in future negotiations among the five declared nuclear powers, which is a variation of government policy. Another useful Socialist tactic in this campaign has been to identify pacifist-neutralist activities with the openly pro-Soviet attitudes of the French Communist Party which, in conjunction with its labor union, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), has been the main source of support for the small neo-pacifist movement in France, and distinguished principally by its opposition to the deployment of American Pershing and Cruise missiles elsewhere in Europe.

A second and related pattern of Socialist Party foreign policy activity is pri-

[9] This information is from anonymous interviews conducted in Paris in 1982 and 1983, and from various press reports.

[10] See the pamphlet by the Parti socialiste, *Déclaration sur la Paix, la Securité, et le Désarmement,* texte adopté par le Bureau Exécutif du 25 Mai 1982.

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marily ideological—to camouflage government policies that are or seem incompatible with positions of the party while it was in opposition, and have to be justified according to ingrained Socialist ideals and rhetoric that the party cannot or will not discard. In particular, the Socialists have had to contend with charges from their own Left that Mitterrand's government has betrayed the party's ideals and aligned itself with the U.S. and international capitalist forces.[11] In reaction to such charges from Socialists as well as Communists, the PS leadership has explained that an apparent French alignment with the U.S.-led Western bloc is only a temporary adjustment to reality, because the Socialists' fundamental aims remain intact—"gradual transformation of the international system sought by so many other countries, who want to liberate themselves from the logic of the bloc system. . . ."[12] This argument was developed early in the life of the new Socialist regime, when PS Secretary-General Jospin warned against setting too much stock in the apparent pro-American "tilt" of the Mitterrand administration. He insisted that the Socialists were not endorsing Atlanticism and, instead, remained determined to work toward the party's goal of dissolving military alliances in both East and West.[13]

The third and quite innovative foreign policy role of the Socialist Party is to anticipate possible government policy, test domestic and foreign responses, act as a barometer for possible shifts in policy, and even carry on semi-independent policies as a separate but coordinated arm of the state. In Western Europe, perhaps only the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) had a foreign policy role of equal significance and even greater independence from its government, to the point of undermining Bonn's own policy preferences under Helmut Schmidt. Until 1983, the more disciplined though still factionalized French Socialist Party seemed unlikely to develop such autonomy or tolerate an obstreperous left wing, however, so that most PS foreign policy activities could be considered complementary to official efforts. In this regard, then, the PS has been used by the government as a vehicle for maintaining contacts and exchanging information with radical movements in the Third World, particularly in Africa and Latin America in cases where foreign ministry contacts would be awkward or embarrassing.[14]

Despite some tensions over the state of French relations with semi-authoritarian African regimes, there is no doubt that government and party actions are closely coordinated in these areas, so that France has become the Western country with the most flexible and informed system for monitoring and,

[11] See, for example, an article published in the journal of CERES: Pierre Luc Seguillon, "Les Cent Premiers Jours de la diplomatie socialiste," *Non! Repères pour le socialisme,* no. 9 (September-October 1981), 17–36.

[12] From the Socialist Party motion passed at the Congress of Valence in October 1981, printed in *Le Poing et la Rose*, no. 95, (October 1981).

[13] *Le Monde*, 4 June 1981.

[14] See Jacques Huntzinger, "La Politique extérieure du Parti socialiste," *Politique étrangère* 47 (1982): 44.

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probably, for understanding developments in many unstable parts of the Third World. Also, as a more open arm of the government, the PS remains active in Socialist International circles, where it has reflected the French administration's distress over the rise of pacifism in Western Europe and, particularly, in West Germany. Thus, in a curious alliance situation, the PS worked with the Paris and Bonn socialist governments to counteract the pacifism of the SPD and other European socialist parties, and has modified the policies of the Socialist International to reflect French hard-line attitudes on the growth of the Soviet SS-20 missile threat to Western security.

Finally, some Socialist Party statements and positions seem to anticipate shifts in government attitude or policy, although it may be difficult to distinguish this role from the party's function as a representative of left-wing ideological priorities. In the case of Franco-American relations, the Socialist Party has often reflected high-level reservations about the pro-American line of the government, and expressed official disillusionment with the meager results of the Paris-Washington axis well before it began to unravel after the unsuccessful Versailles summit of June 1982. The Socialist Party critique of the United States, published in the early spring of 1982, went far beyond emerging government disappointment to label the United States a country that "has never been able to conceive of any international grand designs except containment, and incapable of defining, by itself, a coherent political line."[15] Such statements reflected private French government attitudes towards what Paris viewed as the simple-minded foreign policy of the Reagan administration and were an acknowledgment of the domestic constraints against the development of an unreservedly Atlanticist French foreign policy. Apart from the important substantive implications of this particular development, it confirms that the policymaking process in Socialist France has been transformed from a state- and presidentially-controlled system into a somewhat looser, more pluralistic one where diversified actors in and out of government play a variety of important roles and provide sometimes bewildering signals that complicate the task of interpreting and predicting French foreign policy today.

The Reluctant Atlantic Ally

The fulcrum of the security policy of any postwar French government has been its relationship with the United States and the principal institution linking European-American security interests, the Atlantic Alliance. What the French Atlantic relationship is at any particular time largely organizes French policy on East-West issues and relations with the Soviet Union, in the West European arena itself, and even in the Third World, where France is the most influential Western power after the United States. There is a clear pattern to French Atlantic relations that is common to the Fourth Republic and to all presidential terms after

[15] Ibid., 35.

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1958. After an initial period of entente and uneasy cooperation based on misguided expectations and a superficial convergence of policies, there is a gradual escalation of tensions that often produces an extended crisis based on fundamentally divergent national perspectives and interests. In all past cases, France has not been strong enough to do more than frustrate American designs and act independently as a result of the ensuing crises. In particular, France has been unable to transform the Atlantic and European security system and create a structure more compatible with French (and perhaps European) interests in the long run.[16] For Mitterrand's France, this pattern may yet emerge, but French Atlantic policy under the Socialists has been characterized primarily by accommodation—by often contradictory and confused perspectives, priorities, and policies; and by a preoccupation with economics rather than security affairs on the part of the leadership of a country that was steadily weakening up to mid-1983.

French Socialist attitudes towards the United States and the Atlantic Alliance have undergone an erratic evolution since the period of the Fourth Republic, when the Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO) was one of the most Atlanticist parties in France and remained this way until the late 1960s, when it tacitly accepted the Gaullist design for independence from NATO and for restricted membership in the political Atlantic Alliance itself. At the time of the 1971 transformation of the decaying SFIO into the more left-wing Parti Socialiste led by François Mitterrand and allied with the Communist Party, the Socialists adopted a Marxist analysis of international relations that denigrated the importance of political-military threats (such as the Soviet one) and focused attention on the dangers of international capitalism led by states such as the United States and West Germany.[17] This ideological aversion to the American Atlantic order, in either its military or economic guises, persisted in the rhetoric of the party and its leadership until 1977, when there was a moderation due to the rupture with the Communists and a growing Socialist realization that they would have to work for their distinctive socioeconomic goals within rather than against an international capitalist order dominated by the U.S.[18]

The primary indication of this new pragmatism came in the form of limited Socialist approval for the Alliance connection. By the time of an important Socialist Party meeting on security policy in January 1978, the Socialists were rejecting a breach with the Western economic or security orders, and insisted that in the event of a clear aggression against its allies a Socialist France would fulfill its obligations under both the Brussels and North Atlantic treaties. Voicing a newly discovered enthusiasm for the Atlantic security connection, Mitterrand cited with approval the Gaullist precedent of maintaining basic Atlantic ties; he even insisted that "the Americans ought to know that we will be loyal allies, if

[16] This is a thesis developed in Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally.*

[17] See Richard Gombin, "Le Parti socialiste et la politique étrangère," *Politique étrangère* 42 (1977): 199–212.

[18] See Harrison, "Consensus, Confusion, and Confrontation in France."

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there is a war and if this war is provoked by the desires of outside powers."[19] The French Socialist reconciliation with the United States and the Atlantic Alliance was also based on a convergence of views about the Soviet military threat in Europe that distinguished the Socialists in opposition from Giscard d'Estaing's complacency. This has been the most stable and consistent point of agreement between Mitterrand's Socialist France and Ronald Reagan's conservative United States, sustaining a bilateral entente despite incompatible socioeconomic ideologies and policies as well as openly divergent attitudes toward political and economic developments in the Third World.

Mitterrand's Socialist Party had not always been so sensitive to Soviet military power in Europe, and before 1977 was reluctant to confront the issue because of the apparent success of détente, because of the overt pro-Soviet attitudes of their own French Communist allies, and because of the Socialists' own preoccupation with instruments of economic penetration in the West that naturally diverted attention from any Eastern military menace. By late 1977, however, the Party's *bureau exécutif* had reacted to new internal and international situations and was able to agree on a defense platform citing the Soviet Union as the only power to conduct military actions in Europe since the end of World War II. By 1980—in contrast to slavish Communist Party support for Soviet interventions and Giscard's diffidence on the issue—Socialist leaders were openly condemning the occupation of Afghanistan, as well as the growth of Soviet military strength aimed at Western Europe.

The strong Socialist stand against the deployment of SS-20 missiles in the western USSR dates from late 1979, when the Socialists remained aloof from a PCF-sponsored National Assembly motion censuring the NATO decision to deploy 108 Pershing-2 missiles and 462 cruise missiles after 1983. Although Mitterrand refused to support a NATO decision that did not openly involve France, he was critical of the Soviets and noted: "It seems to me that the United States has been able to preserve a worldwide [military] superiority but, in Europe, Soviet superiority is established."[20] After taking office, Mitterrand and his ministers adopted one of the firmest allied positions and urged the West to deploy its weapons unless the Soviets agreed to withdraw theirs. This stand was clearly in France's national interest as well as the interests of the United States and NATO, because SS-20 precision and multiple warhead capability directly threatened French strategic and industrial targets along with those in the rest of Western Europe.

The partial convergence of French and American national interests was expanded into the image of a comprehensive entente during the summer of 1981, not only because both governments wanted to stress the grounds for partnership rather than discord, but also because each side misunderstood the nature of the other's Eastern policy. For the Reagan administration, the theater nuclear force

[19] Quoted in *Le Monde*, 10 January 1978.
[20] *Le Monde*, 22 December 1979.

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policy is only one aspect of a bipolar vision of the world in which the Soviet Union is a permanent rival and an enemy that must be contained, weakened, perhaps even destabilized and rolled-back by comprehensive military, political, and economic measures. Allies of the U.S. are expected to acquiesce, if not cooperate.[21]

The French Socialist perspective on the Soviet Union and the East-West struggle bears little resemblance to this conservative American one. France's Socialists can scarcely be accused of complacency towards the Soviet Union and its Communist allies in France, having struggled against them for sixty years domestically as well as internationally. Nevertheless, the Socialist Party and Mitterrand himself have always been ambivalent on the issue of a Soviet threat to France, generally limiting their perception of it to military capabilities that were considered to be of secondary importance to the American economic threat.[22] Indeed, only a year before his election as president, Mitterrand insisted that the need for more resolute French measures against Soviet misbehavior did not undermine his enduring belief in "the necessity of friendship and good relations between the USSR and France," which he felt were "indispensable to the European balance."[23]

The Socialist government's Soviet policy has reflected a careful and balanced acknowledgment of any new Soviet threat to France and the West. The SS-20 deployment was judged calmly as a move that destabilized the military balance in Europe (not on a global level) and had to be dealt with pragmatically, either by eliminating the newly established Soviet superiority or by bringing the West up to a level that would restore the European theater balance.[24] Although French policy was presented in the context of Western solidarity against Soviet efforts to divide the security interests of the United States and Western Europe, there was no indication that Paris contemplated going beyond specific measures such as an enhanced Western defense posture and eschewing high level political contacts with the Soviet Union in response to its occupation of Afghanistan.[25] Following the imposition of martial law in Poland, France was second to none in its rhetorical condemnation, but after prolonged and intense debates within the government, it decided in January 1982 to avoid pursuing economic sanctions against the Soviet Union or the East bloc. This was, as Mitterrand later explained, because France had "no reason at all to join in any sort of economic blockade against the Soviet Union, because it comes down to an act of war and we should do all we can to prevent war."[26] Finally, French East-West policy has

[21] For an analysis of the international perspectives of the Reagan administration, see Michael M. Harrison, "Reagan's World," *Foreign Policy*, no. 43 (Summer 1981): 3–16.

[22] See François Mitterrand, *Ici et maintenant* (Paris: Fayard, 1980), ch. 6, esp. p. 252.

[23] Ibid., 236.

[24] See, for example, Mitterrand's interview in *Stern* printed in *Le Monde*, 9 July 1981.

[25] See the interview with Claude Cheysson, *Le Monde*, 2 December 1981.

[26] Quoted in an interview in the Greek daily *Ta Nea*, quoted in *News and Comments from France* (vol. 82, no. 35), French Press and Information Service, New York, 3 September 1982.

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been shaped as much by concern over the possibility of a weaker West German attachment to the West as by fear of growing Soviet strength, after the German public and elements in the Social Democratic party and the Greens reacted to the missile debate by flirting with pacifism and neutralism. During a period of rising East-West tensions and the continued absence of a West European alternative to the eroding Atlantic connection, Mitterrand judged it expedient for France to help shore up the Alliance by presenting the Germans with a lesson in responsible attention to security problems, while urging them to make their own effort in the NATO context.

Adhering to the Gaullist prescription for adjusting to shifts in East-West relations from a position of military strength, the Socialists have also conformed to Fifth Republic precedents by pursuing a strategy of wary cooperation with the United States and the Atlantic Alliance on the basis of complex and even contradictory motives. The favorable French Socialist posture toward the U.S. and an Alliance that is tolerated but not loved has been exaggerated and even misrepresented on both sides of the Atlantic, because of the priority given to short-term political tactics that favor the status quo. In Washington, the conservative Reagan forces welcomed France's firmer anti-Soviet line as a relief from the annoying and diffident Giscard as well as from the evasive West Germans, who under the Social Democrats were widely perceived as aspiring to the traditional Gaullist role of mediator between East and West. For their part, the French were delighted to find a relatively easy way to placate the Americans and to dampen Washington's initial hysteria over the presence of Communist ministers in Paris and a way to shore up an eroding U.S.-European security connection that was deemed important for French as well as European security interests.

Despite the considerations that lend a definite "Atlanticist" air to French socialist security policy, the significance of this development remains in doubt because of persistent Socialist ambivalence and even hostility toward both the United States and the Alliance, an attitude that coexists uneasily with a formal policy of accommodation. The paradoxical French Socialist perspective on the American connection is best represented by Mitterrand himself, whose pro-Alliance views dating from 1981 are inconsistent with statements made in 1980 shortly before his election, when he asserted that he was "no more attached to the Atlantic Alliance than a Rumanian or a Pole is to the Warsaw Pact," and that he "would be satisfied with a situation which would render" the Alliance "defunct"—particularly since it was based on "a fiction" of an American intervention in Europe in the case of Soviet aggression.[27] The Socialist Party had also continued to adhere to its Marxist program and the thesis that American-led capitalist economic threats to French national welfare are more significant than military ones, a view that betrays the attitude of many Socialist elites, even if it is not a successful guideline for policy.[28] Mitterrand himself reaffirmed this logic

[27] Mitterrand, *Ici et maintenant*, 241–42.

[28] See the program approved by the party in 1980: *Projet socialiste* (Paris: Club socialiste du livre, 1980).

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in an interview in mid-1980, when he placed the Soviet military menace in second rank to American economic imperialism, which he contended was a threat to French economic independence capable of "reducing us more surely to nothing, and at less cost to the aggressor than a hypothetical bomb on the Plateau d'Albion."[29] The U.S. was, according to Mitterrand, a power that "has not ceased to carry on an economic war against us," so that "the imperialism of this country requires a great deal of vigilance on our part and justifies our precautions."[30]

This caustic but frank perspective has not been an obvious feature of the Socialists in power after May 1981, partly because their truce with the U.S. was based on the hope that French cooperation in the security arena would bring American concessions in the economic one, where significant problems were anticipated and soon erupted. Mitterrand was explicit on this point in July 1981, when he exposed an Atlantic linkage doctrine, contending that allies "cannot wish for more political and military homogeneity in the Atlantic Alliance and still indulge in self-centered behavior in economic affairs."[31] Mitterrand's conciliatory Atlantic posture failed to produce any such American concessions, however, while France's economic debilitation under the Socialists meant that Paris became a *demandeur* in the West and was forced to submit to international constraints rather than bargain with its partners. The French government's concern for the problem of maintaining Western unity in the face of growing Soviet military power has also discouraged any sustained outbreak of resentment and bitterness at the failure to transform security cooperation into economic concessions. Nevertheless, Socialist attitudes toward the U.S. and the Alliance—including those of Mitterrand himself—are so contradictory and pliable that this curious entente must also be considered a fragile one, subject to the periodic breakdowns and profound tensions that have characterized the postwar Franco-American relationship.

Defense Policy for a Gallo-Socialist France

The symbolic and substantive core of de Gaulle's legacy is the Force nucléaire stratégique (FNS) and a set of strategic guidelines maintaining French independence from American and NATO defense plans. The French Left's adherence to this framework for Fifth Republic defense policy is an important test of the continuing value of the Gaullist legacy and, in the absence of a coherent foreign policy, may be a more reliable indication of the Socialist government's intentions and future policies regarding Atlantic and European security issues. However ambivalent and even contradictory French foreign policy seems, Fifth Republic defense policy and strategy have usually betrayed the preferred foreign policy options of successive governments. Since taking power in the spring of 1981, the Socialists have confirmed the support for Fifth Republic defense policy that they

[29] Mitterrand, *Ici et maintenant*, 252.
[30] Ibid., 233.
[31] *Le Monde*, 2 July 1981.

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developed during the 1970s, and have even moved toward the most classic kind of Gaullist posture in reaction to some deviations under Giscard d'Estaing. The Socialists have also followed de Gaulle's tactic of holding out a European defense option as a theoretical alternative to Western Europe's perpetually unsatisfactory reliance on an American-dominated NATO. The principal concern raised by the first two years of Socialist rule was that economic weakness would debilitate France's defense system along with its international power in general.

In the spring of 1981, the Socialists inherited responsibility for a triad of nuclear weapons systems based on the original Gaullist design of the 1960s.[32] The oldest component is some thirty-six aging Mirage-IV aircraft dispersed over seven bases. The second component of the FNS consists of eighteen S-2 IRBMs (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) grouped in two squadrons at hardened sites set amidst the lavender fields of the Plateau d'Albion in Haute-Provence. The third and most important part, designated as the Force océanique stratégique, are the five missile-launching nuclear submarines now in service. A submarine is equipped with sixteen missiles, each with a range of 3,300 kilometers and armed with a one-megaton thermonuclear warhead. Plans for modernization called for all but the first submarine to receive MRV-type M.4 missiles with a range of 4,000 kilometers and six warheads of 150 kilotons each. French land and air forces are also equipped with the Pluton tactical nuclear weapons, due to be replaced in the early 1990s with the more advanced long-range Hades system. Giscard's most controversial policies in this domain were a shift in budgetary priorities to favor conventional force development over improvements in the nuclear force, and a failure to approve construction of the sixth nuclear submarine until September 1978, which meant that it could not enter service before 1985.

Since taking control of the government, the Socialists have confirmed existing plans for modernizing and expanding France's nuclear armory and have shifted force development plans to favor nuclear over conventional forces. One of Mitterrand's earliest decisions as president (in July 1981) was to approve the construction of a seventh missile-launching submarine to enter service by 1994. Later, at an important meeting of the presidential defense council on 30 October 1981, Mitterrand decided to go ahead with plans initiated under Giscard to create a mobile land-based IRBM force, to proceed with development of the Hades tactical nuclear weapon, and, instead of scuttling the Mirage-IV force, to keep fifteen planes in service after 1985 and equip them with advanced air-to-ground medium-range nuclear missiles enhancing the penetration capability of this attack system. The Socialist attention to defense and military security was also reflected in the government's first defense budget, for 1982, which increased defense spending by 17.63 percent over 1981, amounting to a planned 4 percent real

[32] For a discussion of the development of the French nuclear force, see Wilfrid L. Kohl, *French Nuclear Diplomacy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971); and Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally.*

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increase after accounting for inflation. Defense was to account for 3.89 percent of France's gross national product (GNP) in 1982, and this figure was to be increased to 3.94 percent for the 1983 budget.

These intentions were, however, undermined by the deterioration in France's economic strength by mid-1982, so that defense spending became a principal victim of the selective austerity measures announced for the 1983 state budget. Rather than continuing to grow in real terms, the projected 1983 defense expenditure of 133.2 billion francs (excluding pensions) represented only an 8.43 percent increase over 1982, whereas the entire budget grew by 11.8 percent (with an inflation rate of about 9.2 percent). The firm Socialist emphasis on the nuclear force means that nuclear weapons development is favored over conventional force training and equipment, so at least this crucial element of the Gaullist security system was safeguarded from the defense austerity measures. After the hiatus of 1983, however, the very austerity-minded budget for 1984 restored the priority accorded military spending, since the planned defense budget of 142.1 billion francs (an increase of 6.66 percent) represented the only significant real increase in a major budget category after inflation (projected at 6.1 percent).[33]

Along with force development plans, a useful test of Socialist intentions is their strategic guidelines for using French defense forces in the event of a European conflict. Gaullist doctrine developed during the 1960s relied on the strategic arguments of General Pierre Gallois, who justified the FNS as a "proportional deterrent" capable of preventing aggression by a stronger power because of the credible threat of nuclear retaliation for any attack on French soil, conventional or nuclear. In practical terms, French nuclear doctrine also relied on General André Beaufre's multilateral deterrence theory, which held that a small but independent nuclear force could deter an attack mainly because of the threat that it might trigger a devastating nuclear escalation through its links with the nuclear forces of an allied superpower. Finally, Gaullist strategy also stressed the nuclear force's utility as arm of neutrality and noninvolvement if a French government were to decide against entering an armed conflict that did not directly involve France's own national interests.[34]

De Gaulle's successors generally adhered to these sacrosanct guidelines for French defense policy and deterrence strategy, but under Giscard there were controversial modifications in some strategic guidelines that indicated an evolution away from a strict French nuclear sanctuary approach toward the so-called "extended sanctuary" doctrine favoring early and extended participation by French conventional and tactical nuclear forces on West German soil, prior to an attack

[33] Within the defense budget, spending on new conventional equipment was to rise to 9.3 percent in 1984, while the favored nuclear force saw a 15.5 percent increase in authorizations (long-term spending) and a 12.6 percent increase in allocations. Defense budget figures from *Le Monde*, 5–6 September 1982; *New York Times*, 5 September 1982; *Le Monde*, 11 October 1983; and the Ministère de la Défense, Service d'information et de relations publiques des armées, *Presentation of the 1984 Defense Budget Bill by Mr. Charles Hernu, Minister of Defense* (Paris, n. d.).

[34] See Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally*, esp. ch. 2 and 4.

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on French soil that would trigger the strategic deterrent itself. Although the basic French political freedom to decide whether to fight alongside allies or stand aside remained intact, Giscard's policies represented an obvious step in the direction of NATO flexible response guidelines, and many in France came to fear that the country's defense autonomy from the United States and NATO, the crux of De Gaulle's security legacy, might be in jeopardy.

All of France's political forces except Giscard's loose centrist coalition, with its strong Atlanticist leanings, were critical of these strategic developments after 1975. The Socialists were particularly insistent that France should return to the Gaullist emphasis on absolute national deterrence and a "sanctuarization" of French territory, to reduce the likelihood of involvement in extended conventional or tactical nuclear actions on German territory under the aegis of NATO. Once in power, the Socialists seem to have adopted a "dual track" strategy toward the problem of reconciling their impulse to accommodate the U.S. and the Alliance with their preference for returning to more doctrinaire Gaullist strategic policies. On the one hand, they have reinforced Giscard's favorable political attitude toward the alliance as part of the campaign to convince the United States that a Socialist France can be a reliable partner. The approach continues to be the hallmark of Socialist government rhetoric. As late as June 1982, when Franco-American relations were noticeably deteriorating, Mitterrand was still able to praise the Atlantic Alliance, calling it, along with the FNS, one of France's "two pillars of security."[35] The French president also felt comfortable enough to break tradition and attend a June 1982 Alliance dinner held for heads of state in Bonn, to have Premier Pierre Mauroy attend a working meeting of heads of state or government, and invite the Alliance leaders to meet in Paris for the spring 1983 session. Although important in terms of political symbolism, such developments were easily within the parameters of the Gaullist design for continued membership in the Alliance, and by 1983 represented only a French acknowledgment of the obvious utility the Alliance continues to have as a guarantee of French security, despite quarrels with the United States.

In the long run, however, it may be more significant that France's Socialist rulers have renounced Giscard's innovations in strategy and have circumscribed possible military collaboration with NATO along American guidelines. Leading French Socialist officials have been especially careful to reestablish France's autonomy of decision as the key to their military policy. As Chief of Staff Jeannou Lacaze said in September 1981, "the first goal [is] to safeguard, in all circumstances, our complete freedom of decision and assessment so that our country cannot be automatically engaged in a conflict in which we would not feel involved."[36] Directly refuting the strategic orientation of Giscard, General Lacaze

[35] François Mitterrand, press conference of June 9 reprinted in *Le Monde*, 11 June 1982.

[36] Jeannou Lacaze, "La Politique militaire," *Défense nationale* 37 (November 1981): 9. Lacaze was merely repeating Defense Minister Hernu's words of July 1981: "We have to preserve [within the Atlantic Alliance] our freedom of decision, to avoid becoming automatically engaged in a conflict that we would not want to pursue." Interview in *Le Monde*, 11 July 1981.

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stated that France's status as a "sure and loyal ally" of the U.S. was strictly limited to non-nuclear forces. The subsequent announcement of the creation of a Rapid Action Force for use outside national territory had adhered to this criterion and has kept France uncommitted to a "forward battle" position, although it has confused the issue by enhancing the general prospects for joint French-NATO conventional military actions against Soviet troops far to the East of the Rhine.[37]

As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, however, the Socialists have stood firm against American-NATO strategy, as well as Giscardian doctrine, by refusing to allow tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) to be considered potential instruments of battle used separately from strategic weapons. French TNWs can now be employed only as a sudden, massive political signal, and not as part of an extended conventional-tactical nuclear graduated response scenario favored by American and NATO plans. This is also the explicit rationale lying behind the Socialist decision to continue to develop, and doubtless produce, a neutron bomb, which Mitterrand has indicated will not draw France into a "forward battle" philosophy, but rather will serve to keep France in the forefront of military technology and help to counter the Soviet arms advantage in Europe.[38]

Although Mitterrand is adhering to the Gaullist pattern of reliance on a national nuclear force and restrained military cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance, all Fifth Republic leaders have also entertained various options—up to now hypothetical—as alternatives to this most practical and accessible security policy. One, a policy of détente and a Franco-Soviet arrangement to control Germany, scarcely seems feasible for the coming decade. Two other traditional options for France have been to propose a general revision of the entire Alliance framework, or to attempt to create a West European defense system somehow linked to the United States. French attempts to reorganize the Alliance were prominent even during the Fourth Republic and achieved great notoriety with de Gaulle's 1958 Memorandum calling for a tripartite Alliance directorate.[39] De Gaulle's failure to get very far with his idea has reinforced French skepticism about the possibility of inducing the Americans to entertain serious changes in the Atlantic Alliance that might suit the interests of Paris or of West Europeans generally.

François Mitterrand did vaguely consider this notion before his 1981 election, and one of the few foreign policy commitments in his campaign platform was to press for a "clear definition of the scope and content of the Atlantic Alliance," along with an "increased cohesion of Europe."[40] The previous year, Mitterrand

[37] On this development, see the speech by Lacaze, "Politique de défense et la stratégie militaire de la France," reported in *Le Monde*, 31 May 1983 and printed in *Défense Nationale* 39 (June 1983): 11–30; the interview with Charles Hernu in *Le Monde*, 22 April 1983; and the report in *Le Monde*, 25 October 1983.

[38] See Mitterrand's press conference of 9 June 1982, in *Le Monde*, 11 June 1982.

[39] On de Gaulle's widely misunderstood 1958 initiative, see Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally*, 86–101.

[40] No. 106 of Mitterrand's "110 Propositions pour la France" (pamphlet), the Socialist presidential election manifesto approved at the party convention that nominated Mitterrand, on 24 January 1981 at Creteil, France.

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had complained that the Alliance lacked "substance" and indicated that he wanted to examine the possibility of moving beyond the vague commitments of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 to redefine the reciprocal obligations among allies and the treaty's "degree of authenticity."[41] After the spring 1981 elections, there were hints from Paris that this vague ambition would be clarified with more precise suggestions or proposals. As late as March 1982, Mitterrand could still "hope that this alliance can be more coherent," but had to admit that "there are no real plans, no preliminary negotiations." With disillusionment as well as resignation, he added that the Alliance "is not a living alliance. It is being pulled apart all the time."[42] By 1983, it was clear that the French Socialists had never had any clear idea of how to revitalize the Alliance, and, moreover, their preoccupation with economic problems guaranteed that no effort would be forthcoming in a period when shoring up the status quo had to take precedence over creative innovation.

The final option of creating a framework for West European political-military collaboration has been a subtle but persistent leitmotif of French diplomacy since the early 1950s and the European Defense Community debate. Under the Fifth Republic, this idea has surfaced primarily in the context of French attempts to present an alternative to military dependence on the United States, particularly when it has seemed that West Germany might be tempted to shift from an Atlantic to a more exclusively West European security arrangement. The French socialists did not pay much attention to the hypothetical possibility of European military cooperation while embracing the Gaullist model during the 1970s, but a pro-European minority within the party did keep the notion alive. It became a secondary feature of Socialist diplomacy after the spring of 1981 for two reasons: first, the Gaullist one of maintaining a theoretical alternative to Western Europe's perpetually unsatisfactory dependence on NATO; second, a strategy reminiscent of the Fourth Republic, trying to keep the German Federal Republic anchored in a Western Europe that might also have a military dimension at a time when the German public seemed tempted by alarming pacifist and neutralist chimeras.

A possible revival of a European defense cooperation has not been a consistent or prominent aspect of French Socialist diplomacy, but it has surfaced with enough regularity to confirm that key advisers in both the defense and foreign affairs ministries want to keep it alive for more serious efforts in the future. Sporadic French references to a possible revival of defense cooperation on a West European scale received a major impulse in October 1982, when François Mitterrand and West Germany's new chancellor, Helmut Kohl, made bilateral military discussions the focus of their first summit meeting and something of a benchmark for future Franco-German cooperation. The two leaders decided to revive and intensify their defense discussions under the 1963 Franco-German Treaty of

[41] Mitterrand, *Ici et maintenant*, 232.
[42] *Le Monde*, 15 March 1982.

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Cooperation, and particularly to discuss the implications of France's development of the new, longer-range Hades tactical nuclear weapon and a neutron bomb, both of which would affect their joint security interests. French sources left no doubt that they harbored hopes that discussions might lay the groundwork for a European defense system more independent of NATO and the United States.[43] For the foreseeable future, however, Socialist France seems unlikely to engage in a major foreign policy effort to transform the Atlantic system because of the preoccupation with redressing an acute national economic crisis largely instigated by government mismanagement.

Economic Disarray in France and Atlantic Tensions

One source of confusion about the priorities of the French Socialists in power is the failure to appreciate the primacy they accord economic aims, especially industrial and technological modernization, in their overall domestic and foreign policy. Since May 1981, the accommodating and even diffident Atlantic security policies of the French Socialists can be traced in part to their preoccupation with an audacious domestic economic program and their determination to rebuild France's international economic independence. The "econocentric" nature of the regime has meant that the most serious Franco-American tensions have arisen over issues in this arena, and that foreign policy conflicts emerging within the French Left during three years in power were essentially over the nature of concessions made to international economic constraints at the expense of domestic Socialists aims. Such debates intensified during 1983 because the first two years of Socialist economic experimentation had been nearly disastrous, dramatically weakening the country's economy and its international position, guaranteeing that the Socialists would have to spend many of their remaining years in office recovering from their own economic mistakes.

The Mitterrand economic program and its consequences cannot be described in detail here. In the long run, the most significant aspect of the Socialist economic program may be an audacious industrial policy and the nationalization of some of France's largest industrial groups and most of the banking sector—part of the strategy of augmenting the state's leverage in both the domestic and international economic environments. In the short term, however, the moves that had the most immediate effect on the French economy were the standard Keynesian "pump-priming" measures to increase consumer income and spending taken in the first months of Socialist rule, such as increases in family allowances, old age pensions, and the minimum wage.[44] By the end of the first year of Mitter-

[43] See reports in *Le Monde* for the period around 22 October 1982; and in the *Washington Post* 22–23 October 1982.

[44] Much of the following discussion is based on information provided in *Bilan economique et social 1981: Nouvelles Données* (Paris: Supplément aux dossiers et documents du monde, January 1982); and, *Le Monde, Bilan économique et social 1982: Craquements* (Paris: Supplément aux dossiers et documents du monde, January 1983).

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rand's presidency, this package was a dramatic failure in terms of its effects on France's main economic indicators: the pattern of economic growth, investment and production activity, the inflation rate, and especially the country's international economic position. The only obvious benefit was a slow-down in the growth of unemployment in France, although even this accomplishment was tarnished by dubious statistics. Of course, the sudden infusion of 35 billion francs into the economy as a result of the 1981 social measures meant that private consumption (much of it aimed at imports) could increase by 2.3 percent during 1981, but the gross domestic product (GDP) grew only a scant .3 percent during the same year. By the first quarter of 1982, the GDP actually fell .1 percent, while subsequent growth in 1982 (1.5 percent for the year) was the result mostly of state-mandated wage increases and social payments, not of revived domestic production. Fears about the effects of the government program actually cut into a revival of industrial production, so that it fell during the fourth quarter of 1981, after three quarters of gradual increases.

Domestic private investment reflected the decline in output and did not expand during 1981 or 1982 because of the uncertain economic climate, high interest rates, higher production costs due to a weak franc, and obligatory increases in wages and social benefits. During 1981, overall investment in France fell 12.5 percent in volume, or 1.3 percent in value, compared with three previous years of continuous increases. With more money in France chasing a stagnant amount of domestic goods and ever-more expensive imports, the inflation rate naturally edged up, reaching 14.1 percent for 1981 (versus 13.6 percent in 1980), remaining near the 14 percent annual level by April 1982, falling to 9.3 percent in October 1983 (only after four months of wage and price controls), and rebounding to 11.4 percent by January 1983. The strong underlying inflation rate in France made it a prominent exception to the general trend in Western economies, where the inflation rate fell in the United States and especially Japan during 1981 (to 10.2 percent and 4.1 percent, respectively) and continued to decline in 1982 (to 5.1 percent and 3.1 percent by October). Inflation remained moderate in important trading partners such as West Germany (6.7 percent for 1981, an annual rate of 4.9 percent by October 1982).

The most serious and eventually decisive misjudgment on the part of the Socialists was their attempt to launch and then sustain an expensive and expansionary domestic economic policy that contradicted the policies of France's major trading and financial partners in the capitalist West. Rather than any one of the domestic policies just mentioned, it was the cumulative effect of these policies in terms of trade deficits, losses of reserves, and the general lack of international confidence that forced the French government into three ever-stricter austerity moves that finally amounted to a virtual repudiation of the economic experiment launched in the summer of 1981. When the Socialists came to power in the spring of 1981, France's chronic trade deficit had been cut by the Raymond Barre government to the point where exports were exceeding imports by the first quarter of 1981. The Pierre Mauroy consumer-based recovery immediately

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reversed this trend, so that trade deficits mounted mercilessly quarter after quarter, to 9.5 and 10.5 billion francs in each of the last two quarters of 1981, and 16.1 billion and 22.7 billion francs in the first two quarters of 1982.[45] The 1980 net trade deficit of 55 billion francs remained virtually the same in 1981 because of the import surge in the final two quarters; it soared to an astounding 102.3 billion francs for 1982 and remained at the record level of 17.2 billion francs for the first two months of 1983 (corrected figures). The increase in French consumer demand was directly translated into a 27 percent increase in imports of household equipment during 1982, and a 40 percent increase in automobile imports. France's trade deficit with its most important partner, West Germany, increased by 38 percent during 1981, to a loss of $3.3 billion, and another 68.5 percent during 1982, or 15.9 billion francs more than in 1981. About one-half of this deficit could be attributed directly to the Mauroy consumer spending bonus, since during 1982 France imported 12 percent more consumer goods from West Germany than it sold there as a result of the 1.7 percent drop in demand in West Germany, versus the 3 percent increase in France.

The final and ultimately crucial development in this gloomy picture was the persistent loss in French capital reserves that weakened the franc and forced the beleaguered government to abandon its expansionary policy and adopt progressively stronger economic controls and austerity measures. Despite record high interest rates, international and domestic confidence in the franc was eroded by a program featuring unparalledled French foreign borrowing and deficit spending, an expansionary monetary policy to finance this deficit, and the deteriorating trade position just described. France's net loss of capital amounted to 33.34 billion francs during 1981, about triple the average in the preceding three years, while total reserves (minus gold) fell from $30.10 billion in the first quarter of 1981 to $15.18 billion by the second quarter of 1982 and $13.87 billion by August of 1982. Foreign exchange holdings fell from $27.76 billion in the first quarter of 1981 to $13.13 billion by the second quarter of 1982 and to $11.97 billion by August of 1982. The most visible symbol of this progressive decline in international confidence was the unrelenting fall of the franc after the spring of 1981—from 4.66 to the dollar in early 1981 to 5.55 at the time of the first devaluation in October 1981, to 6.80 at the second devaluation in June 1982, and to 7.23 at the third devaluation in March 1983—then falling to record lows of over 8.0 later in the spring. France's foreign borrowings naturally increased under this pressure. Although France's foreign debt position cannot be calculated with precision, the slow growth in medium- and long-term gross debt since 1973 accelerated rapidly under the Socialists, rising from 125 billion francs in 1980 to 185 billion in 1981 and 300 billion in 1982. By the end of 1982, France's foreign obligations amounted to about $50 billion, with $20 billion of this incurred during

[45] The sources for statistics cited here are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Economic Indicators and International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics, updated from other sources, such as *Le Monde*. Figures may vary according to the source and standards of measurement, but the trends indicated were confirmed in all studies.

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1982—making France the third-ranking annual international borrower after Brazil and Mexico.[46]

In reaction to these developments, the first in a series of moves toward austerity accompanied the 4 October 1981 devaluation, when the expansionist forces around Premier Mauroy acceded to pressure from Finance Minister Jacques Delors and the West Germany government, and froze 15 billion francs in planned 1982 social expenditures as a sign of their determination to hold down the rise in public spending. The October decision had little effect, however, because the austerity measures proved insignificant and the 1982 budget revealed that the government was continuing along its earlier path. Despite some anti-inflationary credit restrictions in February 1982, it was not until foreign pressure on the franc forced a second devaluation in June that the government was compelled to adopt a serious program that amounted to a partial repudiation of its initial economic policy. In its second phase program of "socialist rigor," the Socialist government adopted the priority goals of reducing the underlying inflation rate of 10 percent by November 1982 and of limiting the anticipated 1983 budget deficit to 3 percent of gross national product (GNP), or 124 billion francs.[47] One of the most drastic aspects of the new policy was the wage and price freeze that was in effect from June 11 through October 1982, while both wages and prices continued to be "regulated" through 1983 and beyond. The turnabout from an expansionary policy to relative austerity was confirmed in the government's plans for the 1983 budget, which at 881 billion francs represented a rise of only 11.8 percent over the 1982 budget, whereas the 1982 budget had amounted to an increase of 28 percent over 1981 spending. Although most of the budget categories suffered from cuts, the Socialists reasserted their intention to use the state as a vehicle of economic modernization by increasing government-sponsored research in technology and industrial development programs in 1983 by 28 percent over 1982, to 32.5 billion francs.[48]

A clearly chastened French government and its austerity program should have inspired a revival of international confidence, but doubts about Mitterrand's determination and his control over the domestic political situation meant that France's international position continued to erode and produced a crisis in March 1983, marked by a renewed run on the franc and bitter negotiations within the European Community that almost resulted in a French withdrawal from the European Monetary System. Instead, the franc was devalued for the third time in seventeen months, and France adopted one of the most severe austerity packages in the West just at a time when the Western economies were on the verge of a renewed growth cycle that, ironically, would exclude a Socialist France forced into penury by two years of economic mismanagement. Rein-

[46] *Le Monde*, 28 January 1983 and *L' Express*, 6–12 May 1983. The comparison refers only to annual borrowing levels. France's absolute debt level remained quite low by international standards; government debt amounted to only 2.6 percent of GDP in 1982 and 1.9 percent in 1981.

[47] These measures are described in *Le Monde*, 15 and 24 June 1983.

[48] *New York Times*, 2 September 1982, and *Financial Times*, 16 September 1982.

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forcing the restrictions of mid-1982, the March 1983 measures put absolute priority on the struggle against inflation through restraints on both private and public spending, and acknowledged that a restoration of the trade balance took precedence over the pursuit of social justice at home. Among the measures announced were a special 1 percent tax on income, a forced public loan amounting to 19 percent of 1982 income taxes, restrictions on tourist spending abroad, and reductions in public spending of all kinds. All in all, the package was expected to cut internal demand by nearly 2 percent during 1983, or by 65 billion francs.

The Socialist regime's conversion to an economic policy that was, in many respects, more conservative than anything attempted during the Barre-Giscard era was accompanied by a major government reshuffle that kept Pierre Mauroy in office but otherwise excluded the Socialist Party Left. This shift confirmed the victory of realist-internationalist forces around Jacques Delors at the expense of leftist-protectionist elements—probably a majority in the PS leadership—who would have preferred to safeguard the domestic experiment at the expense of an open, international, market-oriented economy. By the fall of 1983, the realists were proving successful in forcing France into a painful recovery from the consequences of their own initial ineptitude. Because of reduced domestic income, demand, investment, and inflation (about 9.3 percent in 1983), France's international position improved so that foreign borrowing slowed and exchange reserves reached a record level. The trade deficit of around 42 billion francs (preliminary figures) for 1983 represented a marked improvement over 1982, as the government exceeded its goal of holding the 1983 deficit to under 60 billion francs.[49] The price of this austerity was a decline in economic growth in 1983 (about 0.5 percent) and probably in 1984 as well, while France's consumers, taxpayers, and its growing number of unemployed faced gloomy prospects under "socialist rigor." The chastened France of 1983 proved unlikely terrain for a major political debate over the economy or, for that matter, over foreign policy. Thus, any anticipated challenge from the Left of the Socialist Party collapsed by the time of the national congress in October 1983. There was, however, no guarantee that Mitterrand's economic and foreign policy choices would remain firm or would continue to command either the grudging loyalty of the majority or the caustic assent of the opposition.

The domestic and international economic troubles experienced during the first two years of the Socialist regime not only weakened France, they also strained relations with its major political-economic partners, especially the United States. Indeed, the French tended to blame much of their economic dilemma on American policies, such as high interest rates and nonintervention in the foreign

[49] *Le Monde*, 19 January 1984. According to this method of calculation, France's trade deficit in 1982 was 93.3 billion francs and it had been 50.6 billion francs in 1981. The current account deficit was 33 billion francs in 1983 (preliminary figures), 79 billion francs in 1982, and 25.8 billion francs in 1981. The estimates for 1983 indicate that imports grew only 5.7 percent over 1982 whereas they had increased by 15.2 percent between 1981 and 1982. Exports, however, grew by 14.6 percent in 1983 whereas they had gone up only 9.3 percent in 1982.

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exchange market, a perspective that found support in Washington's clumsy attempt to sabotage the planned Soviet-West European gas pipeline with unilaterally imposed sanctions. The pipeline affair exacerbated intra-Alliance conflicts over the management of international economic relations; it also revealed a profound cleavage between American and West European attitudes toward the Soviet Union and post-détente relations with the East. As far as Franco-American relations were concerned, these disputes erupted with surprising bitterness after June 1982, although tensions had subsided by the time of the Williamsburg summit a year later. Nevertheless, continued French resistance to American policies in this arena revealed important boundaries and limitations to the entente between governments in the two countries.

The most important lesson of the pipeline dispute was the confirmation of a persistent French and general West European commitment to partial and restrained political-economic détente, despite the intensification of the East-West military confrontation in Europe and elsewhere. By early 1982, the French and other West Europeans had proved sensitive to Reagan administration arguments against subsidizing the Soviet economy through low government-guaranteed export credits. Paris had responded by raising the cost of such credits from 7.8 percent to 8.5 percent in October 1981, and finally to 12 percent by the spring of 1982. The U.S. had also raised the issue of reinforcing restrictions on trade in technology with military applications; some officials in France were reported to be arguing against supplying some of the computer monitoring equipment for the gas pipeline.[50] Soviet-French pipeline negotiations were coming to a conclusion just as the Polish crisis broke out, and there was an intense debate within the government over the wisdom of signing such an important accord just after the Soviet-sponsored coup. Although there was a range of opinions with strong support for postponing the agreement, there was no support for the American sanctions option and Mitterrand finally decided against even a delay. On 22 January 1982, Paris and Moscow signed an agreement that France would take 8 billion cubic meters of gas a year for twenty-five years after 1984, including French dependence on Soviet natural gas from 18 percent in 1981 to 31 percent by 1990, or to about 5 to 6 percent of total French energy sources after a decade.[51] As part of the deal, France was granted about $1 billion out of the $10 billion in Soviet contracts with the West to construct the pipeline, financed with credits furnished by French banks.

After the United States imposed an embargo on American firms planning to participate in building the pipeline, Washington tried without success to get its

[50] *Le Monde*, 21 October 1981. As a measure of the varied economic stakes in East-West trade, in 1980 it amounted to $23.8 billion for West Germany, $10.21 billion for France, and $5.28 billion for the U.S. As a percentage of foreign trade, this amounted to 6.2 percent, 4.2 percent and 1.12 percent, respectively (OECD Main Economic Indicators).

[51] By comparison, West Germany planned to take 10.5 billion cubic meters a year, and its natural gas dependence on Soviet sources would rise from 17 percent in 1981 to 25–30 percent by 1984. *Le Monde*, 25 January 1982.

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European allies to abandon the project with arguments based on the dangers of dependence on Soviet energy sources, the value to the Soviet Union of long-term hard currency earnings, and possible risks of sharing the technology involved in the pipeline. At the June 1982 Versailles summit, the French and other West Europeans thought they had ended the American campaign with a vague compromise agreement to limit export credits to the Soviet Union and to study all aspects of East-West trade.

Then, amid growing European-American economic controversies over subsidized steel exports, hard-liners in the Pentagon and on the U.S. National Security Council convinced President Ronald Reagan to abandon his accomodating attitude at Versailles, and on June 18 the president extended the embargo to apply to all U.S. companies abroad and to European companies manufacturing under U.S. license. In France, such a ban would have applied to the rotor components manufactured by Alsthom-Atlantique, valves manufactured by Rockwell, and pipeline booster-compressors built by Dressler-France. Although all European countries involved in the pipeline project rejected the claim that the U.S. government could exert this kind of control over American subsidiaries abroad or over American licensing agreements, the French reaction was by far the most determined in terms of counter-measures, as well as in escalating rhetorical attacks on American economic policy. Citing reasons of state and national interest, the Socialist government ordered Alsthom-Atlantique to honor its Soviet contract and furnish the forty spare sets of rotor components. Furthermore, in late August, the government acted under an *ordonnance* of January 1959 and "requisitioned" the activities of Dressler-France, obliging it to disobey its parent U.S. firm and ship its three completed compressors to the Soviet Union and finish work on the eighteen remaining on order.

In addition to an aggressive rejection of Washington's unilateral but international embargo, the French used the dispute as an occasion to vent their pent-up frustration at what they perceived as insensitive and egotistical American economic policies. Embarrassed by the fiasco of the expensive Versailles summit, Mitterrand criticized American actions as "restrictive, oppressive, unfair, and dangerous, creating a veritable disguised protectionism." The U.S., he added, was guilty of a "grave breach of solidarity" in reneging on the Versailles accord on East-West economic relations.[52] Foreign Trade Minister Michel Jobert, Finance Minister Jacques Delors, and Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson added that wild fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate and American interest-rate policies were examples of American insensitivity to the needs of its allies, and examples of an American abdication of "the responsibilities of international 'leadership.' "[53] In the face of French resistance bolstered by firm support from the Federal Republic of Germany and other West European governments, the Reagan administration was gradually forced to retreat from its Atlantic sanctions design

[52] Agence France-Presse dispatch, 29 June 1982.

[53] Jacques Delors, quoted in *Le Monde*, 26 June 1982.

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and, in November 1982, to accept a face-saving agreement that merely restated existing allied commitments to review a range of East-West trade and financial arrangements, and perhaps adopt more restrictive approaches when technology with military applications was at stake.

The French refusal to participate in the accord symbolized the Mitterrand government's concern for the appearance of independence in an area of economic policy that was especially sensitive for a besieged economy. The U.S. retreat continued until East-West trade issues ceased to play much of a role by the time of the June 1983 Williamsburg summit. This represented a partial victory for France and indicated that Paris was still capable of a stubborn assertion of interest on occasion. Yet even this accomplishment was tarnished because it confirmed that Mitterrand's France had reverted to the Fourth Republic pattern of weakness and decline, characterized by stubborn and often rhetorical resistance on a few matters but a general tendency for improvisation and accommodation because of an inability to develop more independent, assertive, as well as constructive foreign policy.

Conclusion

The analysis here suggests that the foreign and defense policy model established during the first decade of the Gaullist Fifth Republic serves as an indispensable guideline and constraint on all political groups and governments in France. The assumption of power by François Mitterrand at the head of a sometimes unwieldy and irresponsible Socialist Party is an important confirmation of this development, because Socialist adherence to the Gaullist security model has allowed the regime to avoid some of the grave mistakes that plague it in other arenas such as economic policy. To a certain extent, then, French security policy is insulated from debilitating experimentation because of a national elite (and popular) consensus in favor of the Gaullist framework, which prevents radical shifts in policy and allows those closest to the core of the Gaullist paradigm to prevail in intra-governmental disputes. Although the paradigm itself has certain fundamental principles—independence in national defense, a special status as an Atlantic ally, reliance on a national nuclear force, opposition to a rigid bipolar international system—it is flexible enough to embrace the variety of political and ideological perspectives within France.

This model is also doubtless the best tool for interpreting and predicting French foreign and security policy, since the Fifth Republic record indicates that governments will in the long run have to adhere closely to Gaullist principles. These principles constrain policy options because they are the most widely accepted, legitimate, and accurate guidelines for interpreting the national interest and for justifying French behavior to domestic and foreign audiences. The flexibility of the Gaullist paradigm as a framework largely accounts for the variations in French security policy both under de Gaulle and his successors, as they adapted national policy to shifts in domestic and international conditions.

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A second conclusion is that the Gaullist model is valuable not only to France, but also to France's allies and the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. The Alliance benefits from a national security policy framework that encourages potentially disruptive domestic political forces to adapt to policies that are ultimately beneficial to Western security interests. The case of the French Socialist Party confirms this point of view, since the party had to abandon its simplistic anti-American, anti-nuclear weapons, and semi-neutralist stance of the early 1970s in order to come to power in France. Under a Socialist regime, France has pursued pragmatic and generally sensible policies on defense and East-West affairs. This conclusion obviously assumes that a "responsible" policy, one beneficial to the West and even the international system, need not coincide with the policy preferences of American governments. Whatever the particular policy conflicts between the United States and France, the West does profit from the presence of a defense-minded ally able to bolster Alliance efforts while maintaining a significant independent capability.

The prevalence of conflicts over economic policy among Atlantic states in recent years is a consequence of the general economic crisis that has created a sense of heightened international competition and reinforces trends towards protectionism and even mercantilism. A distinctive economic policy favoring expansion and social equality in hard times was the most obvious ideological dimension of the new Socialist government in France, even though a strategy of enhancing the state's economic functions in order to bolster productivity, technological capabilities, and international competitiveness has roots in de Gaulle's own approach during the 1960s. De Gaulle's economic policies and those of Pompidou and Giscard generally strengthened France's international position and enhanced its status as an independent state within the West. It is ironic but perhaps not surprising that an overambitious French Socialist regime, ostensibly committed to both social justice and economic independence, should prove so incompetent at economic management that two years of Socialist rule made France weaker and more dependent in international terms than perhaps any time since the Fourth Republic. Even if the Gaullist heritage helps insulate France's defense posture from the effects of this general decline, there was a broad price to be paid in the impression of incrementalism and atrophy that became the hallmarks of Mitterrand's beleaguered France. The regime's ambivalence has been evident in the security policies pursued since May 1981, even though Socialist leaders have learned to manipulate the Gaullist rhetoric and security model to disguise their long-standing failure to develop a new international grand design to benefit the national and European interests of a Socialist France.

One of de Gaulle's intentions was to leave a constitution and a defense structure that would be strong enough to compensate for the failings of his successors, and in this sense a situation of only partial debilitation is a genuine triumph for his foresight. It is not, however, one that allows for much creativity in dealing with the issues that are slowly weakening the varied and fragile links among Atlantic states. During the 1960s, Gaullist France presented an alterna-

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tive to an unsatisfactory Atlantic order in the form of a West European community of semi-independent but cooperating states linked to, but no longer dependent on, the U.S. in economic and security affairs. The economic and political base in France for creating this kind of imaginative and assertive foreign policy may be damaged beyond repair during the remaining years of Socialist rule. However, in the event French economic strength is restored, a wiser and more confident Socialist France would probably have to redefine its foreign policy goals, adapting and reshaping the Gaullist ideal of an independent Europe as one solution to the enduring malaise in Atlantic relations. The Left in France may be too self-absorbed or debilitated to rise to such a challenge, but France's continued weakness and political decay will only encourage the advancing fragmentation of the entire Atlantic system to the detriment of all its members.*

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The Politics of Federal Block Grants: From Nixon to Reagan

TIMOTHY J. CONLAN

In the mid-1970s, the successive enactment of three multibillion-dollar block grants for manpower training, community development, and social services led many close observers of the federal system to anticipate that consolidation of narrowly defined "categorical" grants into larger, more flexible block grants would be the wave of the future in federal aid to state and local governments. As Ralph Widner wrote in a 1974 article: "We should expect the federal government over the next half decade or so to get out of the categorical grant-in-aid business and to continue to shift toward revenue sharing and other broad-purpose fiscal transfers."[1] Yet no new block grants were approved by Congress during the late Ford and Carter administrations. In 1981, however, the dramatic consolidation of seventy-seven programs into nine new block grants renewed expectations that federal program decentralization would become the intergovernmental agenda of the future. Such hopes were reinforced by confident predictions that centralized government had become obsolete and incompatible with the demands of postindustrial society.[2]

Careful analysis of the political origins of recent block grants does little to support such expectations, however. Indeed, grant reform politics have been transformed in such a way that future enactments may now be more rather than

[1] Ralph Widner, "State Growth and Federal Politics," *State Government* 47 (Spring 1974): 90.

[2] For example, see John Naisbitt, *Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives* (New York: Warner Communications, 1982), ch. 5.

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less difficult to establish. Historically, political support for block grants has come from two different and increasingly contradictory sources. Grant consolidation originally was proposed as a relatively nonpartisan means of improving the management and effectiveness of federal assistance programs. Although block grants were urged initially by only portions of the public administration profession, the dysfunctions of proliferating categorical grants in the 1960s produced increasingly broad support for grant reform among administrative generalists. Ultimately, several block grants were enacted on this basis, drawing support from both Democrats and Republicans at all levels of government.

Over time, especially in the middle years of the Nixon administration, the politics of grant consolidation also acquired a growing ideological dimension, although this remained secondary through much of the 1970s. With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, however, this ideological dimension overshadowed earlier sources of support for grant reform. The Reagan administration shunned the tedious process of building a bipartisan consensus for reform in individual policy areas, and succeeded in constructing a partisan-conservative phalanx that rolled major portions of the president's program through Congress in one bold sweep. Nixon's earlier inability to build a working conservative majority for grant reform and Reagan's initial success highlight certain changes occurring in American politics and challenge common assumptions about the structure of the policymaking process. In 1981 at least, narrow-interest subsystem politics and congressional fragmentation were overwhelmed by a highly visible, majoritarian style of presidential policy leadership, although subsequent events suggest that this was a temporary and exceptional event.

In this article, I trace this transformation in grant reform politics, beginning with a brief review of the early politics of consolidation and a description of the fortunes of Richard Nixon's New Federalism initiative and its block grant offspring in the early 1970s. I then analyze three major sources of Reagan's block grant achievements in 1981 and evaluate the potential for future enactments.

Block Grants as a Professional Reform: 1947–1970

The block grant concept was initially formulated by scholars and public administrators examining problems in federal aid programs in the 1940s and early 1950s. They criticized federal categorical grants as uncoordinated and piecemeal devices that distorted state and local budgets, neglected certain vital services, overstimulated others, and failed to equalize—or even exacerbated—service differentials among the states. As Paul Studenski wrote in 1949: "The most immediate need is for the consolidation of the multiple and separately apportioned grant programs into unified grants, on an equalization basis, covering each major grant field."[3] Likewise, the first Hoover Commission identified five significant flaws in categorical assistance programs and concluded: "A system of grants should

[3] Paul Studenski, "Federal Grants in Aid," *National Tax Journal* 2 (September 1949): 211.

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be established based upon broad categories—such as highways, education, public assistance, and public health—as contrasted with the present system of extensive fragmentation."[4]

Encouraged by the recommendations of the Hoover Commission, both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations submitted block grant legislation to Congress in the fields of public health and welfare. Despite this presidential support, none of these proposals were enacted. Opposition arose from defenders and beneficiaries of the programs threatened by consolidation and from those who opposed important non-block grant features of the bills. The repeated failures also reflected a lack of professional consensus on behalf of grant consolidation among public administrators. Throughout the 1950s, the categorical grant system remained modest in size and complexity, and many administrative experts were unconvinced that administrative problems necessitated comprehensive grant reform. In particular, the influential Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (the Kestnbaum Commission) recommended the continued use of conditional grants in 1955 if they were utilized carefully and on a modest scale.[5]

This professional dissension was substantially reduced in the 1960s, as the growing size and complexity of the federal aid system generated a host of intergovernmental problems. Most generalist administrative experts began to strongly endorse the block grant concept, and many specialists in fields with rapidly expanding grants joined them. Attempting to cope with the administrative consequences of the Great Society, the Johnson administration also launched a series of incremental grant reform initiatives and evinced increasing support for the block grant concept.

These developments were rooted in the rapid expansion of federal programs during the postwar period. In 1950, when the first serious efforts on behalf of grant consolidation were just beginning, federal aid totaled only about $2.23 billion annually, spread among some 52 separate programs and authorizations.[6] By 1960, the number of federal grants to state and local governments had risen to 132, and by 1968 this number reached approximately 340.[7] As the volume of federal aid climbed from $7.1 billion in 1960 to $20.3 billion in 1969, state and local governments became increasingly dependent on federal funds. By 1960, federal grants equaled 16.8 percent of state-local own source receipts, up from less than 10 percent a decade earlier. In just the four years between 1964 and 1968, the

[4] Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch, *A Report to Congress on Federal-State Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), 31–32.

[5] Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *A Report to the President* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), 122.

[6] Ibid., 305–307.

[7] This and the following figures are derived from David B. Walker, *Toward a Functioning Federalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1981), 7, 81, 174; and Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), *A Crisis of Confidence and Competence*, A-77 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), 121.

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percentage of state agencies receiving federal grants increased from 34 percent to 53 percent.

These changes in the federal grant system produced mounting administrative problems at all levels of government. State and local governments raised increasing numbers of complaints about the structure and operation of federal aid programs and began to lobby for reform. Holding hearings on the consequences of federal program proliferation in 1966, Senator Edmund Muskie, a Democrat from Maine, responded to these complaints and sought to draw attention to the growing problems caused by "competing and overlapping programs . . . confusion and conflicting requirements," and additional conditions "hostile to coordinating programs." "The picture," he concluded, "is one of too much tension and conflict rather than coordination all along the line of administration."[8]

Muskie's charges were reiterated by students of public administration, who increasingly invoked grant consolidation as a traditional administrative remedy for the maladies of program fragmentation and inadequate coordination. During the late 1960s numerous students of fiscal federalism and the intergovernmental grant system, including Deil Wright, George C.S. Benson, Selma Mushkin, and James Maxwell, prominently mentioned block grants as a means of relieving problems caused by categorical proliferation.

The most influential block-grant advocates, however, were a group of organizations and officials whose responsibilities gave them a broad perspective on emerging problems across the grant system as a whole. By the late 1960s, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), the General Accounting Office, the Committee for Economic Development, and the Budget Bureau had all voiced strong support for block grants as a tool for comprehensive reform of the federal aid system. Concluding a sweeping evaluation of the federal system in 1967, the ACIR echoed prevailing indictments of excessive reliance on categorical grants and recommended "a drastic reduction in the number of separate aid categories."[9] The following year, the General Accounting Office lent its support to grant consolidation, stating:

> We believe the real key to significantly improved administration lies in the legislative consolidation of programs into broad categories of assistance, and the placement of like programs in a single agency.[10]

Additional support for grant reform came from high officials in the Johnson administration. Walter Heller, former chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, became a well-known proponent of revenue sharing and grant consolidation, maintaining that "we must move toward broader categories

[8] Quoted in James L. Sundquist and David Davis, *Making Federalism Work* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1969), 15.

[9] ACIR, *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System*, A-31 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), 260.

[10] Quoted in Selma Mushkin and John F. Cotton, *Sharing Federal Funds for State and Local Needs* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), 182.

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[of aid] that will give states and localities more freedom of choice."[11] Heller suggested replacing "our myriad categories of educational aids with broad classes such as elementary, secondary, and higher education." President Lyndon Johnson's Budget Director, Charles Schultze, also endorsed the block grant concept as a means of "overcoming the problem of excessive categorization and fractionating of Federal aid."[12] Shortly after leaving the Budget Bureau, Schultze expanded on his rationale for block grants, arguing:

> The ability of a central staff in Washington to judge . . . thousands of local plans . . . and to control their performance is severely limited. . . . I believe that greater decentralization in the government's social programs should and will be made.[13]

The Johnson administration did more than preach the merits of grant consolidation, however. It initiated numerous federal aid reforms, which included experimenting with unified federal regional councils, supporting joint funding legislation and the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, and establishing the Comprehensive Employment Program (CEP) and the Cooperative Area Manpower Planning Systems (CAMPS). In the health field, the Johnson administration extended its reform efforts even further, recommending and obtaining enactment of the first true block grant, the Partnership for Health Act of 1966. This long-sought after consolidation, which combined nine public health formula grants into a single block grant program, had been recommended since the days of the first Hoover Commission. By 1966, the concept was supported by most members of the public health community, and the president's proposal faced little opposition in Congress. Although he had recommended a categorical program structure in law enforcement, President Johnson also signed into a law a congressionally inspired block grant, the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1968.

In the closing weeks of the Johnson administration, additional block grant proposals were under active consideration in the Budget Bureau. The bureau's growing institutional commitment to grant reform and consolidation was evident in a staff paper on block grant design circulated in December 1968. This paper suggested that block grants might be utilized for broad functional purposes like "reducing economic dependency, . . . children and youth" services, and "improving our physicial environment."[14] An accompanying memorandum underscored the "almost unanimous conclusion . . . that this is the right direction to move in" among public interest groups and top political appointees in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the Office of Economic

[11] Walter Heller, *New Dimensions of Political Economy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 142.

[12] Quoted in Harry N. Scheiber, "American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives," *University of Toledo Law Review* 9 (1978): 661.

[13] Charles Schultze, *The Politics and Economics of Public Spending* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968), 105.

[14] Lawrence J. Kirsch, "Block Grants: Methods and Implications" (Unpublished Budget Bureau Staff Paper, Washington, D.C., December 1968, author's possession).

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Opportunity (OEO), the Department of Labor, and the Department of Housing, and Urgan Development (HUD). The staff paper specifically recommended establishing a $4 billion block grant for social welfare purposes, and it discussed a variety of programmatic features—including alternative formulas, pass-through provisions to local governments, and performance standards for evaluation—that became familiar components of later block grant legislation. The level of refinement illustrates the degree of organizational capacity and institutional support for grant consolidation within the federal government that existed prior to the inauguration of the Nixon administration.

Block Grants and Nixon's New Federalism

Attempts to reform the federal aid system accelerated rapidly under the Nixon administration. Indeed, block grants in the form of "special revenue sharing" were a centerpiece of Nixon's domestic policy approach. Despite the intensity of these efforts, however, they encountered only modest success. Only two block grants were created under the Nixon administration despite six years of continuous struggle, and both differed substantially from what the president initially proposed.

This limited success resulted partly from an underlying tension in the objectives behind the Nixon administration's block grant thrust, tensions that came to be expressed in the politics of block grants in this period. On the one hand, motivation for the New Federalism stemmed partly from lingering concerns about simplifying the intergovernmental aid system that had surfaced during the Johnson administration. The Budget Bureau's continuing advocacy of grant reform, together with support for block grants developing independently in several executive departments, originated from these managerial concerns. To a considerable extent, the Nixon White House shared this perspective.

On the other hand, President Nixon also launched his New Federalism for overtly partisan and ideological reasons. He sought to alter intergovernmental power relationships as well as to streamline administrative ones. In his first discussion of decentralization in 1969—in which he announced proposals for General Revenue Sharing, an employment training block grant, and welfare reform—Nixon emphasized that:

> My purpose . . . is . . . to present a new . . . and drastically different approach . . . to the way the responsibilities are shared between the State and Federal Governments. . . . These proposals . . . represent the first major reversal of the trend toward ever more centralization of government in Washington.[15]

The objective was to use grant consolidation to alter the ground rules of federal aid politics, thereby undercutting the influence of Washington-centered interest groups and their congressional and bureaucratic allies who promoted and

[15] Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs, 8 August 1969, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), 637.

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benefited from individual categorical grants. Richard Nathan, then assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and chief architect of the Nixon administration block grant proposals, observed in an interview that the administration hoped that individual program clienteles would reduce their lobbying efforts once the payoff was diluted in a consolidated grant: "There were people in the administration who . . . understood that once there was a broad based grant, it would weaken the individual claims for more money."[16] Elsewhere Nathan has added that "the idea was to weaken the federal bureaucracy."[17]

The ambivalence apparent in the Nixon administration's grant reform objectives gave rise to two largely incompatible strategies for enacting the New Federalism. At times, the president tried to sweep his block grant proposals through Congress in one uncompromising, ideological thrust. This approach was unsuccessful. At other times, however, the Nixon administration attempted to work with others supporting block grants in specific fields, an approach that met with somewhat more success. Specifically, the president proposed block grant legislation in six different fields—community development, job training, rural development, education, transportation, and law enforcement. Consolidations were enacted only in the first two fields, where substantial professional consensus existed on behalf of grant reform that was independent of the president's initiatives. These were also areas in which locally elected officials were active and influential members of the legislative subsystem. In contrast, the administration's block grant proposals fared miserably in fields where the president was the only major advocate of grant consolidation.

These outcomes were consistent with prevailing theories of congressional behavior and the policymaking process in the 1970s. Influential works on congressional behavior in the decentralized Congress suggest that rational, election-seeking members will strongly favor categorical grants over consolidated block grants. They provide "particularized benefits" to discrete congressional constituencies, allowing legislators to claim credit for tangible benefits to their districts. As David Mayhew expressed it: "The programmatic mainstay of congressmen is the categorical grant. . . . It supplies goods in small manipulable packets."[18] In a similar vein, the familiar logic of the "iron triangle" model of policymaking underscores the difficulties of enacting comprehensive legislation that upsets the policy preferences of, and established relationships among, program specialists within discrete policy subsystems. Thus, it is not surprising that only those block

[16] Quoted in Timothy J. Conlan, "Congressional Response to the New Federalism: The Politics of Special Revenue Sharing and Its Implications for Public Policy Making" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1982), 420.

[17] Richard Nathan, *The Plot That Failed* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), 31.

[18] David Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 129. For a similar argument, see Morris Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 73–74; and Cynthia Cates Colella with David R. Beam, "The Political Dynamics of Intergovernmental Policy Making," in Jerome J. Hanus, ed., *The Nationalization of State Government* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1981), 134–38.

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grants with independent support among policy specialists in and out of Congress and active encouragement from the intergovernmental lobby were able to overcome political obstacles in Congress and win enactment.

Early Managerial Initiatives and Special Revenue Sharing

Originally, the Nixon administration hewed closely to the managerial tradition of federal aid reform. Components of this strategy included: the establishment of Federal Regional Councils; the creation of the Federal Assistance Review process; and presidential support for legislation establishing a streamlined process for congressional consideration of consolidation proposals similar to the one used in executive reorganizations. The president's first proposal for a job training block grant in 1969 reflected similar concerns and differed sharply from the latter "no strings" consolidation approach utilized in "special revenue sharing." Developed by policy professionals in the Labor Department, the proposed "Manpower Training Act" featured a range of management-oriented provisions, including management incentive grants, a regional planning focus, and a phased consolidation of programs to facilitate the gradual enhancement of states' capacities to administer the program. The administration also deferred to policy specialists in community development and elected to retain the Model Cities program in modified form. It experimented with adding block grant features to Model Cities through the "Planned Variations" program, which increased mayoral involvement, expanded program activities, and reduced federal paperwork in sixteen selected cities.

Indeed, the administration nearly won congressional approval of a management-oriented employment training block grant in 1970, prior to the initiation of special revenue sharing. A compromise proposal, combining a manpower block grant with a temporary public service jobs program, passed the House of Representatives that year with the president's support. The Senate, however, refused to accept the consolidation of many members' favored categoricals, while the president rejected the conference version of the public jobs program designed by Senate liberals. Thus, a compromise block grant-employment program similar to the later Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) program failed to pass Congress in a manner that the president would accept.

Frustrated with the lack of progress by managerial reform attempts and spurred by increasing partisanship between his Republican administration and the Democratic Congress, President Nixon abruptly altered his grant reform strategy in January 1971 with the announcement of special revenue sharing (SRS). The six SRS proposals were highly decentralized block grants that combined elements of conventional block grants with certain "no strings attached" features of general revenue sharing. On the one hand, the use of each program's funds were to be limited to activities in six functionally defined areas—urban community development, rural development, job training, law enforcement,

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education, and transportation. In contrast to conventional block grants and most other forms of federal aid, however, the SRS proposals contained almost no planning, reporting, or matching requirements governing recipients' use of funds. Moreover, no application was required to qualify for funds; grants were to be disbursed "automatically" to eligible recipients on a formula basis. This flexibility was further enhanced by the scope of the SRS initiative. Altogether, the six proposals sought to consolidate 129 programs equaling almost one-third of the existing federal aid budget. In short, special revenue sharing represented a sharp departure from the incremental, managerial approach to federal aid reform, in favor of a bold, comprehensive restructuring of federal domestic programs. As one top official in the Nixon administration explained at the time:

> It has become increasingly clear that a new strategy is needed. [The old] approach . . . would have us work within the system to take successive incremental steps to streamline Federal aids. The problem, simply put, is that this approach doesn't work.[19]

The Failure of Special Revenue Sharing Under Nixon

It soon became apparent that the administration's comprehensive strategy did not work either. Politically, special revenue sharing was a dismal failure. Not one of the proposals came close to being enacted in its SRS format, and most of them received little serious congressional attention. As congressional and interest group resistance mounted, the president sought to force acceptance of his proposals by adopting harsher tactics. Budget cuts and impoundment of funds were used to threaten categorical programs and to create pressure for consolidation. Nixon also sharpened his rhetoric and attempted to fashion an ideological coalition to carry his programs through the Congress.

None of these efforts proved successful. In part, this failure resulted from the obstacles inherent in divided party government. The adminstration's proposals were viewed with deep suspicion by the Democratic majority in Congress. As a result, on rare occasions when the president was able to mobilize a unified Republican coalition, he still lacked sufficient votes in Congress to secure enactment. Despite divisions in their own party, congressional Democrats tended to respond to Nixon's partisan and budgetary tactics with a corresponding degree of partisan unity. For example, a Republican attempt to substitute a manpower block grant for the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 (a public jobs program) failed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 182 to 204. Although Republicans supported the block grant almost unanimously (159 to 6), an overwhelming majority of Democrats opposed it (23 to 198)—including a majority of conservative Southern Democrats who voted against the block grant substitute (21 to 51).

[19] Richard Nathan, "Special Revenue Sharing: Simple, Neat, and Correct," Washington, D.C., 5 May 1971, 2, author's possession.

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Despite the administration's political thrust for SRS, however, partisan coalitions of this sort were rare occurrences in the block grant politics of the 1970s. Most of the president's unsuccessful initiatives fell victim to a combination of opposition and apathy from members of both parties in Congress, while those that gained enactment in some form garnered bipartisan support. In both cases, these reactions stemmed largely from the organization of interests and policy preferences within individual subsystems.

In the fields of transportation, education, and rural development, interest groups and program specialists were almost unanimously opposed to the president's proposals. For instance, the president of the American Trucking Association expressed "revulsion" at portions of the Transportation Revenue Sharing plan, calling it "a large scale raid on the federal Highway Trust fund."[20] Republicans in both the House and Senate refused even to introduce the administration's transportation bill, so hearings were never held on it in either chamber. Undersecretary of Transportation James Boggs observed: "Our categorical programs are nearer and dearer to Congressmen's hearts than any other. They are the porkiest of the pork."[21]

Similarly, before the Rural Development Revenue Sharing proposal was even sent to Capital Hill, portions of the plan came under vigorous attack from leading Republicans like Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott from Pennsylvania and Senator John Sherman Cooper from Kentucky, ranking member of the Senate Public Works Committee, for proposing the consolidation—and effective elimination—of the Appalachian Regional Commission. Supporters of the Agricultural Extension Service mobilized to thwart consolidation of their program as well. Consequently, rural revenue sharing was hardly even considered by the House Agriculture Committee. The Senate Agriculture Committee also rejected the idea of program consolidation, although a coalition of liberal and conservative Democrats did propose that a supplemental rural development "block grant" be appended to existing categoricals as a means of increasing federal spending in this field. This supplemental block grant was opposed unsuccessfully in the Senate by a combination of liberal opponents of block grants like Adlai Stevension III (a Democratic from Illinois) and by Republican fiscal conservatives like Carl Curtis from Nebraska and Milton Young from North Dakota, and it was deleted in the House-Senate conference on the Rural Development Act of 1972.

The Nixon administration's education revenue sharing (ERS) proposals elicited a similar response from interest groups and Congress. The liberal chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee complained that special revenue sharing allowed little federal control over education funds and

[20] Quoted in Jonathan Cottin, "Wide-Ranging Interests Oppose Administration's Proposals," *National Journal* (10 April 1971): 773.

[21] Quoted in Timothy Clark, et al., "Drive to Return Power to Local Governments Faces Hill Struggle Over Control of Programs," *National Journal* (16 December 1972): 1930.

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likened it to "throwing money down ratholes."[22] Others feared that education revenue sharing was simply an indirect means of reducing the education budget. A congressional staffer observed that "people didn't believe they'd spend the money under ERS. They thought it was just a new attempt to subvert the program."[23] Education interest groups echoed those reactions. Even many Republicans, like Representative Albert Quie from Minnesota—an early supporter of education block grants—expressed reservations about the president's "revenue sharing" approach. "You do not want a flat block grant in education," he stated in an interview; "pressure is so strong for increased pay from teachers' unions."[24]

As the reactions of influential congressional Republicans like Representative Quie and Senator Scott suggest, many potential supporters of block grants were opposed to or ambivalent about President Nixon's proposals in these three fields. Even staunch conservatives were often divided on these measures, fearing the lack of congressional controls on spending in these programs or seeking to protect their own pet programs from consolidation. Outside of Congress, too, potential advocates failed to support these plans. Members of the intergovernmental lobby, like National Governors' Conference Chairman Arch Moore, a Republican from West Virginia, and spokespersons for the National League of Cities opposed rural development revenue sharing as a threat to other more important interests. Nor did governors and state education officials make serious efforts on behalf of education revenue sharing, fearing that it might create political problems at the state level. In short, the pattern of failure in these fields was consistent with the conventional wisdom concerning block grant politics—clients and beneficiaries of categorical programs actively opposed grant consolidation as a threat to their established interests, reinforced by protective credit-claiming program sponsors in Congress.

Somewhat surprisingly, this conventional wisdom was only modestly challenged by the successful enactment of block grants for community development and job training. Both Community Development Block Grants (CDBGs) and CETA enjoyed strong interest group and professional support independent of the president's initiative. Naturally, some members of Congress—especially liberal senators—remained protective of the grant programs they had sponsored. However, many members of key congressional committees (from both sides of the aisle) actively supported consolidation for political and policy reasons. Besides responding to active lobbying by local government officials and the president, they generally shared the professional consensus that consolidation would improve program performance in these two fields.

For example, the design and passage of the CDBG program reflected widespread agreement among policy professionals who were in favor of the block

[22] Representative Carl Perkins, quoted in Karen DeWitt, "Administration Revenue Sharing Plan Unlikely to Get Passing Grade from Congress," *National Journal* (24 March 1973): 418.

[23] Quoted in Conlan, "Congressional Response to the New Federalism," 333.

[24] Ibid., 334.

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grant concept. The nation's mayors, who formed the principal clientele of community development programs, were staunch advocates of block grants in this field. Important members and staff of the housing and development subcommittees in both chambers of Congress also favored consolidation. In fact, Democrats on the House subcommittee had begun work on a community development block grant program prior to Nixon's special revenue sharing initiative, and an urban block grant program supported by the administration passed the Senate in 1972 as part of an omnibus housing and community development bill. Although this proposal was stymied in the House Rules Committee, participants agreed that the block grant provisions were not the cause of its failure.

Similarly, considerable support for a job training block grant already existed in Congress and the academic community when President Nixon proposed the Manpower Training Act in 1969. As with community development, local government officials were strong and effective advocates of grant reform. Although congressional liberals and their supporters in organized labor and community-based organizations were less supportive of the block grant concept, all major interests were accommodated by the "hybrid" structure of the CETA program. This consolidated seventeen categorical training programs into a manpower block grant, while retaining several "national emphasis" categorical programs and creating a public employment title.

Despite broad support in their respective policy communities, both CETA and CDBG were enacted only after several years of legislative struggle. This difficulty underscored the obstacles to grant reform in the 1970s, even under relatively favorable circumstances. Partisan suspicions and policy differences between the Nixon administration and congressional Democrats hampered negotiations over block grant provisions. Moreover, many supporters of the block grant concept were deeply divided over programmatic details, such as the division of money and authority among different levels of government, the total level of funding to be authorized, the extent and character of federal oversight, the range of eligible activities to be permitted, the specific programs to be consolidated, and the factors to be included in the allocation formula.

As enacted, both the training and community development block grants had important common features. Both increased federal spending, partly to finance "hold harmless" provisions intended to protect former categorical recipients from loss of funds. In addition, both programs were viewed as favoring local governments over states, and both retained significant federal oversight and control. Politically, however, the two New Federalism block grants could be viewed as policy-specific reforms, whose design and passage depended largely on the particular alignment of interests and attitudes in their policy arenas. The president's attempt to develop a comprehensive reform agenda across multiple policy fields was largely unsuccessful. Each block grant, along with other components of the New Federalism like General Revenue Sharing and the Family Assistance Plan, was treated independently by Congress and aroused its own pattern of politics.

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Block Grant Politics in the Late 1970s

During the remainder of the 1970s, there were few successful block grant initiatives. The Ford administration attempted to sustain political momentum for grant consolidation by reintroducing a version of Nixon's education block grant proposal and by developing new proposals for consolidating health and child nutrition programs. None of these initiatives were favorably received by Congress. Subsequent congressionally sponsored proposals for education and nutrition block grants also failed to attract much support. The only additional block grant enacted in the 1970s was the Title XX program of social service grants, but this did not involve any program consolidation. Rather, Title XX placed a spending cap on the existing, rapidly expanding program of social service grants and, in exchange, gave states additional discretion in using funds.[25]

Instead of adopting new block grants, Congress gradually proceeded to recategorize and recentralize existing ones. This process was first observed with the earliest block grants, Partnership for Health and the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, which were circumvented by new categorical grants or were undermined by earmarking funds. A similar process of "creeping categorization" affected CETA and CDBG under the Carter administration. Between 1975 and 1977, the block grant portion of the CETA program declined from 42 percent of appropriations to 23 percent.[26] New categorical measures appended to CETA included a countercyclical public employment program, a series of youth employment and training demonstration programs, and a new private sector job training initiative. Recategorization was less prominent in CDBG, apart from enactment of the Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program of economic development project grants. However, sustained efforts were made by the Carter administration to assert greater federal direction over CDBGs and local discretion over how and where to spend block grant funds was substantially reduced.

Block Grant Politics in the 1980s

Compared with the modest success of block grant initiatives in the 1970s, the political achievements of the Reagan administration in 1981 were impressive. Nine new block grants were created in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of that year, which consolidated seventy-seven programs and terminated sixty-two others. The administration did not get everything it wanted in the new consolidation; Congress redefined the makeup of several block grants, added restrictions and earmarks to many of them, and refused to consolidate a number of highly visible programs. Nevertheless, in contrast with prior efforts to enact block

[25] See Martha Derthick, *Uncontrollable Spending for Social Service Grants* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), 103.

[26] William Mirengoff and Lester Rindler, *CETA: Manpower Programs Under Local Control* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1978), 19.

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grants, the achievement was substantial. Twenty-five years elapsed before public health programs were finally consolidated in the Partnership for Health Act of 1966. The Nixon administration struggled for five years to pass only two block grant programs, and these merged only a fraction of the programs first proposed for consolidation. The 1981 act, on the other hand, reduced the total number of federal programs by approximately 25 percent in less than one year, prompting Richard Nathan to conclude that:

> The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 is the single most important piece of social legislation enacted in the United States since the Social Security Act of 1935. This legislation did not just cut spending, it fundamentally changed social programs.[27]

This unique outcome was the product of an equally distinctive pattern of block grant politics. In contrast to the incremental politics of managerial reform, Reagan successfully converted block grants into a sharply partisan and ideological issue.

The success of Reagan's ideological strategy can be traced to three sets of political factors. Philosophically, it was advanced by a widely perceived "crisis" of New Deal liberalism and the seeming inability of Democrats to convincingly defend the merits of existing programs or to generate viable policy alternatives. Structurally, the president was aided by Republican control of the Senate, the powerful revival of the conservative coalition in the House, and the relative coherence and technical sophistication of the Republican party. Finally, enactment of the new block grants was greatly assisted by brilliant parliamentary tactics that substantially altered the traditional ground rules of grant consolidation politics. Through the budget reconciliation process, a series of discrete policy decisions were subsumed within the framework of the president's economic program, where consolidation issues were overshadowed by budgetary decisions.

Reagan's Proposals and Early Congressional Reactions

A simple chronology of block grant politics in 1981 underscores the role of tactical considerations in the Reagan victory. Early in the year, as the president's proposals were being considered individually by congressional committees, the prospects for significant change seemed dim. Committees in the Republican-controlled Senate made substantial alterations in the president's proposals, and committees in the Democratic House threatened to block them althogether. This pattern was dramatically reversed, however, as the reconciliation process was used to shift decision-making from committees to the floor and to reframe issues on the president's terms.

Initially, the president proposed consolidating over eighty programs into seven new block grants in the fields of education, health, social services, and community development. In elementary and secondary education, he proposed con-

[27] Richard P. Nathan, "Retrenchment in Washington Ripples Across Country," *Public/Private* 1 (November 1982): 43.

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solidating forty-three programs into two: a local education block grant comprising major programs for disadvantaged, handicapped, and special needs students; and a state block grant comprising thirty-three mostly small programs for purposes like metric and environmental education and emergency school assistance. Two block grants also were proposed in the health field: a preventive health block grant replacing ten programs ranging from family planning to rat control; and a health services block grant consolidating seventeen categoricals like community health centers and maternal and child health. The social services proposal merged twelve programs, including the existing Title XX block grant, most community action programs, and child welfare and adoption services. An emergency assistance block grant combined only two grants—low-income energy assistance and emergency welfare assistance. Finally, the president proposed easing restrictions on the existing community development block grant and turning the federally administered portion of the program for small communities over to the states. He also proposed terminating several categorical programs, such as planning and weatherization grants and rehabilitation loans, allowing state and local governments to pick them up if they so desired with block grant funds.

Structurally, these block grant proposals were very bold, ignoring virtually every characteristic that had contributed to block grant success in the past. No attempt was made to construct consolidations in areas of professional consensus or to focus on politically vulnerable programs. Nor was any effort made to respect Congress's traditional concerns with maintaining fiscal accountability and protecting basic national purposes. Rather, the Reagan proposals resembled and expanded on the Nixon concept of special revenue sharing. Within the broad range of eligible activities specified in each proposal, most of the Reagan block grants gave virtually unlimited discretion to state recipients—without planning, application, or detailed reporting requirements. As one city lobbyist remarked, they "made general revenue sharing look restrictive" by comparison.[28]

Earlier block grant enactments were also budgetarily expensive. They consistently had higher appropriations than the programs they replaced, in order to prevent most recipients of existing programs from losing funds in the shift to a new block grant formula. But there was no such attempt to "buy" consolidation under the Reagan proposals. Rather, they generally cut funding levels 25 percent below expected fiscal 1982 amounts.

Finally, the vast preponderance of CETA and CDBG funds went directly to local governments on a formula basis, in part because these governments had more influence in Washington than states did in the early 1970s. Although "pass throughs" by the states to local governments were required in some cases, the Reagan proposals sent no funds directly to local governments, even in program areas of principally local concern. Instead, they channeled all the block

[28] Quoted in Rochelle Stanfield, "Block Grants Look Fine to States: It's the Money That's the Problem," *National Journal* (9 May 1981): 829.

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grants—and their attendant cuts—through the states, greatly "upping the ante" on the governors' prior offer to accept modest reductions in federal aid in exchange for greater administrative flexibility.

Largely as a result of these factors, initial congressional and interest group responses to the Reagan block grant proposals were sharply negative. Throughout the spring of 1981, congressional committees in both the House and Senate deleted controversial provisions—and entire programs—from the president's proposals. In the Republican-controlled Senate, for example, defections by key moderate Republicans on the Labor and Human Resources Committee stalled progress on the administration's health and education bills for weeks. When compromise legislation finally was reported from committee, the largest and most sensitive education programs had been saved from consolidation, and the health proposals had been reworked into three less ambitious block grants. The Senate also retained Legal Services as a separate program, substantially scaled back the programmatic scope of the social service block grant, and restructured community action grants into a separate block grant. In short, although the Senate eventually acceded to considerable program consolidation, this occurred only after lengthy and difficult negotiations that substantially amended the president's proposals.

During this initial period, the president fared even worse in the Democratic-controlled House, where most of the proposed block grants were bottled up or killed entirely in their respective committees. Education and Labor Committee Chairman Carl Perkins, a Democrat from Kentucky, charged that the president sought to "dismantle programs" rather than reform them,[29] while Representative William Ford, a Democrat from Michigan, likened the education block grant to sending "bags of money to a State" in a Brinks truck: "We cannot send a check to Michigan addressed to: 'To whom it may concern' and hope somebody will cash it and divvy it up properly."[30]

As these statements suggest, the issue of consolidation was more significant for many senior Democrats than the Reagan budget cuts. It was widely recognized that one of the administration's block grant objectives was to permanently reduce the influence of the "Washington establishment," for whom categorical programs often played an important role.[31] Operating on the assumption that many of the president's cuts were popular and unavoidable, Democratic strategy therefore attempted, in the words of one observer, to "protect the [categorical] delivery systems."[32] This would protect Democratic priorities in the long run, permitting rapid program recovery under a later Democratic administration.

[29] Quoted in Dale Tate, "New Federalism No Panacea for State and Local Governments," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports* (25 April 1981): 910.

[30] House Committee on Education and Labor, *Elementary and Secondary Education Consolidation Act of 1981*, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, 61, 64.

[31] See Steven V. Roberts, "Budget Ax Becomes a Tool for Social Change," *New York Times*, 21 June 1981.

[32] Spencer Rich, "Panel Rejects Reagan Plan for Block Grants to States," *Washington Post*, 15 May 1981.

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The president's block grant proposals also came under scathing attacks from affected clientele and interest groups outside of Congress. Many saw the block grants merely as a thin disguise for drastic budget cuts. Others, like the Ad Hoc Coalition on Block Grants (representing over 100 separate groups and professional organizations), focused on consolidation as "a radical transformation in the relationship between citizens and their government." In a letter sent to all members of the House, the Coalition charged that the president's proposals would

> repeal landmark legislation, eliminate essential programs, undermine principles of fiscal accountability and lay the groundwork for confusion, neglect, and new bureaucracy at the state level. . . . These proposals will mean . . . less assistance to those in genuine need . . . and a brutal political struggle at the state level where the most vulnerable . . . are almost certain losers.[33]

Even many state and local government officials—the presumed beneficiaries of grant consolidation—appeared lukewarm or hostile toward the president's proposals. Most state officials reacted tentatively to the new block grants, supporting the concept but wary of the large budget cuts proposed and the rapid transition of program responsibility. Although block grants, in general, had long been a major legislative objective of local governments, most local officials were even less favorable. They expressed a variety of complaints about specific features of the Reagan proposals, despite assurances by the president and members of his administration that these programs would benefit local governments as well as states by reducing the federal paperwork burden and by promoting local discretion. Mayor Richard Hatcher, then president of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, spoke for many in condemning the proposals as "deep budget cuts dressed up to look like block grants and sent to state capitols, where we'll have to go through another layer of bureacuracy to find them."[34] Consequently, much of the hoped-for support for the block grants by the intergovernmental lobby was dissipated in "guerrilla warfare" between states and cities over block grant eligibility and design.

Throughout much of early 1981, therefore, prospects for enactment of the Reagan block grant proposals seemed very dim. One respected journalist covering their fate in Congress concluded only one week before House passage of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act that "the political furnace required to melt categorical grants together into large, simple blocks hasn't reached the critical temperature yet, even in this year's overheated congressional atmosphere."[35] This

[33] Ad Hoc Coalition on Block Grants, "Letter to Rep. Henry Waxman," in *Congressional Record*, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 24 June 1981, 127:E3178.

[34] Quoted in "The New Federalism: Where are the Cities?" *The Mayor* 48 (15 April 1981): 2. See also "Reagan's Block-Grant Proposal Pits Cities Against the States," *Wall Street Journal*, 12 May 1981.

[35] Rochelle Stanfield, "Congressional Roadblocks," *National Journal* (20 June 1981): 1126.

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view was shared by many academic experts as well. "I don't think the block grant proposals will pass Congress," commented Frederick Mosher.[36]

Enactment of the Reconciliation Act

These expectations were dramatically reversed on 26 June 1981, when the House of Representatives passed its version of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981. After being amended by the so-called Gramm-Latta II amendment, the act accomplished four major purposes: it cut fiscal year 1982 federal spending by over $37 billion; it altered funding and eligibility under several entitlement programs; it eased federal restrictions on several large education and urban programs; and it established nine new or revised block grants for public health, social services, secondary education, and community development. In addition to reducing the total number of federal programs by a quarter and cutting funds for consolidated programs by 25 percent, the new block grants greatly strengthened the role of states as grant recipients—to the marked detriment of local nonprofit agencies, local school districts, and small municipalities.

These accomplishments were made possible, in no small part, by brilliant parliamentary tactics. The normal rules of block grant politics were fundamentally altered by packaging these consolidations into one massive budget, grant, and entitlement reform bill. Key decisions about program changes were removed from the arena of the individual committees, which were often dominated by categorical program sponsors and beneficiaries, and placed before the Congress and the country as a whole. In the process, the fundamental legislative issue was transformed from "does each specific program change make sense to program specialists and supporters?" to "do you support the economic recovery plan of a highly popular president?" Under the latter formulation, the block grants became, for many, a secondary issue, obscured in a mass of confusing legislation and nearly overshadowed by a host of competing issues. Accordingly, many observers have attributed primary credit for the president's block grant success to this bold and "audacious" strategy.

The seeds of reconciliation were sown long before the election of Ronald Reagan and the Republican majority in the Senate. In 1974, Congress passed the Budget and Impoundment Control Act in response to the Nixon administration's abuses of its power to impound appropriated funds and to Congress's own inability to develop a coherent set of alternative spending priorities. The act required Congress to adopt two comprehensive budget resolutions each year: a preliminary one in the spring setting forth general spending targets; and a binding one in the fall adjusted for the actual appropriation and authorization bills adopted by Congress. In order to ensure that automatic entitlements would not exceed the binding budget ceilings, the act included a "reconciliation" provision

[36] Quoted in "Congress Stalls Reagan Grant Consolidation Plan," *Public Administration Times* 4 (1 June 1981): 6.

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permitting existing legislation to be amended by the budget resolution in order to "reconcile" them to overall spending limits. This provision was not used until 1980, however, when Democratic leaders employed the reconciliation device to reduce the 1980 and 1981 budgets by approximately $5 billion.[37]

This precedent laid the groundwork for Republican use of reconciliation in 1981. The new administration and Republican leaders in Congress seized on the device as a vehicle for making rapid budget cuts before the president's popularity began to slip away. A comprehensive budget reconciliation bill, combining spending reductions with consolidations, could be used to bypass committee specialists and to divert political attention away from the fate of separately targeted programs and onto the president's broad economic program.

It proved to be a brilliant political move. At a time when individual committees in both chambers of Congress were resisting the president's block grant and budget proposals, the reconciliation vehicle allowed the administration to construct conservative budget coalitions on the floor of each house that adopted overall spending ceilings consistent with the president's economic program. The Republican-controlled Senate passed its initial budget resolution on 2 April 1981 by a vote of 88 to 10 (R:51 to 1, D:37 to 9).[38] The House, in a major victory for the president, rejected the Democratic leadership's proposed budget resolution and adopted a lower, administration-backed budget resolution amendment, the so-called Gramm-Latta I amendment, on May 7 by a vote of 253 to 176 (R:190 to 0, D:63 to 176).

These initial resolutions instructed recalcitrant committees to develop specific legislative proposals designed to meet the new spending targets and to report these changes to their respective budget committees by 12 June 1981. These budget targets were not binding, however, so a second budget resolution setting final spending ceilings and making permanent changes in specific legislation also had to be adopted. Once again, the Senate led the way, passing its version of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act on 25 June 1981 by a vote of 80 to 15 (R:52 to 0, D:28 to 15). The House passed its final reconciliation bill, as amended by "Gramm-Latta II," in a dramatic showdown vote of 217 to 211 (R:188 to 2, D:29 to 209) the following day. A conference version of the Reconciliation Act was signed into law on 13 August 1981.

As Robert Fulton, chief counsel for the Senate Budget Committee, observed, the tactical key to the success of the Reconciliation Act was that it packaged a wide range of program changes and spending cuts into one highly visible package:

> Reconciliation made possible a "critical mass" of spending reductions which members could not afford to oppose, and it enabled the media—and the public—to keep a clear view of the progress Congress was making on the president's proposals. It also provided

[37] Robert Fulton, "Federal Budget Making in 1981: A Watershed in Federal Domestic Policy," *New England Journal of Human Services* (Fall 1981): 26.

[38] Data on this and the following three votes are taken from *1981 Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 5C, 10C; and Fulton, "Federal Budget Making," 28.

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a few highly visible votes upon which maximum leverage could be mobilized by the president and his supporters.[39]

Recognizing the political implications of the reconciliation device, House Democratic leaders made one last-ditch attempt to disrupt the administration's strategy before the Reconciliation Act was adopted. They proposed a rule requiring the administration-backed Gramm-Latta II substitute be considered in six different components, so that House members would go on record for specific cuts in student aid, Social Security, Medicaid, and so forth. However, the president's budget coalition in the House defeated this rule in a critical vote on 25 June 1981 by the narrow margin of 216 to 212 (R:189 to 0, D:27 to 212), and the stage was set for a single yes or no vote on the Gramm-Latta II reconciliation amendment.

Accordingly, the budget for fiscal year 1982 was developed in large part, not through the traditional painstaking and incremental work of the appropriations subcommittees, but in a single, massive, ad hoc amendment pasted together in a scramble of last-minute negotiations among Republicans and conservative Democrats. In the "frenzy" of putting together a conservative substitute on the budget, there was an "almost total lack of information" among House members concerning the contents of the far-reaching Gramm-Latta amendment.[40]

Philosophical and Institutional Dimensions of the Reconciliation Act

The Reconciliation Act provided a vehicle for the president's victory, but it was not the only cause. Political support for the act came from two basic sources: the philosophical and structural disarray of the Democratic party, which hampered attempts to challenge the administration's program; and the political strength of the Republican party in Congress, which reflected both short- and long-term political factors.

Some early journalistic observers attributed much of the credit for the Reagan administration's budget and block grant victories to a conservative shift in public opinion that gave Ronald Reagan a "mandate" for change. Moreover, the appearance of a conservative tide was reinforced by the election of a Republican majority to the Senate for the first time in a quarter century.

Equally important was the contrast between the new administration's ideological vigor and the apparent philosophical malaise of the Democrats. The administration literally exuded confidence that it had found in "supply-side economics" an answer to seemingly intractable problems of stagflation, lagging investment and productivity, and soaring interest rates. In contrast, press accounts in early 1981 were filled with discussions of the Democratic party's or-

[39] Fulton, "Federal Budget Making," 29.

[40] Dale Tate, "Reconciliation Conferees Face Slim Choices," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (4 July 1981): 1168.

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ganizational floundering and intellectual anomie. Because the policy agenda stemming from the New Deal largely had been adopted—with the notable exception of national health insurance—there was an understandable policy vacuum in the party.

With benefit of hindsight, there appear to be valid reasons for questioning the extent to which Reagan's legislative victories were rooted in popular opinion, and many analysts have argued that the election of 1980 was overinterpreted and misperceived.[41] Yet the actuality of a mandate for change in 1981 was less significant than the widely held perception that one existed. The new administration seemed almost uncontested in the realm of new (or very old) ideas, and the president's popularity was growing in early 1981, bolstered by reactions to the attempt on his life and by his reputation as a "great communicator." These factors formed a crucial backdrop for coalition-building in Congress.

Reinforcing the impact of real and perceived popular support for Reagan administration policies were political effects stemming from changes in American political institutions. In the short term at least, these changes strengthened the president's standing in Congress. Specifically, passage of the Reagan block grants was greatly aided by the resurgence of the conservative coalition in Congress, the large and surprisingly unified contingents in both legislative chambers, and, to a lesser extent, the relative decline in the political influence of local governments and the concomitant emergence of state government associations as leading members of the intergovernmental lobby.

The Democratic party's seeming loss of philosophical identity in 1981 was exacerbated by the powerful revival of the conservative coalition. The year 1981 witnessed the highest success rate ever scored by the conservative coalition during a single session of Congress since *Congressional Quarterly* began compiling this index in 1957. The conservative coalition succeeded in a whopping 92 percent of the cases in which a majority of Southern Democrats and Republicans opposed a majority of Northern Democrats. This success rate was 20 percentage points higher than in 1980 and 28 points above the average score of the past decade.[42] As a result, President Reagan achieved the highest presidential support score in congressional voting since Lyndon Johnson's triumphs in the Eighty-ninth Congress.[43]

Much of the credit for this conservative revival was attributed at the time to defections by southern conservatives from the Democratic ranks in Congress. Such defections were epitomized by the actions of Representative Phil Gramm,

[41] See, for example, Everett Carll Ladd, "The Brittle Mandate: Electoral Dealignment and the 1980 Presidential Election," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (1981): 1–25; Demetrios Caraley, "Do Congressional Liberals Really Need to Tremble? A Quick Look at Some Hard Data," in ibid., 27–30; and Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, "Sending a Message: Voters and Congress in 1982" (Paper prepared by AEI Policy Week, Washington, D.C., 6–7 December 1982).

[42] *1981 Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 36C.

[43] Ibid, 19C.

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a Democrat from Texas who changed parties in 1983. Gramm actively negotiated with the White House and Republican congressional leaders on bipartisan conservative budget legislation, and had his name prominently affixed to the key budget amendments that shaped the Reconciliation Act. On the initial vote to set sharply lowered budgetary targets (Gramm-Latta I), he was joined by a majority (59 percent) of his Southern Democratic colleagues. Such support reflected widespread Democratic skittishness about the president's popularity in the South and increasing Republican competition for congressional seats in the no longer "solid South." Republicans gained nine House seats in that region in the 1980 election and had gained thirteen seats since 1976. Not a single southern state's House delegation remained solidly Democratic by 1981, and only two such states retained two Democratic Senators.

Although they were important, Democratic defections were not the leading cause of the president's success. In the heated partisan atmosphere of June 1981, a majority of Southern Democrats returned to the party fold in the binding vote on Gramm-Latta II. With only a minority of all Southern Democrats supporting the president on this amendment (33 percent), the vote fell well below the level needed to constitute the conservative coalition.

A more important source of conservative success lay in Republican behavior in 1981. In a major change from normal voting patterns, Republicans in Congress suffered virtually no defections on key votes in 1981. This "striking gain in solidarity" was especially evident in the Senate, where GOP control for the first time in twenty-five years raised party unity scores among Republicans 16 percentage points above 1980 levels.[44] In the House, where the Republicans equaled their largest contingent since the Eisenhower era, the president's economic program evoked similar unity from party members. On the first budget resolution, House Republicans voted 190 to 0 in support of Gramm-Latta I, reducing fiscal year 1982 spending by $36.6 billion. Six weeks later, they voted 188 to 2 in favor of specific budget cuts and block grants in Gramm-Latta II. Finally, they voted 190 to 1 in favor of the president's tax cut bill, reducing federal income taxes 25 percent over three years.[45]

This striking unity does not mean that the so-called Gypsy Moths—moderate Northern Republicans who threatened to abandon the president's position—had no influence in 1981. Prior to the key vote on Gramm-Latta II, for instance, they were able to exact certain concessions on spending for Medicaid and mass transit grants. Moreover, their threats to defect from the so-called Broyhill Amendment (establishing public-health block grants patterned after President Reagan's proposals) led to the exclusion of health block-grant proposals from the Gramm-Latta substitute. By default, the provisions of the Democratic budget proposal establishing four smaller, more tightly regulated health block grants were included in the Reconciliation Act.

[44] Ibid., 30C.

[45] All data were obtained from ibid., 10C.

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Such amendments are part of the normal give and take of legislative politics. In 1981, they were less significant than is generally the case. More important was the ultimate lack of moderate Republican defections on the key votes. Speaker of the House Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill complained that in previous years "we always had 25 or 30 of the Gypsy Moths . . . who voted with us. . . . But as you look at the discipline of the party, last year the Republican voted in lockstep. . . . The President never lost a vote."[46]

This unity, in turn, reflected both long- and short-term factors influencing the Republican party. In the long term, it reflected historic structural developments in the national party organization. Over the past decade, the Republican party has grown increasingly active in recruiting, training, and assisting candidates for Congress, a process that helped elect fifty new Republicans to Congress in 1980 and helped minimize party losses in the 1982 mid-term elections.[47] In the short term, it represented an initial response by a party long out of power, buoyed by the president's initial popularity and ideological vigor and by the Democrats' disorganization. The Reagan administration's subsequent difficulties in furthering its legislative program and in advancing its New Federalism proposals underscored the transient character of many factors responsible for the president's 1981 victories.

Conclusion

Enormous changes have occurred in block grant politics over the past twenty-five years. Although they have always drawn support from a range of sources, block grants have been politically transformed from a predominantly management-oriented device for simplifying program administration and enhancing adaptation to varying local conditions—a concept frequently attracting fragile but bipartisan support—to a concept more closely identified with conservative ideology and sometimes strident opposition to federal involvement in a range of domestic activities.

This shifting emphasis contributed enormously to the enactment of several block grants in 1981, as converging factors temporarily increased conservative influence over policymaking. In the long run, however, this transformation may be less auspicious for advocates of grant consolidation. The president's 1981 block grant coalition quickly fragmented as governors grew disenchanted with further budget cuts, moderate Republicans distanced themselves from the president's program, and the president's popularity began to slide. The Reagan ad-

[46] Quoted in John White, "The Speaker Speaks: A Talk with 'Tip'," *Party Line* 11 (November 1982): 7.

[47] See Gary Jacobson, "Congressional Campaign Finance and the Revival of the Republican Party," in Dennis Hale, ed., *The United States Congress* (Leominster, Mass.: Eusey Press, 1982); and Thomas E. Mann and Norman Ornstein, "1980: A Republical Revival in Congress" *Public Opinion* (October/November 1980); 16–20.

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ministration's general lack of progress in enacting additional block grants and in advancing the president's sweeping "sorting-out" initiative in 1982 underscores the long-term difficulties of passing further consolidations on this basis. Indeed, since his inital success, President Reagan has proposed creating or expanding an additional nineteen block grants. Only one of these proposals, the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982, which restructured and trimmed back the existing CETA block grant, was adopted by Congress. Thus, to the extent that block grants are increasingly perceived as instruments of conservative ideology, it may be difficult to reconstruct support for them as nonpartisan administrative reforms. Once positions have become polarized, it is difficult—though not impossible—to resurrect a more consensual style of politics. Despite the genuine accomplishments of block grant proponents in recent years and the apparent momentum they developed, the political future of block grants remains as problematic and uncertain as ever.*

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Oil Politics and Canada-United States Relations

JOCK A. FINLAYSON
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The Canadian-American relationship has recently undergone major strains. It is hard to believe that scarcely four years have passed since Canadian diplomatic personnel helped a group of American embassy officials escape from Tehran, and in so doing earned for Canada a passionate, if short-lived, vote of thanks on the part of both the American government and the public. The official mood in both capitals then changed dramatically in a relatively short period of time; this was especially evident in 1981. Going into that year, each side had grievances to resolve, but the single biggest irritant to develop recently in Canadian-American affairs did so in 1981 over the question of Canada's attempt to "Canadianize" the domestic oil industry, now dominated by foreign (mostly American) multinationals, as part of its National Energy Program (NEP).[1] It is no exaggeration to state that this one issue soured relations between the two countries to a degree not experienced in a decade, when the Nixon administration's August 1971 imposition of across-the-board surcharges on all imports into the United States signaled to many in Canada that the "special relationship" they believed their country enjoyed with the United States was no more.[2]

[1] Anthony Westell, "Poison Pinpricks," *Foreign Policy*, no. 41 (1981): 95–111.

[2] Michael Tucker, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980), 80–85. To one student of the Canadian-American relationship (an American),

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To be sure, disputes have arisen and have become acute on issues other than energy, particularly since the return of the Liberals to office in Canada in early 1980 and the advent of the Reagan administration at the beginning of the following year. From the Canadian perspective, one of the most serious bilateral issues is acid rain. Ottawa has sought for two years to obtain a commitment from Washington to make an effort to address this issue, but as of the end of 1983 the Reagan administration has not seen fit to do so.[3] Pollution from U.S. factories and power plants, especially along the Great Lakes, has long drifted into Ontario and is believed by many in Canada already to have poisoned numerous lakes and rivers. Perhaps unknown to the U.S. government, acid rain is rapidly becoming a highly charged political issue in Ontario, and Washington's evident lack of interest in the matter is deeply resented north of the border. Another irritant from the Canadian point of view stems from the refusal of the U.S. Senate to ratify the 1979 treaty dealing with east coast fisheries.[4] Once the strength of Senate opposition to the terms of that arrangement became clear, President Ronald Reagan withdrew it rather than face the embarrassment that would have attended formal Senate rejection. As a result of U.S. failure to accept the treaty, the contentious issue of allocating fishing privileges among U.S. and Canadian fishermen in the affected areas continues unresolved.

A third serious problem in Ottawa's view is the failure of the U.S. government to make good the Carter administration's 1980 promise that the U.S. would commence construction of its sections of the 4,800-mile Alaska gas pipeline, designed to bring Alaskan natural gas through Canada to California and the Midwest.[5] On the strength of this promise, and at the cost of considerable domestic criticism, the Liberal government led by Pierre Elliott Trudeau approved construction of the Canadian portions of the pipeline, despite the fact that a firm plan for financing this mammoth and expensive project was not yet in place. The high cost of the project, combined with soft gas markets, virtually doomed the pipeline; if it does, the political repercussions in Canada are sure to be unpleasant for the federal government.

For its part, Washington has complaints of its own on issues other than the NEP and energy. The hawkish outlook of the Reagan administration on defense policy matters has led the U.S. to urge Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty

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"relations between the two countries have never been worse . . . , looking back for a generation or two . . . ." Alexander C. Tomlinson, "The Pearson Conference: An American Reprise," in *Canada and the United States in the 1980s* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations; Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982), 1.

[3] Major aspects of the acid rain problem are summarized in Don Munton, "Political Problems of Acid Rain," *International Perspectives* (January-February 1981): 6–9.

[4] Erik B. Wang, "Canada-United States Fisheries and Maritime Boundary Negotiations: Diplomacy in Deep Water," *Behind the Headlines* 38–39 (April 1981).

[5] See, for an analysis of the "pre-build" issue, John N. McDougall, "Prebuild Phase or Latest Phase? The United States Fuel Market and Canadian Energy Policy," *International Journal* 36 (Winter 1980–81): 117–28.

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TABLE 1

Foreign-Controlled Investment in Canada, by Sector
(Based on Asset Values to End of 1979)

Sector	Percent of Industry Foreign Controlled	Percent of Industry U.S. Controlled
Mining	38.3	30.1
Oil and Gas[1]	62.7	47.4
Total Manufacturing	45.6	34.1
Rubber Industry	90.4	68.6
Transportation Equipment	73.4	68.4
Chemicals Industry	76.5	59.4
Electrical Equipment	60.0	47.5
Heavy Machinery	55.4	46.7
Textiles	55.6	43.9
Metal Fabricating	36.5	29.2
Pulp and Paper	38.6	30.5

Source: Canadian Department of External Affairs, Domestic Information Programs Division, *Canadian Foreign Policy Texts* 83/1, "Relations between Canada and the U.S.A." (Ottawa: January 1983), 3–4.

[1] Based on revenues instead of asset value, foreign control of the oil and gas sector was 79.5 percent in 1979, and U.S. control was 64.1 percent.

Organization (NATO) allies to increase defense spending in line with the U.S. strategy of rearming the West. Canada is already committed to an expensive program to re-equip its armed forces with modern planes and frigates, but this did not prevent the U.S. ambassador in Ottawa from making known his government's feeling in 1982 that Canada did not contribute enough to the security of the Alliance.[6] But a far more serious U.S. complaint, and one with a history of more than a decade, relates to Canadian policy toward foreign direct investment. Since the early 1970s, Canadian political elites have manifested rhetorical opposition to the spread of foreign multinationals within the domestic economy; sometimes the opposition has transcended mere rhetoric and has taken on policy substance. Foreign economic presence is highly visible in Canada, much more so than in most advanced Western countries.

Direct United States Investment in Canada

Many sectors of the Canadian economy are in large measure controlled by foreign direct investment, and as Table 1 indicates, in many instances more than 80 percent of the foreign capital is of U.S. origin. Since the establishment of the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) in 1973, Ottawa has sought to screen all incoming foreign direct investment in order to guarantee that it will provide

[6] Paul H. Robinson, Jr., "Fortifying the Ties that Bind," *Maclean's*, 23 August 1982, 8.

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net benefits to Canada. The U.S. government and American business have consistently argued that FIRA's practices are unfair, discriminatory, and protracted, and that they constitute a major burden for prospective U.S. investors in Canada.[7] In addition, much American opinion intensely disfavors the very principle that governments should control foreign investment and seek to bargain with investors so as to maximize domestic benefits. The dispute over energy is in many respects linked to the deeper and more longstanding American distaste for anything suggestive of "economic nationalism" in Canada. In this regard, it must be noted that the newly elected Liberal government's intention (announced in early April 1980) to strengthen FIRA and to "get tougher" with foreign investment, coming as it did a few months before the unveiling of the NEP, helped to create a climate of suspicion and alarm in Washington that the NEP itself then served greatly to exacerbate.[8]

The National Energy Program

Notwithstanding the areas of concern noted above, as well as other areas, the recent dramatic change in Canada's energy policy was unquestionably the principal reason for the serious deterioration in Canada-U.S. relations. The Trudeau government's desire to reduce the level of foreign ownership in the Canadian energy sector and to strengthen the national government's role in this vital area became policy in the celebrated National Energy Program, which Trudeau presented to Parliament in October 1980 and which, while subsequently modified, will form the basis of Canadian energy policy for at least as long as the Liberal government remains in power.[9] The NEP is really a congeries of measures, ranging from taxation and pricing arrangements to exploration and development incentives. At the outset, the NEP was directed at least as much against the Province of Alberta as it was against the multinationals. But with the Alberta-Ottawa energy accord of September 1981, which moderated certain of the federal government's earlier demands on the province, the brunt of the NEP will come to bear almost fully on the large, foreign-owned companies that still control more than two-thirds of Canada's oil industry (calculated on the basis of revenue).[10]

At stake is nothing less than the future of the foreign multinationals in the Canadian energy sector. It is the policy of the federal government to ensure that at minimum 50 percent of the oil industry be in Canadian hands by the end of the 1980s. After 1990, it is assumed that the momentum of Canadianization will

[7] See Ingrid Bryan, *Economic Policies in Canada* (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982), 115–20.

[8] The government's "nationalist surge" is analyzed succinctly in Tom Kierans, "When Nationalism Costs Too Much," *Policy Options* 4 (1983): 35.

[9] Government of Canada, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, *The National Energy Program, 1980* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1980).

[10] Government of Canada, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, *The National Energy Program, Update 1982: A Summary* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1982), 10.

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be sufficiently strong to guarantee, at some future date, the effective neutralization of what would remain of the foreign-owned oil producers. Some even hold that these producers face ultimate extinction.[11] But whether the outcome be the former or latter, it is clear that Ottawa intends that in the future the foreign multinationals play a very different—and subordinate—role in Canadian energy development. The specific means by which the NEP will begin to bring about this state of affairs include the following: government-encouraged purchases of foreign companies; discrimination against foreign firms in the issuance of federal incentives and grants for hydrocarbon exploration and development; the requirement that all activity in the "Canada Lands"—that is, the Yukon and Northwest Territories, plus the offshore areas where energy analysts expect the most important oil and gas finds to be made in the future—be carried out by companies that are at least 50 percent owned by Canadians; and the enlargement of the state-owned oil company, Petro-Canada, in particular by the means of purchasing foreign-owned firms and by insisting that it be granted a 25 percent interest in all new hydrocarbon discoveries made by anyone on the Canada Lands.

It is plausible to argue that the NEP, particularly its provisions concerning ownership of the oil and gas industry, is the most recent expression of a strong impetus toward economic nationalism that is felt by many, both in Canada and abroad, to have become a more prominent element of Canadian economic policy in recent years. "Economic nationalism" may be defined as the use of public policy instruments to thwart the natural tendencies of uncontrolled international economic forces to bring about increased economic integration and interdependence and thus reduce national sovereignty, or at least national autonomy, over economic matters.

According to this view, the NEP is best understood as an important chapter in a longer story of intervention by the Canadian government to assert greater national control over the economy.[12] In the past two decades, economic nationalism in Canada has primarily manifested itself in connection with the issue of foreign ownership of the economy, which in turn is linked to the broader question of American influence over Canada. Since the mid-1960s, several groups in Canada have persistently argued in favor of national policies to reduce foreign investment and to lessen Canada's general economic dependence on the U.S. In addition to the social democratic New Democratic Party (the third largest party at the level of federal politics), support for action against foreign investment has

[11] Peter Foster, *The Blue-Eyed Sheiks: The Canadian Oil Establishment* (Toronto: Collins, 1979), 49.

[12] One can date the emergence of economic nationalism as a major current of Canadian public policy from the 1890s, at which time the principal nationalistic issue was "the nickel question," by which was meant the attempt to achieve further processing of domestic nickel ores within Canada. O. W. Main, *The Canadian Nickel Industry: A Study In Market Control and Public Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955), 32, 52–60, 76; H. V. Nelles, *The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849–1941* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1974), 326–35, 348–60.

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come from the labor movement, various intellectual circles, and the left wing of the national Liberal party. The appointment of Herbert Gray, the most prominent economic nationalist on the Liberal side of the House of Commons, as minister of industry, trade and commerce following the 1980 election was widely interpreted as a victory for those Liberals anxious to launch a vigorous campaign to lessen the extent and influence of foreign-owned industries. That Gray became the minister with responsibility for FIRA did not serve to ease the worries of those opposed to his policy preferences. Gray immediately reiterated promises made by himself and Prime Minister Trudeau during the 1980 election that FIRA would be strengthened by, inter alia, introducing so-called "performance reviews" of existing foreign-owned enterprises to ensure that they were acting in accordance with government policy.

Given this situation, it is not difficult to understand the belief of many in both Canada and the United States that the assault on the foreign-owned oil firms indicated in the NEP was but part of a broader strategy systematically to reduce the degree of foreign ownership in Canada. That similar federal initiatives in respect of other economic sectors were likely to be forthcoming seemed to be a *parti pris* to many on either side of the Canadian-American border.

That the NEP should not have been regarded as *prima facie* evidence of further interventionism is only apparent with hindsight—if it is apparent at all. Yet a careful analysis of the reasoning that led to the introduction of the NEP should give grounds for reasoned consideration of an alternative position. Rather, the energy program, far from being an omen of future interventionism, was intended to be self-limiting from the outset. As noted earlier, the recent strains in the Canada-U.S. relationship were mainly attributable to the introduction of and reaction to the Canadianization features of the NEP; accordingly the analysis here of the bilateral relationship reflects the centrality of this element in Canadian-American affairs.

In seeking to understand the effect that the Canadianization provisions of the NEP have had on the Canadian-American relationship, it must first be asked why the Trudeau government decided to introduce the NEP. It is possible to peremptorily dismiss the argument—held in certain arch-conservative circles, both in Canada and in the United States—that the NEP was and is the product of a camarilla of socialistic policymakers anxious to use energy as a springboard to more extensive state control of the economy, with the ultimate objective being nothing less than the implementation of socialism north of the border. This said, however, it does remain the case that many influential members of the Trudeau circle of advisers do maintain a commitment to a kind of Galbraithian interventionism in the market place that is now so manifestly out of fashion in Washington.[13] But it would be a grave mistake, it is argued here, to infer from the current

[13] Charles F. Doran, "Left Hand, Right Hand," *International Journal* 36 (Winter 1980–81): 236–40.

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evidence as it relates to energy policy that *dirigisme* must be the order of the day in other sectors of the Canadian economy in coming years. Rather, it seems more likely that the outward thrust of the Canadian state will be confined to the politically charged energy sector, and that Canadianization will ultimately prove to be, by international standards, a comparatively moderate form of nationalization (or, to use a better word, naturalization) of the oil industry. Put differently, the NEP looks like an isolated initiative occasioned not by an ideological commitment to interventionism for its own sake, but rather by a conviction that, for a variety of reasons, swift governmental action was needed in this particular area of national economic life.

Although it is a fairly easy task to demonstrate the existence of a felt need that something be "done about" the large foreign involvement in Canadian energy development, it is far more difficult to demonstrate that the NEP is an effective response to that need.[14] Canadianization of the oil industry may not have been necessary in a purely economic sense, and, indeed, it will probably entail much greater economic costs than benefits, at least over the next decade. But Canadianization may nonetheless have appeared sensible in a political sense for several reasons, the most important of which stem from the undeniable fact that energy (and oil in particular) has become highly politicized, internationally as well as domestically, over the past decade.[15]

The evident fact of the politicization of oil, in Canada as elsewhere, has elicited a political response to what had heretofore been considered (with some notable exceptions) more of an economic than a political issue—the role of foreign capital in resource development.[16] If the view argued here has merit, then one important implication is that—whether "necessary" or not, whether wise or not—the NEP need not and probably will not be a precursor of further intervention in other sectors of economic life in Canada. The NEP will not become a harbinger of further interventionism if the assumption is correct that the energy sector is like no other realm of the economy in that it possesses dimensions that far transcend the purely economic—however important that one dimension might be. For the sake of analysis, the NEP may be looked at from a multidimensional perspective, one in which the important vectors of policy change are

[14] For a critical analysis of the economics of the NEP, see Robert N. McRae, "A Major Shift in Canada's Energy Policy: Impact of the National Energy Program," *Journal of Energy and Development* 7 (1982): 173–98.

[15] Issues get "politicized" when they become subject to agitation and controversy, and subsequently are raised to the top of various national or international policy agendas. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977), 33.

[16] Iron ore, for instance, is a mineral that is not now "politicized," and though some 77 percent of the Canadian iron-ore industry (based on production capacity) is controlled by American companies, there is no evident pressure for "Canadianization" of this sector of the economy. Government of Canada, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, *Iron Ore*, Mineral Bulletin Policy Series MR 148 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1976), 4.

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seen to emerge from a combination of symbolic, fiscal-federalism, economic, and supply-side considerations.

The Symbolic Dimension

Perhaps the most powerful motivating force behind the NEP, this dimension consists in the idea that the energy sector is so vital to national well-being that it has become infused with substantial non-economic (or supra-economic) properties. It is not just that this sector occupies what former Energy Minister Marc Lalonde called the "commanding heights" of the economy. It does; but more to the point, energy has become charged with a kind of symbolism that leads many Canadians—even those not otherwise enamored of the present Liberal government—to consider it a matter of sovereignty, in the political as much as in the economic sense. Canada, an admittedly developed country, is nevertheless similar to certain resource-rich lands of the Third World in having a vital sector of the economy controlled from foreign corporate headquarters. Like Chileans in the years prior to the nationalization of their copper industry, Canadians resent the fact that the power to decide matters of vital national interest (irrespective of how, or whether, that power is exercised) lies outside of the country. To many, it is as incredible to allow the energy sector to be alienated from national domain as it would be to allow the armed forces or the federal or provincial courts to be controlled by foreigners. In a word, such alienation is seen to be a violation of sovereignty, however vaguely understood that concept may be.[17]

This desire, on a symbolic level, to repatriate the energy sector is not confined to the ruling hierarchy in Ottawa. In a country beset by factional, linguistic, and sectional strife, it is hard to find an issue that draws such widespread popular support as Canadianization of the oil and gas industry. Even opinion polls conducted by the oil industry reveal that more than 80 percent of the public support Canadianization as a minimum step in the repatriation process, while some two-thirds of those polled urged that stronger measures be adopted.[18] However unpopular certain other provisions of the NEP might be, it is very hard to come across too many Canadians who would argue against the principle of Canadianization.

The general popularity of the NEP and its Canadianization elements should not, however, be taken to imply that there is a consensus among elites in support of the policy. Indeed, not only the governments of the petroleum-producing provinces but also most of the Canadian business community continue to have grave doubts about the wisdom of the NEP. In part this stems from fears of U.S. retaliation, but it also reflects the strong hostility toward economic nationalism

[17] Perhaps the most well-known discussion, from the left-nationalist perspective, of the impact of foreign direct investment on Canadian economic "sovereignty" is Kari Levitt, *Silent Surrender: The American Economic Empire In Canada* (New York: Liveright, 1970).

[18] *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 16, 23 September 1981.

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and federal *dirigisme* felt by most business elites and some provincial governments. Moreover, the Canadian government's continuing support for a "low price policy" for petroleum is widely regarded by its domestic critics as a transparent political tactic designed to curry favor with the majority of Canadians who reside in parts of the country lacking oil and gas reserves and who understandably do not relish the prospect of paying "world" energy prices.[19] In this respect, the rhetoric of Canadianization gained in popularity because it was also taken to signify the government's adherence to a "made in Canada" oil price; that is, to a price well below that prevailing in world markets or in the United States. Canadians' support for the NEP was probably in no small part dependent on their view that they should continue to pay less for oil than citizens of other Western countries.

The Fiscal-Federalism Dimension

Although only indirectly related to Canadianization per se, this dimension was in large measure responsible for the introduction of the NEP, which as noted earlier was initially directed at least as much against Alberta as it was against the multinational oil companies. One of the stated objectives of the NEP was to arrest what the federal government took to be a dangerous shift in fiscal power away from itself and toward the western resource-rich provinces, the foremost of which is Alberta.[20] With a federal budgetary deficit then approaching some $14 billion a year, it seemed to Ottawa in late 1980 both justifiable and essential to attack the revenue base of the Alberta government, which has over the past few years been massing petrodollars in a "Heritage Fund" that by 1983 contained more than $12 billion.[21]

In their haste to conclude the worst about the NEP, foreign critics perhaps failed to notice that the alarming deterioration in the federal government's financial situation had prompted Ottawa to undertake an almost desperate search for additional revenue sources. The Canadian government's expenditures on the public debt had increased sharply, from less than $3 billion in 1975 to almost $11 billion in 1981. With most of the federal government's revenues committed in advance both to servicing the debt and to providing funds required for social programs (whose cost has been escalating rapidly in recent years), Ottawa feared

[19] Lauren S. McKinsey, "Détente in Canada's Energy War," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 12 (1982): 101.

[20] A good treatment of federal-provincial tensions attending the relative shift of Canadian economic power to the western provinces is John Richards and Larry Pratt, *Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West* (Toronto: McClelland and Steward, 1979), especially ch. 9, "Empire Alberta: The Province as Entrepreneur." Also see Neil Crawford, "Canada's Energy Dilemma: The Viewpoint of the Government of Alberta," in Earl H. Fry, ed., *Energy Development in Canada: The Political, Economic, and Continental Dimensions*, (Provo: Canadian Studies Program, Brigham Young University, 1981), 133–41.

[21] Unless otherwise noted, monetary amounts are expressed in Canadian dollars, which in November 1983 were valued at slightly less than 80 percent of the U.S. dollar.

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that it would lack any significant revenues with which to pursue new programs to help develop the economy. Billions of dollars are required to improve the transportation infrastructure for example, and billions more will be needed if the Canadian government hopes to upgrade Canada's research and development capabilities. Federal energy planners originally believed that the NEP would provide more than $50 billion in new federal revenues over the 1981–86 period, largely at the expense of the oil and gas companies, but partly too by outflanking the energy-producing provinces on the fiscal front. Ottawa's belief that it could solve its financial problems by obtaining a greatly increased share of energy rents was a critical factor in its decision to develop the NEP.

With the energy accords between Ottawa and the provincial governments of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia in the autumn of 1981, federal-provincial energy tensions were reduced significantly. Although Ottawa insisted on preserving its much greater share of total energy rents as specified by the NEP, it compromised on the question of oil prices by agreeing to a more rapid escalation of prices. This was sufficient to obtain the reluctant acquiescence of the Alberta government, the main provincial protagonist. Although Alberta remained unhappy about the thrust of the NEP, it was glad to obtain higher prices for its dwindling conventional oil reserves. The most important remaining area of federal-provincial tension over energy has the federal government pitted against the province of Newfoundland on the question of which one of them ought to control development of oil deposits found in the Hibernia region off the coast of the province. As of December 1983, this issue was still before the Supreme Court of Canada, after having been heard in February 1983 by the Newfoundland Court of Appeals (which found against the province's claim to jurisdiction over Hibernia and other offshore deposits).

The Economic Dimension

The Canadianization issue is directly linked with the larger economic question of the costs and benefits associated with foreign direct investment in the Canadian economy. Viewed from this perspective, the massive foreign presence in the vital energy sector poses problems for Canada—not because of the symbolic aspects of energy discussed earlier, but rather because of the size and success of the foreign oil companies. In short, the economic dimension reduces down to what are primarily balance-of-payments considerations, and in this narrower focus it becomes much easier for economic nationalists to make seemingly convincing arguments for Canadianization. Ironically, this is the case precisely because of the success that the multinationals have enjoyed over the past decade as generators and remitters of vast profits. Domestically owned oil firms raise most of their capital and distribute most of their profits within Canada; foreign-owned oil firms have in the past decade or so also been raising nearly all their capital within Canada, but sending much of their profit

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abroad—chiefly, of course, to their U.S. headquarters. As former Energy Minister Lalonde stated in 1981:

> In spite of all the rhetoric about how much we needed the multinationals and about how they were doing such great things for Canada, all the money that they were spending in this country had been raised inside Canada, out of the Canadian taxpayers and the Canadian consumers, and . . . since 1974 the industry had been a net exporter to the tune of about $3.7 billion. . . .[22]

The economic, or balance-of-payments, argument against the multinational oil industry has become more compelling since Canada ceased being a net exporter of crude oil in the mid-1970s.[23] Prior to that time, export earnings from crude-oil sales dwarfed the capital outflows associated with debt-servicing and profit-remitting by the foreign oil companies. But since the late 1970s, the Canadian balance-of-payments has suffered from the paucity of oil exports, and the capital sent abroad by the multinationals has appeared more conspicuous and alarming to the federal government's energy policymakers. In large part because of heavy foreign ownership of many Canadian industries, Canada has been registering growing deficits on current account, notwithstanding consistently heavy surpluses on merchandise trade. It became undesirable for the multinationals to be seen doing what they have, after all, been doing for some time—earning money for the foreign investors who originally brought them into Canada.[24] For nearly a quarter of a century, a protracted and inconclusive debate on the merits and costs of foreign investment has raged within Canada. Neither side has been able to demonstrate convincingly the effects of such investment on the overall economic performance of Canada, but the economic nationalists have made some good yardage out of the balance-of-payments consequences of foreign investment and ownership over the short term. The irony is that their excellent track record in making and patriating profits constitutes one of the major obstacles facing the multinationals as they seek to make their case to the govern-

[22] Quoted in Melville Watkins, "In Defence of the National Energy Program," *Canadian Forum* 66 (June-July 1981): 7.

[23] It should be noted that Lalonde and others in government were not advancing the thesis that the multinationals were "decapitalizing" Canada (though more radical critics of foreign direct investment have so argued). For an excellent treatment of the distinction between the "decapitalization" thesis, which alleges that foreign direct investment actually depletes a host country's capital stock, and the "foreign exchange gap" thesis, which maintains that such investment often puts pressure on a host's balance of payments, see Benjamin J. Cohen, *The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 174–76.

[24] The literature on foreign direct investment in Canada is voluminous. Readers interested in pursuing this topic should consult the following two introductions to the fundamental issues: Grant L. Reuber, "Foreign Investment in Canada: A Review," in D. A. Auld, ed., *Economics: Contemporary Issues In Canada* (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 161–80; and A. E. Safarian, "Foreign Direct Investment from a Canadian Perspective," in W. Andrew Axline et al., eds., *Continental Community? Independence and Integration in North America* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), 274–301.

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ment and public, for as will be shown they are also attacked for their recent lack of success in finding and producing Canadian oil.

The "Supply-Side" Dimension

If the economic case against the multinationals is that they have been too good at generating and exporting profits over the past decades, the "supply-side" case is quite the reverse; it maintains that the foreign-owned oil sector has been woefully incompetent as a producer of crude oil. Like the hockey player who cannot skate but has no slap-shot, the multinationals are held to be both too exploitative *and* too inefficient. For those who seize upon the supply side as the worst of the multinationals' failings, the question of the moment seems to be: "If you're so good at what you do, how is it that you have turned a country that was until recently a large exporter of crude oil into one that is a large importer?"

Wherever the blame for this situation might lie (and a dispassionate observer might suggest that it could be fairly generously distributed among a variety of governmental and private-sector bodies), it is undeniable that prior to the current severe recession Canada had become uncomfortably dependent upon imported crude oil. No student of oil in Canada can forget that only one decade ago, a federal (Liberal, incidentally) energy minister, relying on data provided by the multinational-dominated Canadian Petroleum Association, predicted that based on 1971 rates of consumption, Canada had 923 years of oil left.[25] On closer inspection, these "hundreds of years" turned out to be 15, and then slightly more than 11. And instead of being able to continue exporting more than 1 million barrels a day (MBD) to the United States, Canada by the middle of the 1970s became a net importer of crude, a category that it will not likely leave until the 1990s at the earliest. Today, some 25 percent of total Canadian consumption (which is about 1.85 MBD) is accounted for by imports. Within a few years, it is probable that Canada will be as dependent on imports as a percentage of consumption as the United States. It is already more dependent upon imports from the Middle East than is the United States.[26]

Given the recent record of oil production in Canada, there are many who are prepared to argue for Canadianization on efficiency grounds alone. And there are many others who, like the nationalist economist Melville Watkins, have numerous reasons to dislike the multinationals, and who fear that Canada's energy crisis will never be solved by giving "yet more power to the very companies that helped to bring us that crisis in the first place."[27] The nationalists see

[25] H. V. Nelles, "Canadian Energy Policy, 1945–1980: A Federalist Perspective," in R. Kenneth Carty and W. Peter Ward, eds., *Entering the Eighties: Canada in Crisis* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1980), 98.

[26] David G. Haglund, "Canada and the International Politics of Oil: Latin American Source of Supply and Import Vulnerability in the 1980s," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 15 (1982): 259–98.

[27] Watkins, "In Defence of the National Energy Program," 6–7.

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the supply-side performance as clinching the argument against the foreign-owned oil companies, and wonder why the government does not move faster and farther than it has to date.

The decision of the Liberal government to fashion a new energy policy for Canada has thus resulted from a number of political and economic imperatives that are at least in some respect specific to the energy sector. While the NEP was loudly applauded by those who have in the past advocated a greater dose of economic nationalism and federal government intervention in economic affairs, they, like the NEP's many critics, may have overlooked the uniqueness of energy as a policy issue and thus mistakenly believed that the government's new approach to this sector portended major changes in other sectors as well. The dramatic medicine administered by the Canadian government in the NEP may or may not prove to be an effective strategy to meet Canada's energy needs, but in the meantime there is little reason to assume, as so many have apparently done, that greater state intervention and Canadianization will be the orders of the day for the other sectors of the Canadian economy.

The terrible economic slump of 1982, which affected Canada more severely than almost any other industrial country, prompted the Canadian government to dispense with any plans it might have had to take new economic policy initiatives as it became increasingly preoccupied with immediate pressures and concerns. It must also be noted that Herbert Gray was removed as minister of industry, trade and commerce in the autumn of 1982 and replaced with a minister who has publicly indicated his opposition to toughening Canada's foreign investment rules. In addition, several government ministers have made it quite clear that no "son of NEP" is being considered. In short, the fears of those who argued that the NEP presaged major across-the-board changes in Canadian economic and industrial policy have so far been shown to be unfounded. Of course, this result was not yet known when the United States formulated its response to the NEP in 1981, and it is to a consideration of the U.S. reaction that attention may now be turned.

The United States Response

United States unhappiness with Canada's new energy program stemmed from both a litany of specific complaints concerning Ottawa's new treatment of foreign oil companies and a more general unease about the entire thrust of Canada's evolving attitude toward foreign investment. Specifically, U.S. government officials have joined industry spokespersons and the American business media in denouncing the provisions in the NEP that manifestly discriminated against non-Canadian oil companies in the allocation of government tax and investment incentives in areas under federal jurisdiction. Also a source of extreme irritation to U.S. critics was the NEP provision giving the federal government a retroactive 25 percent interest in hydrocarbons discovered on lands leased from Ottawa. To some, this was tantamount to "confiscation," since the amount of compensation

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to be offered was seen as far less than the market value of the discovered fuels would dictate. (It should be noted that this part of the NEP applies equally to Canadian-owned firms operating on federal lands.) The various policies envisaged by the NEP to "Canadianize" the oil and gas industries are held to be highly injurious to U.S. capital already invested in the Canadian energy sector. Not only is the future role of foreign-owned companies to be sharply circumscribed, but the value of capital in place will be reduced through the discriminatory treatment mandated by the new program, thus permitting wily Canadian investors to buy out American companies at "bargain basement" prices.

In addition to, and in some respects more important than, these specific complaints concerning Ottawa's energy policy, American spokespersons purported to see a link between the NEP and the alleged growing hostility of the Canadian government toward all direct foreign investment. According to this view—which remains current if not widespread in Washington—the discriminatory features of the NEP emanated from the approach established in the early 1970s, when the Foreign Investment Review Agency was created to regulate both foreign takeovers of Canadian firms and all new foreign investment.[28] As Myer Rashish, former U.S. under secretary of state for economic affairs, put it:

> Canadian investment policies unjustly discriminate against U.S. and foreign investors. These policies clearly represent a major departure from the principle of "national treatment" for all enterprises established in a country, regardless of their nationality.[29]

Canada is a signatory to a 1976 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) code prohibiting discrimination by host governments against foreign investment. However, Ottawa insisted (and was joined by other signatories in this) that its endorsement of the OECD guideline calling for "national treatment" of foreign investment was a qualified one that allowed for occasional and exceptional derogations from the principle.[30] Another international agreement requiring national treatment is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Article III of the GATT calls for equal treatment of imported and domestic goods in terms of government taxes and regulations. To the extent that both the NEP and FIRA require foreign firms to obtain a certain share of their purchases of goods from Canadian suppliers, foreign governments can plausibly allege that Ottawa has violated its international obligations. As an initial response to the NEP Washington decided to pursue complaints against the foreign-investment aspects of the new policy in both the OECD and GATT forums.

[28] Canadian investment-screening measures, including those predating FIRA, are discussed in Wallace C. Koehler, Jr., "Foreign Ownership Policies in Canada: 'From Colony to Nation' Again," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 11 (1981): 77–97.

[29] Myer Rashish, speech to the Center for Inter-American Relations, New York City, 22 September 1981. Information Release, United States International Communication Agency, United States Embassy, Ottawa.

[30] Edward Wonder, "The U.S. Government Response to the Canadian National Energy Program," *Canadian Public Policy* 8 (1982): 482–83.

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In addition to lodging complaints against Canada in international forums, the U.S. administration and Congress gave serious consideration to several other retaliatory moves. Proposals to limit the ability of Canadians to invest in the United States were deliberated in Congress. The House and Senate approved a bill that imposed U.S. margin requirements in cases where foreign firms sought to buy more than 5 percent of the stock of an American company. Canadian firms contemplating takeovers are permitted to borrow the entire purchase price from Canadian banks, while in the U.S. no more than half the funds needed may be borrowed. Here the U.S. can claim quite legitimately that the aim was simply to establish regulations governing takeovers that do not discriminate against domestic companies.

A second proposal considered by Congress also touched on the question of foreign investment in the United States. In July 1981, a House subcommittee passed a bill mandating a nine-month moratorium on foreign purchases of more than 5 percent of any American company holding mineral leases on federal land, a bill introduced in the wake of several attempts by Canadian enterprises to take over large U.S. concerns. Also under consideration for a time was a plan to deny Canadian firms access to leases on lands under federal control for exploitation of mineral resources by categorizing Canada as a "non-reciprocal" country under the terms of the U.S. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920. However, Secretary of the Interior James Watt successfully resisted congressional calls to have Canada stripped of its reciprocal status as a consequence of the discriminatory investment elements of the NEP.

It may be useful to ask how Canada's Liberal government would react to measures to restrict Canadian investment opportunities in the United States. In light of unprecedented net investment outflows from Canada and a very sharp rise in Canadian direct investment in the United States in recent years, the Ottawa government may welcome American legislation making it more difficult for skittish Canadian investors to send their scarce capital south. U.S. restrictions on Canadian investment in the energy sector in particular would likely elicit a palpable sigh of relief from Ottawa; the millions of exploration dollars and scores of Canadian oil rigs that moved into the U.S. after the introduction of the NEP discomfited the Trudeau government.

If Washington really wanted to pressure Ottawa to make changes in its energy and foreign investment policies, a more effective approach might be to offer *preferential* treatment to Canadian investors! In any case, impeding the flow of Canadian investment southward would scarcely benefit the U.S. economy.[31] Another retaliatory route that Washington could have pursued involved the im-

[31] It is sometimes overlooked that while the United States has some $50 billion of direct investment in Canada, Canadians have more than $16 billion of direct investment in the United States. Thus, on a per capita basis, Canadian direct investment in the United States is much larger than American investment in Canada. Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs, Domestic Information Programs Division, *Canadian Foreign Policy Texts*, 83/1, "Relations between Canada and the USA" (Ottawa: 9 January 1983), 13.

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position of trade barriers against imports from Canada, which relies on the U.S. market for about 70 percent of all its exports, and over 80 percent of manufactured exports.[32] Several observers noted that the president could have invoked Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act if he found that Canada's economic policies discriminated against or caused harm to U.S. commercial interests. The extremely broad and flexible nature of this section permits the president to act first and schedule public hearings later, and allows for such actions as the imposition of higher trade barriers and the temporary abrogation of trade agreements previously negotiated with an offending country. If the authority provided by the Trade Act had been used to suspend bilateral trade accords, the consequences for the Canadian economy would have been serious indeed. In view of Canada's heavy reliance on the United States as a trade partner—a dependence that is highly asymmetrical since the U.S. buys 18 percent of everything produced in Canada while Canada, despite being the largest foreign market for U.S. production accounts for only 1.8 percent of all U.S. production—trade restrictions are undoubtedly a potent retaliatory instrument.

Fortunately, resort to such a drastic step was eschewed by Washington, despite the urgings of some congressional and business critics of Canadian policy. Instead, the U.S. government chose to "multilateralize" the NEP dispute by complaining to the GATT, where it argued that the value of lower tariffs previously negotiated with Canada was being "nullified or impaired" by Canada's attempts to compel both foreign and domestically owned energy firms to acquire a portion of their purchases of supplies from Canadian companies. The U.S. also argued, as noted earlier, that the NEP violated GATT provisions concerning "national treatment," a claim denied by Ottawa. If GATT adjudicatory bodies should come out in support of the U.S. position on these matters, Washington can then take limited retaliatory steps in a way fully consistent with existing trade law and international obligations and less offensive to Canada than bilateral sanctions would be.

Finally, another consequence of American displeasure over the NEP was that Canada found it more difficult to obtain the cooperation of U.S. authorities on some of the issues discussed earlier, such as acid rain and the East Coast fisheries question. In part this may have stemmed from a deliberate attempt by the U.S. government to put pressure on or perhaps punish Canada. Perhaps more persuasive is the view that the unhappiness generated by the NEP in Congress and in the business community simply precluded a forthcoming American diplomatic attitude in other areas. During 1981, few in Washington were disposed to make "concessions" to Canada on matters of concern to the Ottawa government.

[32] Government of Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Canada-United States Relations*, vol. 2, *Canada's Trade Relations with the United States* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1978).

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Conclusion

The recent energy and investment dispute between Canada and the U.S. is a reminder that strains are to be expected in what has withal been a bilateral relationship characterized more by harmony than by discord. Undoubtedly the economic policy approaches and philosophies of the Reagan and Trudeau governments diverge in many important respects. Thus, it would have been surprising indeed if Canada's new energy program did not cause concern among government and business circles in the United States. However, it is argued here that the severity of the conflict reflected more a difference in style than in substance.

This is not to say substantive matters were not at issue in the bilateral dispute; clearly the United States and Canada did have conflicting interests at stake. Although the Congressional opposition to the NEP stemmed from a variety of sources, the Reagan administration made it quite evident that it was against the NEP primarily on grounds of high principle. Specifically, the White House mounted a vigorous defense of the principle of nondiscrimination in international investment and, to a lesser extent, in trade—a principle that it feared would have been severely compromised if Canada, one of the charter members of the GATT-OECD liberal economic regime of the post-World War II decades, could with impunity adopt legislation that, to Washington at least, suggested the country was veering in the direction of interventionism and protectionism. The Canadian interest was similarly one of principle, but it was at the same time more tangible than the American one. For Canada, the rights of sovereign states to regulate their international economic affairs in what seemed to be the national interest took precedence over generalized commitments to a more liberal investment and trade order—commitments that were in any case so qualified, in the Canadian view, as to permit countries to depart from them with good cause. And in the sector of energy, Ottawa judged that for reasons discussed above it had ample cause to invoke the argument of exceptionalism.

Differences in principle notwithstanding, the Canadian-American conflict over the NEP was distinguished by the extent to which its course was shaped by fundamental misperceptions on the part of both actors, above all the United States. It is hard to escape the conclusion that had the Reagan administration in 1981 not assumed that the NEP must inevitably lead to further interventionism on Ottawa's part, the tone of Canadian-American diplomacy would have been substantially muted. And, it bears emphasizing, what made the NEP dispute so noteworthy was not the fact that distinct interests were being pursued by each side, but rather the shrillness of the rhetoric that passed between both capitals.

It is not the intention here to argue the ultimately fruitless question of whether Washington was "wrong" in its opposition to the NEP, and Ottawa "right" in its defense of it. Good arguments can be and have been made against the NEP, but one argument that was given more credence than it warranted was the argument

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that confused an exceptional energy policy with a generalized program of *dirigisme*.

Despite the claims of some students of the bilateral relationship that the events of 1981 marked, in the words of Stephen Clarkson, "an important turning point in the two states' previous history of generally tranquil and tolerant interactions," the strains engendered by the NEP seem rather to have been, for all their temporarily alarming aspects, eminently containable within the yet strong fabric of Canadian-American bilateral diplomacy.[33] It may be taking the matter too far to maintain, as Edward Wonder has, that the dispute over the NEP actually had a salutary effect, given that "the fact that further disruption has been avoided may point to the enduring nature of what certainly is not a 'special relationship,' but one which does have unique qualities."[34] Nevertheless, that the dispute was contained so rapidly is undeniable—and quite surprising, in view of the harsh tones of protest and counter-protest that emanated from either side of the border in 1981 and early 1982.

The two countries continue to have their differences on a range of issues, of which energy is only one. But, indicative of the evident decision of Washington to accept Canadianization for the time being, even in the domain of energy, the NEP is no longer the major issue of the moment.[35] Instead, the far more prosaic, if important, question of the export price of Canadian natural gas now dominates the bilateral energy agenda. Washington wants more "realistic" (that is, lower) energy prices for imports of Canadian natural gas, while Ottawa, concerned about recent declines in American purchases, seeks to hit upon a pricing strategy that will yield a greater volume of sales, but at a price that does not appear to be "concessionary."*

[33] Stephen Clarkson, *Canada and the Reagan Challenge: Crisis in the Canadian-American Relationship* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for Economic Policy, 1982), 48.

[34] Wonder, "U.S. Response to the Canadian National Energy Program," 480.

[35] American diplomats and policymakers, it must be noted, are quick to assert they have never opposed the principle of Canadianization; it is only the means they object to.

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Political Struggle and Institutional Reorganization in Yugoslavia

PEDRO RAMET

One of the most salient, if less remarked upon, characteristics of Communist regimes is the frequency with which basic political institutional arrangements are overhauled. Almost every Communist country has had at least two constitutions; some (such as the Soviet Union) have had three, and Yugoslavia is now under its fourth constitution since the Communists came to power. In most cases the leader, originally simply general-secretary of his respective party, later became premier as well, then dropped the premiership, retaining only the secretaryship. Finally, in most cases over the course of the 1970s, the leader would add the title of president (head of state). These and other analogous changes were usually explained as symptoms of the process of "building communism," a process that, apparently by definition, has to involve regular institutional adjustments. In reality, however, the changes have had almost nothing to do with building anything, and reflect rather the pervasive instability in monocratic systems. When there are no organizational alternatives, political competition—which might otherwise be expressed in the struggle between rival organizations—is naturally transferred into the monopoly party itself and therefore expresses itself in part as a struggle over organizational forms.

It is thus symptomatic of a popular misconception to believe that the most significant question in Communist succession struggles is: "Who will lead?" Quite the contrary; far more important is the intensification of the struggle over institutional forms that invariably emerges in conditions of political fluidity. The

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central question, then, is not "who will rule?" but rather "what form will that rule take?" This throws into focus the meaning of the organizational instability and the persistence of currents for "reform" in Yugoslavia, and suggests that the post-Tito debate over "democratization" (*demokratizacija*) should be understood not as a major departure from previous political behavior, but rather as a renewed expression of a constant theme in Yugoslav Communist politics.

Party Dynamics in Yugoslavia

As with previous organizational debates in Yugoslavia (the most memorable being those of 1963–67 and 1969–74), the current debate is carried on both at the level of broad concepts and at the level of ostensible minutiae. It is because of the latter aspect that observers are sometimes lulled into the supposition that certain organizational changes are "routine" or "without significance" or, to put it another way, merely a reflection of the process of "building communism." But, to take a small but clear example, when it was proposed in 1981 that the term of office of party chairman be lengthened from one to two years, its logic was not efficiency but rather the strengthening of a federal office at the expense of the federal units.

The current Yugoslav debate over institutional reorganization is remarkably similar to previous such debates, with the issue generally posed in terms of centralization versus decentralization, and hard line (*čvrsta ruka*) versus liberalism (*liberalizam*). Two important differences from the past are worth mentioning, however. First, where the current debate is limited to the party and governmental hierarchies, the earlier debates embraced also the umbrella organization known as the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY), which involves non-party members, including theists, in policy discussion. Stevan Vračar, Stane Kavčić and even Krste Crvenkovski became identified with proposals to strengthen the role of SAWPY, and it was later claimed that efforts were made to build up SAWPY as an independent political party, an organizational rival to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY).[1] A second difference has to do with the changed political context in which the debate has taken place. At the risk of some oversimplification, it might be said that the difference between Yugoslavia's situation in 1984 and what it was in 1964 or even 1974 is that the centripetal forces ([Josip Broz] Tito, self-management, the secret police, the political myths) have been weakened, so that disintegrative forces automatically appear more threatening. In the current context, therefore, a debate over party reorganization immediately takes on additional overtones (such as overtones of republican "etatism"—a species of disintegrative nationalism—and "leaderism").

[1] The leadership of SAWPY Montenegro was targeted as especially guilty in this regard. See the report by Dobroslav Čulafić in *Sedma sednica Predsedništva Saveza komunista Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1970), 111–12; report by Jure Bilić in *Deseti Kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije (Beograd, 27–30 V. 1974.)—Stenografske beleške*, 4 vols. (Belgrade: Komunist, 1975), 2: 369; and *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 11 November 1969.

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Offical Yugoslav accounts record July 1966 as the triumph of "liberal" reform over hardline centralism, and December 1971 as the triumph of "moderation" over disintegrative liberalism. The impression is created that the so-called liberals were somehow disloyal to Yugoslav socialism and even that their program would have wrecked the Yugoslav federation. In reality, these "liberals" were moderate reformers who took a more literal interpretation of written guarantees both to citizens and to the federal units. The Ninth Party Congress (held in March 1969) represented a victory for this current of "liberal" reform, as party statutes were revised to allow members to hold opinions contrary to the majority even after a decision was taken, though not to oppose an adopted policy. The "liberal" coalition scored a major victory when the LCY Central Committee (CC) was abolished and replaced by a Presidium chosen by republic party congresses.[2] And though the Central Committee was reestablished at the Tenth Party Congress in 1974, the republican parties retained the right to select their own Central Committee deputies, who then elect the CC Presidium.

Even before the Ninth Party Congress, there had been warnings that republican and even local party organizations had been openly defying directions from the center. A key document prepared before the Ninth Congress noted that some local party

> organizations and committees have reacted very vehemently when control commissions have overturned their decisions. They have a hard time accepting the arguments given out by the control commissions and think that they are always in the right and consider their methods the most objective. There are [even] exceptional cases in which certain organizations refused to accept decisions of the control commissions.[3]

After the Congress, centrists became even gloomier and one Serbian party official dourly objected that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was in danger of becoming a "league of leagues of communists," as republican organizations aggrandized too much power.[4]

If party statutes adopted at the Ninth Party Congress had increased the freedom and power of the party apparatuses of the constituent federal units, the statutes adopted at the Tenth Congress (May 1974) curtailed this freedom and revived the stress on democratic centralism. And where the 1969 statutes had allowed individual party members to submit proposals for discussion at conferences, congresses, and in party organs and to express their own views, the 1974 statutes allowed party members only the right to submit questions for discussion in LCY organs (not to congresses and conferences). The thrust of the 1974 Congress was to repudiate the program of federalization of the party (the restoration of a 166-member CC being one symptom of this repudiation), to strengthen

[2] Paul Shoup, "Problems Facing the Party" (Paper presented at a conference, "Yugoslavia: Accomplishments and Problems," Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 16 October 1977), 9.

[3] *Nacrti dokumenata za Kongres SKJ* (Belgrade: Komunist, 1969), 110.

[4] Othmar Nikola Haberd, *Parteiorganisation und nationale Frage in Jugoslawien* (Berlin: Osteuropa-Institut an der Freien Universität Berlin, 1976), 97.

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party discipline, and to increase the representation of the military in the upper rungs of the party.[5]

The Eleventh Party Congress of June 1978, despite its dramatization of Edvard Kardelj's *Pravci razvoja političkog sistema socijalističkog samoupravljanja*, published on the eve of the Congress, offered no departures of any consequence, and represented rather an attempt to freeze the political status quo and to justify its principal premises.[6] Despite the ostensible self-confidence of party spokespersons, there were persistent signs of problems of party control, problems that represented in part the heritage of the decentralization of the 1960s and early 1970s, and in part unforeseen consequences of that decentralization. Organizational differences between the republican parties, the provincial parties, and the LCY apparatus itself resulted in a certain amount of confusion; the official report presented at the Eleventh Congress suggested that these differences—themselves products of decentralization—had "impeded communication between the leaderships of the republican and provincial parties and the [central] organs of the LCY in the execution of current assignments."[7] Others warned that both the content and the method of ideological training had been inadequate. Even in the realm of policymaking, weaknesses were noted. For instance, in autumn 1981 the Central Committee of the LCY, repeating a charge made already once during the summer, criticized the work of the Party Presidium for inactivity, indecisiveness, and lack of energy, with several CC members specifically upbraiding the Presidium for having failed to set forth a clear economic policy.[8] These sundry failings were neatly summed up by Slavko Šajber, who told the Twenty-first session of the CC LCY, on 30 September 1981, that "the League of Communists today operates neither in the old way, nor in a new way. The League of Communists simply operates inadequately."[9]

The LCY has thus been confronted with two distinct, though related, problems: the struggle over reform (manifesting itself in efforts to strengthen the autonomy of the republican party organizations, as well as in debates over party discipline and the role of SAWPY); and persistent worries over the alleged inefficiency of the party. The connection between the two issues lies in the utility of "proof" of inefficiency to those who seek to alter the balance of power within the party, specifically to those seeking to roll back devolutionary concessions and to use reorganizational schemes to tighten central party control. The cam-

[5] Slobodan Stanković, "Jugoslawien—ein Jahr nach dem X. Parteitag," *Osteuropa* 25 (1975): 493–95.

[6] Edvard Kardelj, *Democracy and Socialism*, Margot and Boško Milosavljević, trans., (London: Summerfield Press, 1978).

[7] *Jedanaesti Kongres Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije (Beograd, 20–23. Juna 1978.)—Magnetofonske beleške*, 6 vols. (Belgrade: Komunist, 1981), 1: 142.

[8] *Sedmi kongres Saveza komunista Hrvatske (7–9 IV. 1974.)—Stenografske bilješke*, 3 vols. (Zagreb, 1974), 1:185; and *Handelsblatt*, 2 October 1981.

[9] Quoted in Tanjug, 30 September 1981, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 2 October 1981.

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paign to recentralize the party appears to have solid backing in many upper reaches of the party apparatus and to have built up a certain momentum, but certain elite spokespersons have continued to resist their campaign.[10]

A Holy Alliance of National Bureaucracies?

Because the regional party organization of the Albanian-populated autonomous province of Kosovo had directly benefited from the earlier decentralization and had suppressed information about internal problems, the outbreak of Albanian irredentist violence in the spring of 1981 provided useful ammunition for would-be recentralizers, who can now point to Kosovo and link "excessive" decentralization with "counterrevolution." Throughout the summer of 1981, Serbian and Bosnian party officials continued to assail "unacceptable tendencies toward the federalization or even confederalization"[11] of the party, while Serbian party theorist Dragomir Drašković urged the party to retreat from its evolution "into a holy alliance of national bureaucracies."[12]

Specifically, the "recentralizers" seek to accomplish three objectives. First, they want to scale down the autonomy of the regional party organizations of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Second, they would require greater coordination among the republics in various policy realms, including education, transport, price policy, and supplies, and increase the role of federal agencies in supervising this coordination (some recent proposals affecting the interrepublican committee system may reflect this current). Finally, recentralizers seek to tighten party discipline and to reestablish party control over an increasingly unruly press. (One symptom of the growing tension between regime and the press was the arrest of several Yugoslav journalists who attempted to cover the riots in Kosovo in March 1982.) To accomplish these purposes, the hard-liners launched a campaign to confuse the issues and to attempt to shift the burden of proof from themselves to the "neo-liberals." Branko Mikulić, a leading member of the Bosnian party occupying a middle position between the "liberals" and the recentralizers, told the twenty-third plenum of the LCY that discussion of the "alleged federalization" of the party was designed by hard-liners to open the floodgates to reconsolidation of the party as a highly centralized institution of control.[13] At more or less the same time, Mirjana Trajković championed the centralist line, observing that "lately, it appears it has been forgotten that the LCY is a unified organization whose democratically adopted general political

[10] See Pedro Ramet, "Yugoslavia's Debate over Democratization," in *Survey* 25 (1980): 43–48, for a specific indication of some of the leading liberals and hard-liners in Yugoslavia today.

[11] *NIN (Nedjelne informative novine)*, no. 1594, 19 July 1981, 8.

[12] Quoted in Slobodan Standović, "Yugoslavia: One or Eight Communist Parties?" *Radio Free Europe Research*, 21 August 1981, 4.

[13] *Borba*, 24 December 1981.

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line must be implemented without any exception by all its parts."[14] Others stirred up old fears and warned that, since Tito's death, certain unnamed elements were once more looking to SAWPY as an embryonic potential opposition party. "According to their intentions," alleged Bosnian legist Fuad Muhić:

> SAWPY should facilitate the unleashing of all shades of ideological orientations, [resulting] by that means in a kind of "ideological pluralism" . . . and gradually put[ting] the LCY behind it as a party of "old Bolsheviks" (*stare ljevice*) . . . [and culminating in] the legalization of a multiparty system.[15]

Discussion over SAWPY's role began in earnest already in 1966, with CC member Slavko Milosavlevski's exhortation in the pages of *Gledišta* to empower mass organizations such as SAWPY to reach their own determinations, and even to differ with the party over policy matters.[16] Stevan Vračar seconded this motion, arguing further that SAWPY be transformed into a second party, thus creating a two-party system in Yugoslavia.[17] Professor Andrija Gams joined the chorus in 1968, insisting on the necessity of permitting the establishment of what he called "an organized political opposition."[18] But these various proposals ultimately led nowhere, and the party center has continued to denounce programs for turning SAWPY into a "rival organization." Some dissatisfaction remains, however, as demonstrated by Jovan Marjanović's complaint late in 1981 that "SAWPY today is illegitimately pushed to the periphery of discussions involving party assemblies."[19]

Yet the idea of restoring a multiparty system in Yugoslavia has continued to haunt Yugoslav writers; most recently, in a 1983 publication, two young political scientists from Belgrade denied that there was any necessary connection between socialism and a one-party system and have argued that there are no practical or ideological or even legal obstacles militating against the introduction of political pluralism in Yugoslavia.[20]

The new congeries of liberals in the party has a vision as different from the hard-liners' caricature of it as it is from the hard-liners' program itself. The weakness of the liberal position, however, is that it is not clear that there exists a single, explicitly formulated liberal program with which to oppose the hard-

[14] Radio Belgrade, 8 November 1981, translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 13 November 1981.

[15] *Oslobodjenje* 27 March 1981.

[16] April Carter, *Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia: the Changing Role of the Party* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), 97–98.

[17] "Jugoslawischer Theoretiker für Zweiparteiensystem," in *Osteuropäische Rundschau* 13 (December 1967): 19–21. See also the summary by Štefica Deren in "Recenzije i prikazi," in *Politička misao* (1967): 534–35.

[18] *Politika*, 18 May 1968.

[19] Quoted in *Politika*, November 7 1981.

[20] Vojislav Koštunica and Kosta Čavoški, *Stranački pluralizam ili monizam* (Belgrade: Institute for Social Science, 1983), as summarized in Zdenko Antić, "Yugoslav Authors Plead for Socialist Multiparty System," *Radio Free Europe Research*, 17 November 1983, 1, 4.

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liners; rather, there are various individual initiatives, proposals, and demands that are mutually compatible and that reflect a rival vision of the role of the LCY in Yugoslav society. This rival vision has perhaps been most clearly articulated by Croatian journalist Antun Žvan, who argued in February 1981 that the principle of democratic centralism (by which members are obliged to refrain from arguing against party policy once it is fixed) had become obsolete, and that the looser arrangement more fitting in Yugoslav society would be better described by the term "democratic unity." One of the paradoxical dimensions of this particular controversy involves the technicality that party members are bound to adhere to party decisions when engaged in discussions in self-managing organs, even though non-party members are free to articulate any views they desire. Liberal critics now charge that this means that Yugoslav Communists have fewer rights than non-Communists.

As far as party reorganization is concerned, liberal aims have focused on four issues: preventing the redistribution of devolved powers back to the federation; introducing the secret ballot for the election of party executive bodies and the LCY Central Committee; allowing the appearance of multiple-candidate elections on ballots for party posts; and making CC members responsible to the republican organizations they represent rather than to the LCY. Under the current party statute, CC members are held responsible to the committee itself, making the committee the primary judge of its own work. A proposal was, however, put forward in late 1981 to make the members responsible to the organs which elected them to the committee—this, quite obviously, would have been a step in the direction of the federalization of the party. That this proposal should have appeared in conjunction with a plan to strengthen the role of the CC at the expense of the LCY Presidium, the linchpin of the system, makes it clear how unstable the balance of power between liberals and hard-liners in Yugoslavia actually is.[21]

The liberals lost at least one battle in the drive to shift power from the Presidium to the CC. The party as a whole was agreed that the post of president of the LCY (Tito's old post) should be removed from the party statutes at the Twelfth Party Congress. Disagreement ensued over what should replace it. Liberals suggested establishment of a president of the Central Committee. Others preferred election of a president of the CC Presidium. The latter position was ultimately adopted in an unmistakable setback for liberals.[22]

In some ways, however, it is the issue of the secret ballot that remains one of the most vitriolic, chiefly because it strikes directly at party control of appointments, but also because it calls into question the legitimacy of open ballots and thus implicitly of political institutions that rest on open ballots. The case for a

[21] *Komunist*, 9 October 1981; and *Politika*, 17 March 1982.

[22] See Slobodan Stanković, "Precongress Struggle in Yugoslavia over Party Statutes," *Radio Free Europe Research*, 27 January 1982, 3; and Jens Reuter, "Der XII. Kongress des BdKJ," in *Südost Europa* 31 (1982): 380–85.

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secret ballot was succinctly made by former Foreign Minister Miloš Minić, evidently a recent convert to the liberal camp, at the Twenty-Third CC plenum in December. Supported by Slovene CC member Jože Smole, Minić argued that the secret ballot was an important guarantee of the freedom of choice of party members and urged that it be introduced for elections to party bodies.

Though Minić's initiative was roundly condemned by Milutin Baltić, a Croatian Serb serving as secretary of the Croatian Presidium and a leading hard-liner, it found support in an unexpected quarter—the Belgrade daily *Politika*. Slavoljub Djukić, one of *Politika*'s political editors, wrote that "if the ballot is not secret, then everything becomes a political demonstration and [merely] confirms what was decided in advance." Djukić went on to support the nomination of more candidates than the number of seats available. Instead of this, Djukić noted to his evident consternation, the party appeared to want to keep everything completely predictable and controlled. He continued:

> In trying to explain why this has been the case, it is usually claimed that it is the essence that has been important, not the form. It is said that we elect the best people after broad consultation. For this reason, to suggest more candidates than seats required would mean showing a lack of respect for the real wishes of party members. If this is so, then one should answer the question why we need elections at all.[23]

Djukić concluded with a revelation that pointed to the existence of disunified crosscurrents in the "liberal" camp. Apparently, according to Djukić, Minić and certain Serbian supporters favored the secret ballot in part to hide, if not to compromise, the political punch of the republican and provincial parties.

Part of the difficulty facing the Yugoslav regime is the sheer size of the party. Pruned down in the early 1970s, the party nonetheless admitted some 600,000 new members between the Ninth and Eleventh Congresses and registered 1,950,000 members by early June 1980—almost twice the size of the party in 1972.[24] By the beginning of 1981, this figure had risen to 2,041,272—representing 9 percent of Yugoslavia's population and notching an all-time record since the party's founding in 1920.[25] The question is inevitably asked whether a party of this size ought to operate in the same fashion as a party one-fourth or even one-half its present size. Writing in the now-defunct weekly, *VUS (Vjesnik u srijedu)*, in 1977, Mirko Galić suggested that the LCY was no longer a cadres party, even if not "strictly speaking" a mass party either.[26] The clear implication was that membership criteria and party discipline (and required activity) ought to be relaxed. Replying in the party organ *Socijalizam*, Gojko Stanić repudiated Galić's

[23] *Politika*, 10 January 1982, quoted in Stanković, "Precongress Struggle," 3.

[24] *Narodna armija*, 19 June 1980.

[25] Slobodan Stanković, "A Survey of Yugoslav Party Membership," *Radio Free Europe Research*, 20 July 1981, 1.

[26] Mirko Galić, "Pristalice u partiji," in *Vjesnik u srijedu* (*VUS*), 3 December 1977, as rendered in Gojko Stanić, "Kadrovski ili masovni Savez kommunista—stvarna ili izmišljena dilema," in *Socijalizam* 21 (1978): 115.

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position as tantamount to the abandonment of the identification of the LCY with the working class and insisted that there was no reason for changing party membership criteria.[27]

Reorganization as a Policy Front

As the Twelfth Party Congress (26–29 June 1982) approached, it became increasingly evident that the federal balance of power established in 1974 remained unstable and that institutional reorganization presented itself as a policy front in its own right, as an arena in which the basic parameters of Yugoslav policymaking were to be drawn. Yugoslavia's liberals, seeking to give themselves a free hand in their own regional party organizations, adopted a modified version of Žvan's proposal by advocating retention of the principle of democratic centralism within the regional party organizations of the federal units, but by abandoning it at the level of the central party apparatus.[28] This was unmistakably a resurrection of the earlier effort to federalize the party.

The hopelessness of this endeavor was, however, demonstrated by the inability of these liberals to match the torrent of articles written against them in the Yugoslav press. Party hard-liner Dušan Dragosavac, for instance, condemned what he called "wavering" on the subject of party unity and underlined that "no elements of federalism can exist in the League of Communists; no Communists of any region, republic, province or sector may place themselves, on a regional or sector basis, in the position of partner on an equal footing with the whole, which is to say with the LCY."[29] The centralist position was given its most extreme articulation by Nenad Kecmanović, who claimed that the liberal program signified the destruction of the unity of the party and the erroneous opposition of democracy and centralism.[30] Kecmanović's conclusion was that any weakening of democratic centralism would stimulate the degeneration of the party. The centralists now came forward with several proposals of their own designed to weaken the regional parties and to strengthen the center. First, centralists sought to have future LCY congresses held before the congresses of the regional party organizations, a change that would have threatened to reduce regional congresses to mere rubber stamps of LCY policy programs and reverse a much heralded reform of the late 1960s.[31] Second, in another tough gambit, the Montenegrin Central Committee suggested in November 1981 that republican party organizations be divested of the power to elect members of the CC LCY and allowed only to nominate candidates to be picked at the regular Yugoslav party congresses.[32]

[27] Stanić, "Kadrovski ili masovni," 117.
[28] *Borba*, 20 October 1981, translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 2 November 1981.
[29] Tanjug, 8 April 1982, translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 9 April 1982.
[30] *NIN*, no. 1596, 2 August 1981, 15–16.
[31] Ibid., no. 1645, 11 July 1982, 10.
[32] Ibid., no. 1601, 15 November 1981, 9.

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Third, they proposed that the statutes of the regional parties be abolished and that they be governed solely by the Statute of the LCY.[33] Fourth, centralistically inclined forces in the Croatian, Vojvodinan and Serbian regional parties tried to impose a set of standard mandates uniform throughout the system—a move that appeared to be directed against the maverick Slovene party organization, and that was resisted not only by the Slovenes but, perhaps surprisingly, also by the party organization in the Yugoslav National Army.[34] And fifth, a small minority, led by Serbian delegate Rade Končar, tried to persuade the congress itself to replace the territorial organization of the party (the basis of the quasi-federal character of the LCY) with a production principle, in which the party would be organized according to branches of production.[35] That Končar's proposal was designed to undercut the autonomy of the regional parties was clear to all, and even admitted by Končar himself.

The liberals scored major successes at the Twelfth Party Congress, defeating all the above-mentioned centralist proposals, holding the mandate of the president of the CC Presidium to one year (instead of two, as proposed by those who felt the center had grown too weak), and obtaining approval of voting by secret ballot in elections of members of the federal executive organs.[36] On the other hand, a suggestion to allow congress delegates to abstain from voting on certain issues was rejected. The Twelfth Party Congress was a victory for Yugoslavia's new breed of "liberals" in at least two other respects, adopting the economic program drafted by a committee chaired by Sergej Krajger and making no move to change the rather loose-grip policy in effect since Tito's death; not surprisingly, liberals quickly claimed the congress as "their own."[37]

Others were not so satisfied. Najdan Pašić, chief justice of the Serbian Constitutional Court, publicly grumbled that the political system was badly deformed and that it was not functioning as intended. He singled out the so-called self-managing interest communities for special criticism, but implied that the malaise was general.[38] Bogdan Crnobrnja, another delegate to the congress, traced these deformations to weaknesses and problems within the party itself and demanded the convocation of an "extraordinary" congress within a year. This idea evidently gathered support among centralists during the summer of 1982, compelling *Borba* to assail advocates of the extraordinary congress in a September 1982 editorial. Denying his antagonists' contention that the formulas of the Twelfth Party Congress were "inconclusive," *Borba*'s editorialist hinted

[33] *8 Novosti*, 3 July 1982, 9.

[34] *NIN*, no. 1645, 11 July 1982, 10.

[35] *Borba*, 24 September 1982, and *NIN*, no. 1656, 26 September 1982, 9–10 (both translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* [Eastern Europe], 1 October 1982).

[36] *Vjesnik*, 8 May 1982; *8 Novosti*, 3 July 1982, 9.

[37] Anonymous interviews conducted by the author in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in July 1982.

[38] *NIN*, no. 1644, 4 July 1982, 9.

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that their intention was to turn the clock back and restore the level of centralization of the pre-1966 period.[39]

In the absence of a strong center, however, the republican party organizations have inevitably adapted organizational forms to suit their own, often opposed, predilections. Thus, for instance, a decision to create special basic organizations linked to the central and provincial committees or the LC in the federal units was carried out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina, but ignored by Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia.[40] In June 1983, a high-ranking Macedonian party official pointed out that the republic party organizations were implementing decisions of the Twelfth Party Congress in very different ways and yet, in each case, depicting their views as the views of the entire party.[41] Along with such symptoms, there has also been entrenched resistance to critical reevaluation. Thus, although the Federal Social Council for Questions of Social Order began preparing a critical analysis of the functioning of the system in 1983, it found itself hampered by the a priori exclusion of consideration of fundamental institutional change from its agenda. However, Ivan Šeber, a council member, fretted that in the absence of true federal consensus, the system has been operating on the basis of "informal centers of power" that often decide questions without regard to formal rules or the wishes of the general public.[42]

Conclusion

The fact that the Twelfth Party Congress was the first LCY congress since Tito's death no doubt served to kindle expectations in some quarters that major issues would be "resolved" there and that departures in policy would be broached and sanctioned. Yet there are two basic reasons why such expectations were misplaced. First, the notion of "resolution" implies that a momentary instability would be transcended and harmony restored, whereas in fact the struggle over organizational forms has been a constant feature of Yugoslav politics that has reflected the evident inability of the LCY to devise a formula for political stability.[43] Second, Yugoslav party congresses have rarely figured as major watersheds, chiefly because they have generally served essentially to record the status quo of the on-going political conflicts at that particular juncture.[44] Still,

[39] Ibid., *Borba*, 19 September 1982, translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 23 September 1982.

[40] *Borba*, 28 January 1983, translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 8 February 1983.

[41] Tanjug, 13 June 1983, translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 14 June 1983.

[42] See *Borba* (Zagreb edition), 21 September 1983.

[43] For an illuminating illustration of this, see Simo S. Nenezić, "Divergentne koncepcije u SKJ o demokratskom centralizmu," *Socijalizam*, 18 (1975): 52–69.

[44] On this point, see Pedro Ramet, "Yugoslavia 1982: Political Ritual, Political Drift, and the Fetishization of the Past," *South Slav Journal* 5 (1982):13–21.

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the record of the Sixth (1952), Seventh (1958), and Ninth (1969) Congresses reminds one that even this function can all the same produce fairly dramatic results, and that the sanctioning of a particular institutional configuration by the party sets the parameters in which policy struggles will take place.

Ever since the early 1960s, when regional elites in Yugoslavia first became politically conscious, interrepublican disputes over the federal balance of power (which themselves reflect inter-ethnic disputes) have been reflected in disputes over institutional forms. For in the absence of alternative parties, political options are staked out within the framework of the ruling party and are demarcated by other organizational schemes that are partial to the central party apparatus, to the federal units inclusive of or exclusive of the two autonomous provinces, or to managerial and production interests. Since policy alternatives cannot be championed by political parties, protagonists of rival policy programs seek to achieve their desiderata by achieving power shifts through institutional reorganization. Some reorganization schemes are conceded to be what they are—and the political status quo is accordingly denounced as degeneration or stagnation, or as threatened by would-be disintegrative or "unitarist" forces. Other such schemes are advertised as aimed at overcoming inefficiency, passivity, apathy, corruption and other ills.

The consequences of this transference of political rivalry from the system at large to the party itself are that unity, upon which the party insists, becomes unattainable. Thus, the party in time loses any meaningful sense of direction, being able to agree only on vague ritualistic phrases and the barest essentials of the system—self-management itself (though even that has been called into question lately), the preservation of the territorial integrity of the country, and of course the political monopoly of the party.[45] Lacking direction, the party becomes a caretaker of an unstable status quo. Hence, in the Yugoslav case, the party monopoly has undermined the very charactertistic that the Leninist concept of rule was supposed to ensure—"revolutionary" action by a unified vanguard party. The party pleads for democratic centralism, but is far from able to implement this principle in anything like the Leninist fashion. Edvard Kardelj, long-time chief ideologue of the LCY, was acutely conscious of this dilemma and, though he endeavored to exempt Yugoslavia as a special case, made the remarkable admission in a work written in 1977 that

> from a socio-historical point of view, the one-party system is a permutation of the political system borrowed from the bourgeois state in the era of capitalism. It in fact performs the same role as the multiparty system of bourgeois pluralism, the only difference being that power is wielded by one party rather than by several parties in turn.[46]

Since, as Kardelj recognized, there continue to be conflicts of interest between

[45] See Pedro Ramet, "Jugoslawien nach Tito—zerbrechliches Gleichgewicht und Drang nach Legitimation," *Osteuropa*, 32 (1982): 292–302.

[46] Kardelj, *Democracy and Socialism*, 69.

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various sectors and groups under socialism, it is inevitable that those conflicts will be played out, at least in part, within the party itself.[47]

Foreign observers have good reason to tire of the interminable institutional reorganizations in communist countries. Often trumpeted as progressive phases in the process of "socialist construction," they are thus disguised as innocent readjustments even when more significant power shifts are occurring. Yet rather than being a mere backdrop to the more fundamental policy struggles being waged, the struggle over institutional forms is in fact a more central issue in Communist states, to which policy struggles often serve as the backdrop.

[47] Ibid., 133, 136.

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Congressional Reapportionment in the 1980s: Types and Determinants of Policy Outcomes

Q. WHITFIELD AYRES
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State government efforts to reapportion congressional districts are guided by a curious combination of abstract notions of "fairness" and pragmatic desires for political advantage. A substantial literature has established normative criteria by which reapportionment plans might be evaluated, such as compactness, contiguity, equal population, and equitable swing ratios.[1] At the same time, participants in the process often view reapportionment as an opportunity for substantial political gain. Plans can be created to benefit individuals, such as con-

[1] See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., *Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), chs. 12–13; David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Representation: Theory and Practice in Drawing the Districts," in Nelson W. Polsby, ed., *Reapportionment in the 1970s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 249–92; Richard L. Morrill, *Political Redistricting and Geographic Theory* (Washington, D.C.: Association of American Geographers, 1981); Richard G. Niemi and John Deegan, Jr., "A Theory of Political Districting," *American Political Science Review* 72 (1978): 1304–23; Howard A. Scarrow, "Partisan Gerrymandering—Invidious or Benevolent? *Gaffney v. Cummings* and Its Aftermath," *Journal of Politics* 44 (1982): 810–21; Edward R. Tufte, "The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two Party Systems," *American Political Science Review* 67 (1973): 540–54; John K. Wildgen and Richard L. Engstrom, "Spatial Distribution of Partisan Support and the Seats/Votes Relationship," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 3 (1980): 423–35.

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gressional incumbents and challengers in the state legislatures, and groups, such as political parties, racial minorities, ideological coalitions, and interest groups.

The existing literature provides an indication of the types of reapportionment plans that might emerge from this complex process. Assessments of congressional reappointment plans after the 1970 census challenged the common notion that partisan considerations generally prevailed. David R. Mayhew has pointed out the existence of "bipartisan gerrymanders," that protected the political fortunes of both political parties, and of "individual gerrymanders," when incumbents of both parties lobbied for plans to preserve their own political futures.[2] Edward R. Tufte has argued that "it is hardly surprising that legislators, like businessmen, collaborate with their nominal adversaries to eliminate dangerous competition."[3] The partisan gerrymander, however, is still alive and well in American politics. Recent congressional reapportionment plans in Indiana and California bear all the marks of unadulterated partisanship, one produced by a Republican and the other by a Democratic state legislature. In addition to reapportionment plans designed for partisan advantage, there is, as Charles Bullock III has pointed out, an increasing incidence of reapportionment attempts intended to enhance the electoral fortunes of minority groups.[4]

Results of the recent round of congressional reapportionment, spurred by the population changes revealed by the 1980 census, offer a chance to reassess some of these existing generalizations about the nature of state reapportionment processes and the types of plans they produce. Although individual state plans are often scrutinized, systematic analysis of an entire set of reapportionment results is rare. The approach here assumes that differing reapportionment plans reflect different orderings of four competing priorities—party, incumbency, race, and ideology. Each of these priorities may at some point structure debate about a particular congressional district, but past research suggests that one priority normally comes to dominate the overall process and to characterize the resulting plan. While the final ranking of priorities may appear to be produced solely by state-level actors, the federal courts and the Justice Department are always involved as latent, if not active, participants.[5] The existence of these outside institutions as a potential appellate body or final aribiter may raise one of the priorities, usually race, in a state's ranking.

In this article, we first develop a typology of plans produced when each of the four priorities dominates, taking into account that types may present different appearances when the number of allocated congressional seats increases, decreases, or remains the same. We then explore determinants that help to explain why a particular priority may ultimately dominate the process in any one

[2] Mayhew, "Congressional Representation."

[3] Tufte, "The Relationship Between Seats and Votes," 551.

[4] Charles S. Bullock III, "The Inexact Science of Congressonal Redistricting," *PS* 15 (1982): 431–38.

[5] Bernard Grofman, "Reformers, Politicans, and the Courts: A Preliminary Look at U.S. Redistricting in the 1980s," *Political Georgraphy Quarterly* 1 (1982): 303–16.

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state. In making our decisions on the rankings of priorities in each state, we have relied on a survey of journalistic accounts of both the process and the resulting plan. Each author evaluated accounts of every state plan, including general commentary and the specific perspectives of participants in the process. Cases of disagreement in classification stimulated further refinement of the typology. The final ordering reflects our consensus assessment.

Types of Reapportionment Plans

In order to be categorized in one of the four types of reapportionment plans, a state must have made more than minor changes in its existing districts. Continuation of the status quo, in effect, reaffirms the type of reapportionment plan adopted during the last redistricting. While possibly protecting incumbents, a plan that continues existing districts is not necessarily synonymous with incumbent protection, for it may miss an opportunity to shore up a weak incumbent. Given the force of inertia and the desire of most incumbents to run in familiar areas, continuation of the status quo appears to be the default option when possible. Some factor or set of forces needs to move a state away from the status quo, such as usually uneven population change and the resulting necessity to alter significantly one or more districts. Once a state moves away from the status quo, no particular type of plan is assured. At this point, the political process revolves around efforts to rank the competing priorities.

Party as the Dominant Priority

Where party becomes the dominant priority, the resulting plan will follow the traditional desire to promote a partisan advantage and will reflect an overt attempt to enhance the electoral standing of one party at the expense of the other party. Oklahoma provides a good recent example of an attempt to create a partisan advantage in a state that neither gained nor lost congressional seats. A Democratic-controlled legislature, supported by a Democratic governor, packed Republican voters into the fifth district containing Oklahoma City, and spread Democratic areas among the remaining districts to strengthen the five Democratic incumbents.[6]

Attempts to create a partisan advantage may present a different appearance in the face of population losses that lead to a reduced number of congressional seats. If substantial population losses occur in Democratic-controlled areas, for example, then Democratic losses may be inevitable. In this situation, attempts by a Democratic state legislature to create a partisan advantage may actually produce fewer Democratic seats than before. But if the controlling Democrats attempt to minimize the effect of those losses on their electoral fortunes, then the

[6] Diane Granat and Phil Duncan, "Oklahoma Map Maintains Democrats' Edge," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (10 July 1982): 1670–73.

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process is still dominated by the criterion of party. For this reason, a simple examination of the electoral fate of incumbents after reapportionment may not be an adequate indicator of the type of plan adopted.[7]

In the face of population shifts that produce a loss of congressional seats, then, attempts to create a partisan advantage result in a plan that protects the incumbents of one party to the extent possible, and forces the other party to assume a disproportionate share of the losses. Illinois, which lost two congressional seats in the 1980 reapportionment, provides a good example, where a federal judicial panel adopted a Democratic instead of a Republican reapportionment plan. Despite substantial population decline in Democratic-controlled inner-city Chicago, the plan eliminated two Republican suburban districts, in the process throwing two pairs of Republican incumbents together.[8] The Indiana reapportionment may set the standard for partisan advantage in the face of population decline. Despite losing one congressional seat, the Republican-controlled state government produced a plan that, in the words of one Democratic official, went "for the jugular."[9] It created an open district leaning Republican, altered the district of one Democratic incumbent so that it leaned Republican, eliminated the district of another Democratic incumbent, and placed two other Democratic incumbents in the same district.[10]

Where the population has grown sufficiently to allow a state to gain congressional seats, plans with party as the dominant priority show an overt attempt to create a partisan advantage with the new seats. A clear example of this type occurred in California, despite the contention of Democratic Congressman Philip Burton that his product was a "Boy Scout plan that follows the criteria for good government and logical redistricting."[11] California gained two seats after the 1980 census; two new districts were created (in Fresno and San Diego), with a two-to-one Democratic voter registration advantage in each. In the process, the map managed to throw three Republican incumbents together and alter the districts of three other Republican incumbents so that they were "carved up beyond recognition."[12]

[7] See Mayhew, "Congressional Representation," 276, for a similar argument.

[8] Ann Pelham, "Illinois Map is Unpleasant Surprise for the GOP," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (13 March 1982): 573–83; Basil Talbott, Jr., "Illinois GOP Incumbents Stung By Court Reapportionment Map," *Washington Post*, 25 November 1981.

[9] Edward Walsh, "GOP Plays Chess With Indiana Hill Democrats," *Washington Post*, 11 May 1981.

[10] Christopher Buchanan, "Classic Gerrymander by Indiana Republicans," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 39 (17 October 1981): 2017–22.

[11] John Berthelsen, "California GOP Faces Loss of 5 Seats in Redistricting," *Washington Post*, 16 September 1981.

[12] Christopher Buchanan, "California GOP Forced to Accept Burton Map," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (24 April 1982): 923–43.

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Incumbency as the Dominant Priority

In contrast to state plans that attempt to generate a partisan advantage, other plans reflect incumbency as the dominant priority. These show a bipartisan attempt to protect incumbents of both parties.[13] Louisiana provides a good example of the general case, where Republican Governor David Treen threatened to veto a plan to create a black majority district in New Orleans because it hurt Republican incumbent Robert Livingston in the first district. As a result, the Democratic state legislature produced a plan to protect incumbents of both parties.[14]

In the face of a reduction in congressional seats, plans with incumbency as the top priority may not be able to protect all incumbents. Rather, these plans are characterized by bipartisan attempts to spread losses evenly, with no obvious attempt to force the incumbents of one party to bear a disproportionate share of the burden. New York, which lost five congressional seats after the 1980 census, spread losses between the parties in part by throwing one pair of Democratic incumbents together into one district in New York City, and one pair of Republican incumbents together on Long Island.[15]

Where the population has grown sufficiently to justify additional seats, plans with incumbency as the dominant priority will create new districts that are essentially the residual areas of the state after incumbent needs have been satisfied. These districts will of course have a partisan flavor, because it is impossible to create new seats without partisan implications. But the new partisan districts are a by-product of the effort to protect incumbents, rather than the dominant priority of the plan. Consequently, we would expect that the new seats created by reapportionment plans designed to protect incumbents would not necessarily enhance the fortunes of the party controlling the reapportionment process. In contrast, new seats created by plans with party as the dominant priority always lean toward the controlling party.

[13] This category would include both David Mayhew's "bipartisan gerrymander," where the leaders of cohesive political parties forge a compromise to protect their overall party fortunes, sometimes at the expense of one of their own incumbents, and his "individual gerrymander," where the incumbents themselves lobby the legislature for protection in states with weak political parties. We are unable to evaluate this distinction with the information available to us, since the difference appears to depend as much on who does the lobbying as on the character of the resulting plan. Where a state loses seats, for example, some incumbents will be hurt, regardless of who makes the case to the legislature. Mayhew, "Congressional Representation."

[14] Phil Duncan, "Redistricting Moving Slowly in Most States," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 39 (14 November 1981): 2236; Phil Duncan and Larry Light, "Campaign '82: Louisiana Redistricting," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 39 (21 November 1981): 2294.

[15] Larry Light, "New York District Map Splits Removal of Five House Seats," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (15 May 1982): 1128; idem., "Justice Voids New York Map; Cites Racial Discrimination," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (26 June 1982): 1546; "Campaign '82: New York," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (10 July 1982): 1674; Jane Perlez, "New Districting Being Weighed By Congressmen," *New York Times*, 10 May 1982.

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Oregon and Washington, each of which gained one seat after the 1980 census, provide good examples of incumbency as the dominant priority in states gaining population. In Oregon, a Democratic legislature protected three Democratic incumbents, which had the effect of creating a new district leaning toward the Republicans.[16] In Washington, Republican Governor John Spellman vetoed the first plan produced by the Republican state legislature because it weakened one representative in each party and was opposed by the congressional delegation. A bipartisan majority in the state legislature passed a second plan that created a new district leaning Republican by strengthening the three surrounding districts for incumbent Democrats.[17]

Race as the Dominant Priority

Frequently during the 1980 reapportionment process the federal courts or Justice Department became involved in an effort to raise race in the ranking of priorities. Usually this intervention focused on only a few districts in a state, so that state-level efforts to protect incumbents or to promote a partisan advantage were not substantially affected. But where that intervention increased the importance of race to the point where it served as the major focus of debate or interfered with the other priorities, then we have labeled race as the dominant priority.

Where race dominates, reapportionment plans demonstrate an overt attempt to create an advantage for a particular racial group. The racial group helped may be majority whites, as in reapportionment arrangements that dilute black voting strength. Indeed, continuation of the existing plan may incorporate a prior racial advantage. On the other hand, race-dominant plans may help an ethnic group, as in plans that try to create districts with a majority of voters from one racial minority. In Georgia, the major dispute evolved around attempts to create a black majority district in the Atlanta area. The Justice Department rejected the first plan because it split the Atlanta black population between the fourth and fifth districts.[18] The legislature eventually produced a fifth district that is two-thirds black.

New York provides an example where race was raised in the ranking of priorities but did not become paramount. The Justice Department rejected the first plan produced by the New York legislature because it diluted black voting

[16] Phil Duncan, "Oregon Awarded Fifth Congressional District," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (27 March 1982): 689–692.

[17] Christopher Colford, "GOP Apt to Gain Seat in Washington Remap," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (19 June 1982): 1472–77.

[18] Albert Menendez, "Racial Issue Dominates Georgia Redistricting," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 39 (5 December 1981): 2403–2407; "Capital Boxscore: Politics," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (13 February 1982): 299; Larry Light, "Politics: Georgia," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (20 February 1982): 340; "Campaign '82: Georgia," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (29 May 1982): 1296; Tom Watson, "Campaign '82: Georgia," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (7 August 1982): 1932.

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strength in Brooklyn. A second plan creating a black majority district was easily accepted by the state legislature and a federal judicial panel.[19] The plan damaged Democratic incumbent Frederick Richmond, but that damage can just as easily be explained by the bipartisan effort to spread seat losses in the New York City area evenly between the two parties as by the increased importance of race.

Ideology as the Dominant Priority

Where ideology is the dominant priority, there is an overt attempt to create an advantage for an ideological group. In Nevada, the Democratic legislature first produced a plan that split Democratic Las Vegas into two districts, thereby allowing the Democrats to control both. After Republican Governor Robert List threatened a veto, a coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats produced a plan to put Las Vegas in one district and leave the other for a Republican or conservative Democrat.[20]

In Texas, the initial plan produced by the legislature demonstrated the dominance of ideology. Republican Governor William Clements and conservative Democratic House Speaker Billy Clayton forged a bipartisan coalition in the legislature that attempted to enhance the electoral fortunes of conservatives. Clements explained that "Texas is a conservative state, and the [plan] reflects what is right for Texas."[21] After the Justice Department rejected this initial plan because of its distribution of Hispanics in south Texas, a federal judicial panel produced a plan, later modified by the Supreme Court, in which ideology receded in importance.[22]

Distribution and Determinants of Types

In this section, reapportionment results are categorized from all fifty states subsequent to the 1980 census. The six states with only one congressional seat have no reapportionment plans to evaluate—Alaska, Delaware, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. Eight other states fall into the status quo category, reflecting only minor change in district boundaries—Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New Hamsphire, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. These states have only a small number of seats (most have two and the largest has four), and have experienced modest and evenly distributed population

[19] Light, "New York District Map Splits Removal of Five House Seats," 1128; idem, "Justice Voids New York Map," 1546; "Campaign '82: New York," 1674; Jane Perlez, "New Redistricting By New York State is Approved By U.S.," *New York Times*, 4 July 1982.

[20] Phil Duncan, "Las Vegas Area Dominates New Nevada House District," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 39 (31 October 1981): 2119-20.

[21] Dan Balz, "Texas Approves Redistricting That Aides GOP," *Washington Post*, 11 August 1981.

[22] Phil Duncan, "Courts At Odds Over Texas Redistricting," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (3 April 1982): 752-62; idem, "Remap Debate Overshadows Texas Primary," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (17 April 1982): 878.

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change. Of the remaining 36 sates, the incumbency category emerges as the most common. Incumbency was the dominant priority in 18 states, party in 13, race in 4, and ideology in 1.

Three cases are problematic, where several priorities are evident but no one priority clearly dominated the reapportionment process and the resulting plan. In Iowa, after rejecting two plans produced by a "nonpartisan" Legislative Service Bureau and one partisan plan drawn by the Republican Party State Committee, the Republican-controlled state legislature adopted a plan that hurt one incumbent Republican whose objections were ignored, and cut off one Democratic congressman's home from his district. Because the legislature rejected a blatantly partisan plan, and since the excised Democratic congressman could move back into his old district (which remained basically intact), we have placed this plan with those dominated by incumbency.[23]

In Florida, the Democratic legislature carved up the districts of one Republican and one Democratic congressman, ignoring the objections of both men.[24] Of the four new districts that Flordia gained following the 1980 census, the legislature produced one district that is solidly Republican, two that lean Republican, and one that leans Democratic. We have placed this plan with those dominated by incumbency, based on reports that "the vast majority of Florida's House delegation [11 Democrats and 4 Republicans] seems satisfied with the remap."[25]

Massachusetts presents a particularly difficult case. A Democratic legislature was forced to redraw district lines to eliminate one seat. The legislature's plan threw Democratic incumbent Barney Frank (who had alienated some of his own party members) into a district with Republican incumbent Margaret Heckler, presumably in a way that favored the Republican (even though Frank managed to win reelection).[26] Since the one other Republican and nine other Democratic incumbents were treated kindly by the plan, we have placed Massachusetts with states where incumbency was the top priority.[27]

Categorizing congressional reapportionment plans permits assessment of the factors that lead to the dominance of particular criteria. We began with three basic expectations: that states with large changes in seat allotments would produce more party-dominant plans; that states where one party controlled the entire state government would produce more party-dominant plans; and that states in which a large percentage of congressional incumbents had served in the state legislature would produce more incumbency-dominant plans. Several trends are

[23] Phil Duncan, "New Iowa Map: No Gerrymandering Allowed," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 39 (19 September 1981): 1798–1801.

[24] Phil Duncan, "Pair of Incumbents Troubled By Redrawn Florida Districts," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (29 May 1982): 1297; idem, "Crafting New Seats a Headache for Florida," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (14 August 1982): 2006–2016.

[25] Duncan, "Pair of Incumbents Troubled," 1297.

[26] *New York Times*, 10, 17 December 1981.

[27] Christopher Colford, "Massachusetts Democrats Victimize Frank," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (20 March 1982): 618–24.

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TABLE 1

Type of Reapportionment Plans By Change in the Number of Congressional Seats

	Change in Number of Seats			
Type of Plan	*Fewer Seats*	*No Change*	*More Seats*	*Total*
Incumbency	3 (33%)[a]	9 (56%)[b]	6 (55%)[c]	18 (50%)
Party	6 (67%)[d]	4 (25%)[e]	3 (27%)[f]	13 (36%)
Race	0	3 (19%)[g]	1 (9%)[h]	4 (11%)
Ideology	0	0	1 (9%)[i]	1 (3%)
Total	9 (100%)	16 (100%)	11 (100%)	36 (100%)

[a] Massachusetts, New York, Ohio
[b] Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, South Carolina, Virginia, Wisconsin
[c] Arizona, Colorado, Florida, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington
[d] Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania
[e] Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Oklahoma
[f] California, Tennessee, Utah
[g] Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina
[h] Texas
[i] Nevada

clear, despite the relatively small number of cases and the many idiosyncratic factors that affect reapportionment plans in the various states.[28]

According to Table 1, incidence of the various types of plans does appear to vary with the magnitude of population change. Six of the nine states losing seats produced party-dominant plans, accounting for nearly half (46 percent) of all party plans observed. States gaining seats or experiencing no change were much more likely to produce plans in which incumbency was the dominant priority. The political process in most states appears to provide less resistance to incumbency-dominant plans than to party-dominant plans, because incumbency plans do not challenge established centers of power. Where seats must be eliminated, however, the electoral fortunes of one or more incumbents must be damaged, and partisan considerations are more likely to prevail in the distribution of those damages.

An intriguing finding is the effect of the partisan balance of state governments on reapportionment plans. States were divided according to whether a single party controlled the state government (both the governorship and the state legislature) or whether control was split between the two parties. In contrast to our own expectations and those of earlier studies, Table 2 indicates that states in which one party controlled the state government were no more likely to produce

[28] The case of Illinois illustrates the difficulties involved in generalization. A plan favoring the Democrats was produced, even though the state had a Republican governor, a split legislature, and a federal district court panel composed of two Republican appointees and one Democratic appointee.

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TABLE 2

Types of Congressional Reapportionment Plans By Party Control of State Governments

	Party Control of Governorship and Legislature		
Type of Plan	*Same Party Controls Both*	*Party Control is Split*	*Total*
Incumbency	9 (50%)[a]	9 (50%)[b]	18 (50%)
Party	6 (33%)[c]	7 (39%)[d]	13 (36%)
Race	3 (17%)[e]	1 (6%)[g]	4 (11%)
Ideology	*0*	1 (6%)[g]	1 (3%)
Total	18 (100%)	18 (100%)	36 (100%)

[a] Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, South Carolina, Washington

[b] Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, Wisconsin

[c] California, Indiana, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, New Jersey

[d] Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Tennessee, Utah

[e] Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina

[f] Texas

[g] Nevada

party-dominant plans than states with split control.[29] One factor complicating this finding is the existence of cases in which the federal courts and Justice Department became actively involved in determining the final district configurations. Exclusion of these thirteen cases leaves a result somewhat more in line with expectations. Incumbent-dominant plans accounted for 67 percent of the plans produced by split-control states (six of nine), compared to 57 percent of the plans produced by single-party states (eight of fourteen).

A clearer relationship between partisan control and the type of reapportionment plan occurs in the nine states losing congressional seats (although the small number of cases necessitates cautious interpretations). Removing the four states with federal involvement leaves five states, four with single-party control and one with split control. Ohio, the state with split control, produced an incumbency-dominant plan. Of the four states with single-party control, three produced party-dominant plans. The one exception, Massachusetts, has already been identified as one of the more problematic cases.

The thirteen cases in which the intervention of the federal government altered the ranking of priorities in state plans warrant special attention. All four race-dominant plans came about through this process—Georgia and North Carolina through Justice Department intervention, and Mississippi and Texas through both court and Justice Department activity. Of the ten cases in which the federal

[29] Mayhew, "Congressional Representation," 275.

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court produced the final reapportionment plans, eight involved states in which party control was split. Surprisingly, the most common type of plan to emerge from the federal courts was the party-dominant plan (five of ten). This result underscores the courts' primary concern with racial and population inequities, and their reluctance to disqualify reapportionment plans solely on the basis of their partisan implications.

Reapportionment plans were also expected to be influenced by the strength of ties between incumbents and members of the state legislatures. Legislatures with close ties to their congressional delegations would seem to be more likely to produce incumbency-dominant plans. However, no clear relationship was found between the strength of these ties, as measured by the proportion of congressional incumbents who had served in the state legislature, and the type of plan produced.

Conclusion

Once a state moves beyond the status quo in its congressional reapportionment process, four types of plans are evident, each characterized by its dominant criterion. In plans where party considerations are dominant, one party attempts to create an electoral advantage by forcing the other party to bear a disproportionate burden if seats must be lost, by generating partisan advantages when the number of seats is stable, and by creating new seats likely to be won by the party when the number of seats increases. Incumbency-dominant plans spread seat losses evenly between both parties and protect all incumbents when the number of seats remains stable or increases. Other plans try to create an advantage for a particular racial or ideological group.

Incumbency is most frequently the dominant priority among congressional reapportionment plans of the 1980s, reflecting a substantial set of political forces resistant to purely partisan uses of the redistricting process. Party-dominant plans are still very common, however, and occur most frequently in states forced to lose congressional seats. The four plans dominated by racial considerations all resulted from federal intervention into state processes.

The population change experienced by a state does affect the character of plans, with states losing seats much more likely to adopt plans dominated by party considerations. The partisan balance of the state government exerts a surprisingly small influence, with only a weak tendency found for single-party states to produce party-dominant plans. The strength of incumbents' ties to the state government, as measured by the percentage of members with state legislative experience, had no apparent effect on the type of reapportionment plan produced.

Research after the 1970 census began to identify the different types of plans produced by state reapportionment processes. We have elaborated these types and have provided a systematic analysis of the congressional reapportionment plans adopted for use in the 1982 elections. The difficulty of specificying a dominant priority for all plans, and the focus of the racial priority on a few districts, suggests that future research might usefully drop the level of analysis from the

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state to the congressional district. Changing the analytical unit may be particularly helpful when the federal courts and the Justice Department become involved. Further refinement of reapportionment typologies will eventually allow more accurate prediction of which plans are most likely to be produced under particular circumstances and, consequently, of which congressional incumbents are most vulnerable to damage through reapportionment.

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Testing Human Bonds Within Nations: Jews in the Occupied Netherlands

HENRY L. MASON

Helen Fein, a holocaust scholar, has posited that "Jewish victimization was a test case of the response of nations, the end product of a process testing human bonds within nations subject to German instigation or occupation." In order to implement the Final Solution, "the Germans had to change the boundaries of the universe of obligation" in each of the nations controlled by them. In this effort they did not always succeed, and the rates of Jewish victimization varied accordingly: "in almost half . . . of the states and regions occupied by or allied to Germany, fewer than half of the Jews counted there were killed."[1]

National bonds between Jews and non-Jews had been close in the Netherlands before the German invasion. The Jewish population, some 143,000, was well integrated, and anti-Semitism had been relatively unimportant.[2] Yet these national bonds did not withstand the Nazi onslaught when the Germans implemented

[1] Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust* (New York: Free Press, 1979), xv-xvi, 33-35.

[2] All kinds of intangibles influence judgments concerning the extent of a Jewish population's integration into a national society and the prevalence or absence of anti-Semitism in that society. There appears to be general agreement that the Jewish citizens were well integrated into Dutch society and that anti-Semitism was relatively unimportant in the Netherlands. Fein compared the success of anti-Semitic movements in the states of the German orbit up to 1936. Using the categories "highest" (success), "high," "some," and "low," she put the Netherlands into the "low" category, together with Belgium, Denmark, Italy, and Norway. Ibid., 72-73.

In 1940, the percentage of Jews in the Netherlands, 1.6 percent, was somewhat higher than in Germany before 1933.

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measures against the Jews with severity and considerable tactical skill. As disasters befell the Jews in the Netherlands with ever greater harshness, the Dutch sense of solidarity toward their Jewish fellow citizens ultimately crumbled. The Netherlands had one of the highest rates of Jewish victimization. By the end of the occupation, approximately 107,000 Jews had been deported from the Netherlands—virtually all the Jews in the country except those exempted by the Germans because of their marriage to non-Jews (some 12,000) and those remaining undetected in "underground" hiding (some 18,400). In addition, perhaps as many as 3,000 persons escaped after submitting to "de-Jewing" procedures—a sometime life-preserving bureaucratic enterprise conducted by a German official.[3] Of the deported Jews, only 5,200 survived; these survivors included 4,000 persons who had been sent to the "privileged" camps of Bergen-Belsen and Theresienstadt. The main Dutch transports to the extermination camps took place between July 1942 and July 1943—about 43,000 victims to Auschwitz (with 85 survivors) and about 34,000 to Sobibor (with 19 survivors).[4]

There are many Dutch names among the "righteous gentiles" who have been honored at the Israeli Holocaust memorial center of Yad Vashem for their assistance to Jews during the Nazi period. The Dutch have been perceived as heroes of the Holocaust, duly penalized by the Arabs during the oil embargo of 1973–74 and supported in Israel as the "home" team during the finals of the soccer world championship of 1974. Nevertheless the "righteous gentiles" were but a tiny minority. The Dutch-Jewish catastrophe was in part a consequence of the interactions among efficient and ruthless German implementors on the one hand and indifferent, if not cooperative, Dutch bystanders on the other, including government officials as well as the general public.

The following stages of the implementation of the Final Solution in the Netherlands will be depicted: definition of "Jewishness"; "stripping" (depriving Jews of their social roles and their economic status); concentration (collecting the Jews in transit facilities to have available at all times sufficient "Auschwitz material"); and the shipping of Jews on trains to the East. These implementation stages will be followed by an examination of the role played by the Jewish "officials" of the Jewish Council, the Joodsche Raad of Amsterdam. Finally, the fate of Jews in the Netherlands will be discussed in view of the so-called Danish

[3] The German in charge of "de-Jewing" procedures in the Netherlands, Dr. Hans Georg Calmeyer, happened not to be a Nazi. Proof had to be submitted that the officially registered child of a Jewish parent was in fact the offspring of an extramarital relationship with an "Aryan" father. Calmeyer was willing to accept the most flimsy evidence and, in spite of SS pressures, ruled favorably on the majority of the applications. He is credited with saving up to 3,000 Jewish lives. Louis de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog*, 10 vols. (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1969–1982), 6: 295–303. De Jong's multivolume depiction of the Dutch experience in World War II provided the source material for an important part of this article. All translations are the responsibility of the author. For a personal experience of "Calmeyering," see S. Asscher, *Shaddai: de bewogen jaren van een Joodse familie* (Haarlem: de Haan, 1980).

[4] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 7: 306–307, 386, 666–68, 673, 729, 844.

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reversal. In Denmark, the national bonds did hold; there was sufficient resistance on the part of the non-Jews to forestall the German measures in their earliest stages, and Danish Jewry survived virtually intact.

The Definition of Jewishness

The Nuremberg decrees of 1935 in Germany provided the definition of Jewishness in the occupied Netherlands. A person was considered Jewish if he or she had at least three grandparents who had belonged to the Jewish religion. Conversion to Christianity, or non-membership in a Jewish religious community, was of no consequence. Thus defined, Jewishness as such was persecuted with utmost severity. Nazi regulations applied to all Jews regardless of their merit or economic status, their age or sex. The German authorities did not deal with Jews as individuals, but only with "batches of Jews" to be concentrated, deported, and annihilated. (At the Auschwitz or Sobibor camps, no individual records were permitted to be kept of those sent to the gas chamber.) Communications concerning Jews were usually addressed to the Jewish Councils instituted by the Germans, and each Jewish Council had to adapt the German demands to the level of individual Jews.

Nevertheless, important concessions were made in the Netherlands to persons who were Jewish in terms of the definition but who were assumed to be so close to non-Jewish bystanders that their mistreatment and deportation would cause concern—"*deining*" (waves)—among these bystanders. The *national* bonds uniting Jews and their non-Jewish compatriots were always challenged by the Germans; in the West and in Germany itself they did not always dare to challenge the bonds of *family* ties. If a Jewish person was married to a non-Jew, he or she ordinarily was exempted from deportation (and annihilation). In the Netherlands, there were about 12,000 "mixed-married" Jews, and most of them survived.[5] The Germans also did not care to include in the Final Solution persons with only one or two Jewish grandparents—the so-called *Mischlinge*, or "quarter-Jews" and "half-Jews." Because of their close family ties to "Aryans," the

[5] This is not to say that their life was easy. The mixed-marrieds never quite knew what was in store for them. The Germans were not able to reach consensus among themselves on a definitive, long-range policy toward this group. The Nazis did exert pressure on the "Aryan" spouses to divorce their Jewish mates, but forced divorces by decree were ruled out because of the anticipated reaction among church leaders and the public in general. Very few of the "Aryan" spouses in the Netherlands—or in Germany, where there were some 28,000 mixed-married Jews—deserted their Jewish marriage partners. Threats not to spare certain categories of mixed-marrieds did develop (for example, if there were no children, or if the children were more than sixteen years old, or if the non-Jewish spouse had died). Actually, all of these categories were ordinarily exempted from deportation. However, a relatively large number of mixed-married Jews were convicted of alleged violations of German decrees and as "punitive cases" were shipped to the Auschwitz gas chamber. Abel J. Herzberg, "Kroniek der Jodenvervolging 1940–1945," in J.J. van Bolhuis, C.D.J. Brandt, H.M. van Randwijk, B.C. Slotemaker, eds., *Onderdrukking en Verzet*, 4 vols. (Arnhem and Amsterdam: van Loghum Slaterus and J.M. Meulenhoff, 1947–1955), 3: 127–31.

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Mischlinge were spared deportation, concentration, and most of the other anti-Jewish measures. A great majority of them could continue to lead fairly normal lives.[6] As Louis de Jong has remarked, from a "racial purity" point of view it was quite illogical for the Nazis to spare the mixed-marrieds or the *Mischlinge*, but the fear of "interventions" from non-Jewish bystanders prevailed.[7]

Except for the categories mentioned, the persecution of the Jews was virtually total in the Netherlands. Only forty-eight "full" Jews (who were not mixed-married) were officially allowed to escape the ultimate measures. Among these were: some old members of the Dutch Nazi party (which had not always excluded Jews) and some personal friends of the Dutch Nazi leader, Anton Mussert; a handful of renowned experts on Dutch painting; and a few persons involved in the German black market in the Netherlands or otherwise of particular usefulness to the occupier.[8] Not exempted were, for example, the so-called Portuguese Jews, a true upper class (some with Dutch titles of nobility) who had lived in the country for centuries. They were gassed at Auschwitz or Sobibor just like the "Eastern" Jewish street peddlers, although somewhat later.

In order to implement the definition stage, the Germans decreed the registration of Jews in January 1941, six months after the occupation began. Very few Jews refused to register. Some of these were caught later, but a few survived without being "defined." Substantial assistance in the registration of the Jews was provided by Dutch officials. Personnel of the government registry offices had persuaded themselves that they would render a service to the Jews by keeping their registration in Dutch hands. The head of the registry offices, J. L. Lentz, certainly did not provide such a "service" when he invented a tagging device to make identification of Jews easier in the filing systems. Although several Dutch officials did refuse to work on the registration of Jews "for reasons of principle," Lentz found enough volunteers to finish the task in record time. The Germans praised the Dutch for their highly efficient system of registering Jews.[9] Dutch authorities also aided the Germans with the enforcement of the registration measures. For example, a Dutch police report mentioned how one

[6] In the Netherlands, there were at least 14,500 "half-Jews" and 6000 "quarter-Jews"; in Germany, at least 64,000 and 43,000, respectively. On the exemption of the *Mischlinge* in Germany, see the documents printed in "Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 9 (1961): 262–313.

[7] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 5: 503. The only Jews in the Netherlands who were left untouched out of respect to *national* bonds were those of certain enemy, neutral, or German-allied nationalities—a few American and British Jews, a handful of Swiss and Swedes, and a number of Italians and Hungarians. Ultimately, all of these were permitted to leave the Netherlands, even after a complete emigration stop for Jews had been decreed. Ibid., 5: 1035–36.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., 5: 504–507. The Dutch also invented a "falsification-proof" identity card, which indeed proved much more difficult for the resistance to reproduce than, for example, the Belgian identity card. The French bureaucrats were proud of their "remarkable" card-file system, which listed the 150,000 Jews in the Paris region, as "a model of organizational efficiency." Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 243.

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Jew "had dared . . . in sly fashion" to secure for himself and others identity cards without the "J"; he and the other "guilty" Jews were apprehended promptly by the Dutch police. In another report, the Amsterdam police listed various categories of crimes committed in its jurisdiction: theft, embezzlement, fraud—and several cases of violation of the registration decree for Jews.[10] Only Jews were "defined" and registered, since only Jewishness was a crime, per se.[11]

The Stripping of Social and Economic Status

Helen Fein used the term "stripping" to characterize a most ominous phase of the implementation of the Final Solution. Stripping meant depriving the victims, on the one hand, of material goods and legal and economic rights, and on the other, "of social roles, rights, and claims for respect within society."[12] Stripping affected the bystanders' perception of the Jews as well as the Jews' perception of the bystanders. A study on Bavarian attitudes toward the Jews during World War II concluded that "as long as the Jewish traders and the peasants in the Bavarian countryside were part and parcel of a traditional scheme of social relationships, the peasants would not be persuaded by Nazi ideology; the change came *after* the Nazis had succeeded in isolating the Jews and had turned them into mysterious strangers living their lives at the edge of the village"—in other words, after stripping had taken place.[13]

There had been some hope at the beginning of the occupation that the Jews in the Netherlands might not be too drastically affected by the German presence. The first Germans in the country, the army, had sounded moderate. Even the German civilian governor, Artur von Seyss-Inquart, had promised in his inaugural address to leave the Dutch legal system intact and not to force an "alien ideology" on the Dutch people.[14] It was assumed that German non-interference would be encouraged if more prominent Jews were pushed into the back-

[10] Jacob Presser, *Ondergang*, 2 vols. (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij-Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 1: 69.

[11] The persecution of the gypsies was also against "gypsyness," per se. However, the Germans never issued a workable definition of "gypsyness," and they certainly did not go after the gypsies with the total determination and severity devoted to the Jews. For example, persons could apparently be "de-gypsied," at least in some regions, if they could prove continued residence in one locale for two years or more. In the West and the Balkans approximately 200,000 gypsies may have been killed by the Germans, many in gas chambers at Auschwitz and other extermination camps. See B.A. Sijes, et al., *Vervolging van Zigeuners in Nederland 1940–1945* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 124.

[12] Fein, *Accounting*, 60.

[13] Ian Kershaw, "Antisemitismus und Volksmeinung," in M. Broszat and E. Fröhlich, eds., *Bayern in der NS-Zeit* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1979), 343–347. The above translation of the Kershaw citation appeared in Yehuda Bauer, *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), 57.

[14] Herzberg, "Kroniek," 3: 16–17. Gerhard Hirschfeld concluded that during the first phase of the occupation there was widespread Dutch willingness to cooperate with the Nazi authorities. See "Collaboration and Attentism in the Netherlands 1940–1941," *Journal of Contemporary History* 16 (1981): 469.

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ground before such action was demanded by the occupier. Accordingly, a scientific journal asked its one Jewish editor to resign; the Concertgebouw and The Hague orchestras placed their Jewish first-desk players into back rows and refrained from playing the music of Felix Mendelssohn or Gustav Mahler. The Social Democratic labor unions removed their Jewish functionaries, and the Social Democratic press association dismissed most of its Jewish personnel, from editors to paper boys. Another early attempt to placate the Germans affected the approximately 16,000 German-Jewish refugees residing in the Netherlands. De Jong suspects that the highest Dutch officials remaining in the country, the secretaries-general of the various ministerial departments, had from the beginning indicated their willingness to abandon these refugees to their former masters.[15]

The Germans launched their first incisive stripping measure in November 1940. All Jewish government employees were dismissed, including civil servants, teachers, judges, and the like. This crass violation of the Dutch constitution (according to its Article 5, "every Dutchman is eligible to appointment in any public office") was tolerated by the secretaries-general and other high officials. There were only sporadic expressions of protest and a few resignations by non-Jewish officials. One of the most influential of the secretaries-general, A.M. Snouck Hurgronje of the Foreign Ministry, convinced his colleagues that a drastic reaction, such as mass resignations, in protest to the Jewish dismissals would have disastrous consequences for the nation. The secretaries-general did issue a note of protest, but they cooperated with the circulation among the civil servants of the so-called Aryan declaration, in which all non-Jewish government employees had to testify as to their "Aryan" origins. Even the judges of the Netherlands Supreme Court (reportedly by a vote of twelve to five) agreed to submit such a statement, with the majority opining that there was no legal base for refusal—despite the fact that the presiding judge was Jewish! Professor J. P. A. François, the legal adviser to the secretaries-general, argued that the Germans had the right to remove the Jewish civil servants since they could be assumed to be anti-German. While the dismissals were first described as a "*provisional* removal from the performance of their function," the secretaries-general also submitted to the German request to delete the "provisional" from the state-

[15] Queen Wilhelmina and the ministers of the government had escaped to England. De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 4:752–754. Reportedly, early deliberations among the secretaries-general about "that lot" had been accompanied by Jewish jokes and anti-Semitic remarks. Marrus and Paxton emphasized "how central was the distinction between native and foreign Jews" in shaping the implementation of the anti-Jewish policies. Only the Danes and the Italians broke the "general rule" that non-native Jews, especially German refugees, could be surrendered to the Germans without much ado. In France, the Vichy authorities attempted fairly energetically to protect Jewish French citizens from deportation—but the many foreign Jews, including large numbers of children who had previously been separated from their parents, were rounded up by French police and delivered to the Germans for shipment to Auschwitz, even in the Vichy zone. Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, 232, 250–51, 256, 263–65, 364.

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ment. Virtually all the non-Jewish government employees signed the "Aryan declaration."[16]

The loudest protest against the dismissals came from the universities. When the "Aryan declaration" forms were received at Leiden University, a group of twenty-five (out of a total of seventy-three) full professors announced their intention not to sign, out of sympathy for the ten Jewish staff members at Leiden (two full professors and eight more junior persons). Ultimately, all the Leiden professors did sign the declaration, but some 60 of them added a statement of protest. A ceremony was organized to honor the most renowned of the dismissed Jewish scholars, Professor E. M. Meijers of the law faculty. The Germans reacted strongly to this emotional public protest; the dean of the law faculty was arrested and detained for eight months. When Leiden students proceeded to stage another public demonstration against the dismissals, the Germans closed the university. It was not to reopen for regular studies for the duration of the occupation. Throughout the Dutch universities, about half of the professors signed their declaration with a note of protest. Students everywhere talked about organizing protest actions, but none of these materialized. However, most of the social fraternities (the *corpora*)—which in the Netherlands had always contained "Aryan" as well as Jewish students in the same organization—disbanded voluntarily when the Jewish students were barred.[17]

The churches, too, voiced some protest against the dismissal of the Jewish civil servants. The six major Protestant denominations delivered a joint note to the Germans in which they condemned the "alien ideology" used to justify the dismissals, and observed that Christ was born out of the Jewish people. One Protestant minister, J. Koopmans, wrote a remarkable brochure that was distributed in "underground" circles. Koopmans charged that the Germans would not have been able to implement the Jewish dismissals if the Dutch civil servants, en masse, had refused to sign the Aryan declaration. He thought that a battle had been lost needlessly, and the next blow would be even more cruel—the dismissal of all Jews from their employment. As Koopmans predicted only too correctly: "*zij gaan eruit, en zij gaan eraan*" (the Jews will be shoved out, and they will perish).[18]

All the Jews were to lose their jobs within the next year or soon thereafter.

[16] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 4: 758–65, 781, 784. The number of Jewish civil servants was not large. For example, in the center of Dutch Jewry, Amsterdam, there were 582 Jews among a total of 24,920 public employees. Of a total of 192,205 public employees in the Netherlands Department of the Interior, only 1,427 were Jewish. Herzberg, "Kroniek," 3: 47.

[17] Some academics went considerably beyond protest notes, and suffered for it. For example, Professor B.M. Telders of Leiden died at Bergen-Belsen in 1945, and Professor R.H.W. Regout of Nijmegen died at Dachau in late 1942. Both men had continued to protest publicly against the exclusion of their Jewish colleagues. See Eduard G. Groeneveld, "The Dutch Universities between 1940 and 1945," *Preliminary Report Nr. 157* (Amsterdam: Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation, 1979), 8–13. Also de Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 4: 782, 794–99.

[18] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 4: 775–77.

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By late 1941, the employment of any Jew required a special permit. Employers were to dismiss their Jewish employees with at most three months notice, regardless of seniority, tenure, or contractual rights. To those employed twenty-five years or longer by a firm, a maximum compensation of six months salary could be paid. The Jews became a "welfare class" overnight, as virtually no way of earning a living was left to them. Even the still-powerful medical and bar associations remained silent as their Jewish colleagues were forced out. Wealthier Jews could not escape pauperization; as of August 1941, all Jewish-owned moneys, stocks, bonds, and other assets had to be deposited at a bank designated by the Germans, where all these assets were frozen. All art objects and jewelry had to be surrendered. The maximum monthly income per Jewish family from any source was set at f. 250 (about $150). As de Jong emphasized, these economic sanctions were imposed by the Germans in such a way that non-Jews would be aware of them only partially, without being able to appreciate the real extent of Jewish pauperization.[19]

Above all, stripping was aimed at the social isolation of the Jews. Gradually, with the first measures coming on 15 September 1941, they were barred from all public parks and zoos; from cafés, bars, restaurants, hotels, pensions, and sleeping and dining cars on trains; from theaters, cabarets, concerts, and other kinds of artistic events, public libraries and museums; from all sport events, beaches, and swimming pools. They were not admitted to beach resorts and other resort towns. Even certain streets and squares, or parts of them, were forbidden—the side containing public buildings, or the more elegant side, or merely the sunnier side. Private motor vehicles, taxis, or bicycles could not be used by Jews, and travel on public transport required special permits not readily granted. Even with a permit, a Jewish person had to travel in the lowest class, only in smoking compartments, and could sit down only after all non-Jews had found seats. Jews were not permitted to have telephones in their homes and they were also not authorized to use public phones. They were not permitted to buy fruit; vegetables could be purchased only at special Jewish stores (where supplies were minimal). They were prohibited from practicing any form of sport in public and they could not sit on public benches. They were not permitted to visit non-Jewish homes. All Jews had to be in their own residence from 8 P.M. until 6 A.M. During these hours they were not to lean out of windows or to occupy a front balcony or front yard, and all front windows had to be kept closed. Sexual relations with non-Jews and marriage to non-Jews were forbidden, although existing marriages were not dissolved. Jewish households could not employ non-Jewish servants.[20]

[19] Ibid., 5: 522–23; Herzberg, "Kroniek," 3: 71, 75.

[20] Presser, *Ondergang*, 1: 149, 265; Herzberg, "Kroniek," 3: 68–69, 77; *Joodsche Weekblad*: 27 June 1941; 4 July 1941; 26 September 1941; 14 November 1941; 20 and 27 March 1942; 22 June 1942; 3 and 10 July 1942; 14 August 1942. "Aryans" could still visit Jewish homes. "Great hilarity" developed at a press conference when the German spokesman admitted that this remained possible and wished "much pleasure" to any person who might want to avail himself of such a "privilege." De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 5: 1051–52.

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Jewish children could only attend special schools for Jews. When Roman Catholic and Protestant parochial schools refused to eject their Jewish and "Christian-Jewish" pupils, the Germans, characteristically, did not use force against the parochial school authorities. Instead, they threatened the Jewish parents with punitive measures if they continued to send their children to the parochial schools, and these threats sufficed.[21] One of the most drastic stripping measures was the dislodgment of a great number of Jews from their homes all over the Netherlands, as decreed in early 1942. Thus, many Jewish families lost not only their homes and most of their belongings, but even the non-Jewish friends and neighbors among whom they had lived. Cramped quarters among strangers awaited these Jews in Amsterdam, where they were told to move.[22]

The most hateful stripping measure was the imposition of the "star." In Germany, as of 19 September 1941, the "police decree concerning the marking [*Kennzeichnung*] of the Jews" had ordered that all persons above the age of six with at least three Jewish grandparents had to wear a yellow star marked "Jew" (in odd "Jewish" lettering), the size of a palm, on the front of their outer garment. The star had to be displayed whenever Jewish persons were in a locale where they might be seen by persons not belonging to their own household. As Victor von Klemperer (a Jew married to an "Aryan") noted, the day that the star was introduced was by far the most cruel of all the days of suffering inflicted on the Jews in Germany before the deportations began. All his friends agreed.[23] In the Netherlands, where the star was imposed on 29 April 1942, it was considered the most brutal measure before the deportations. Many Jews were so deeply hurt that they no longer cared to appear in public at all.[24] The star was a symbol, or rather the one "anti-symbol," in the Third Reich. In a regime much devoted to symbols, the star embodied Hitler's Jewish policy—the Jews as the only enemy of all of humanity. Henceforth, the Germans hoped, the Dutch nation would be divided into two camps, the good and the evil. The former included, in principle, all those without the star.[25]

Abel J. Herzberg has suggested that the impact on the Dutch public of the "starring" of the Jews was profound.[26] Louis de Jong has argued that the star did arouse many non-Jews for the first time; it was perceived as one of the most shameful acts of the occupier. Students in Amsterdam talked about staging a demonstration, with each demonstrator displaying an imitation star. The police convinced them that the Germans would not tolerate such an action. A small-scale demonstration did occur in the provincial city of Deventer. In another provincial town, a Jewish family "rehearsed" walking through the main street

[21] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 5: 518–20, 527–28. Also, J.C.H. de Pater, *Het Schoolverzet* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 76–80.

[22] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 5: 1020.

[23] Victor Klemperer, *LTI—Notizbuch eines Philologen* (E. Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1949), 177.

[24] Presser, *Ondergang*, 1: 218–19, 228–29.

[25] Herzberg, "Kroniek," 3: 66–67.

[26] Ibid.

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with their new stars; they observed all kinds of gestures of sympathy, such as strangers lifting their hat. De Jong did not know how many such outbursts of concern for the Jews took place, but he doubted that they were numerous.[27] The Jews were left alone to bear the new burden. There were no reports about grand gestures in their behalf in the Netherlands—such as the later rumour about the Danish king riding through the streets of Copenhagen with the star on his gala uniform.[28]

Stripping turned out to be an effective German process, characteristic of the particularly effective implementation of the Final Solution in the Netherlands. The "supreme objectivity, perfect lucidity, and consummate reasoning" of the German anti-Jewish tactics remained "incomprehensible" to Jacob Presser.[29] De Jong, too, concluded that the anti-Jewish measures were conducted by the Germans in a "businesslike," "calm and orderly" manner, "as a normal and smooth social process" and "with a minimum of friction." Even individual profiteering was largely avoided. Very little German manpower was required; a staff of about twenty Germans administered the persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, including the deportation of more than 100,000 persons.[30]

During World War II, the Germans hardly proved themselves masters of psychological warfare, but they seemed truly "inspired" in the anti-Jewish sphere. The victims were left totally helpless, while among the bystanders commotion was largely avoided in spite of the drastic nature of the measures. One of the successful German tactics used against the Jews was the "*Etappensystem*" (step-system). As Herzberg observed: "always creating the illusion that the worst had been reached, always causing disenchantment because things became even worse; yet, even with each disenchantment . . . [the Nazis] were able to bring about a new illusion that the end of the measures had been reached."[31] The Germans also used intricate systems of divide-and-rule against the Jews as well as the bystanders, in addition to simple trickery and deceit.

As a result of the stripping, their compatriots were not able to imagine the fears that plagued the Jews. Dutch non-Jewish public opinion appeared to be acquiescing to whatever fate was in store for them. One got used to the idea that the Jews were receiving the blows, and one was happy not to be a Jew. The public

[27] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 5: 1042.

[28] Leni Yahil has established that the Danish king did not really engage in such an action—the Germans never dared to impose the star on the Jews residing in Denmark. See Leni Yahil, *The Rescue of Danish Jewry* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969), 54, 81–82. The imposition of the star was rejected by the Vichy government, the first German proposal on Jewish matters refused outright by Vichy. The star was imposed by the Germans in the occupied zone of France. Maurice Duverger later recalled "that it was the star that first conveyed the gravity of the persecutions" to the French public; and it was the star that provoked "the first extensive, open resistance" to the Jewish measures. Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, 209, 236, 239.

[29] Presser, *Ondergang*, 2: 156.

[30] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 5: 996–98, 1046–47.

[31] Herzberg, "Kroniek," 3: 46.

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did not understand how desperate the Jewish plight really was—that for the Jews there were no "answers," and that only too soon the portents of the most ignominious death would be felt in the dark streets of Amsterdam.[32] From London, Queen Wilhelmina had movingly described her feelings—how the pain inflicted on the Jews was felt by her as pain inflicted on herself and the entire Dutch nation. The queen's empathy for the fate of her beloved people of the Old Testament was not, unfortunately, shared by the great majority of her subjects. The Jews felt utterly isolated as Dutch civil servants, Dutch policemen, and Dutch streetcar and train personnel assisted the Germans in all the Netherlands stages of the Final Solution as if they were carrying out routine chores.[33] The Jews' fellow citizens hardly took notice, and the Germans saw to it that Jews were ignored in the press.[34]

The Concentration of Dutch Jews

Even the draconic events of the concentration stage could be undertaken by the Germans without producing major commotion. The ultimate stages of deportation and annihilation required that sufficient "batches of Jews" be available for transport to the East. The only real bottlenecks for the Germans turned out to be the shortage of freight cars, and the not unlimited capacity of the gas chambers at the extermination camps. The various methods for concentrating Jews did secure adequate supplies of "Auschwitz material" at all times.

In Poland and the neighboring regions, the Germans used sealed-off ghettos in the middle of cities, such as Warsaw and Lodz, for purposes of concentration. Once the walls were built and the gates secured, the millions of Jews within them would leave alive only in the train to the nearby extermination camp. In the West, including Germany, the Nazis did not choose to introduce ghettos within cities inhabited by non-Jews. In Germany and Austria, the Jews were kept in decentralized holding patterns—small complexes of ramshackle barracks on the outskirts of cities and towns. From there trains went directly to the extermination camps or to the ghettos of the East, with the latter serving as concentration facilities also for many German and Austrian Jews. In the occupied West, large "transit" camps were set up, usually one for each country, where the Jews were dumped after having been picked up from their homes. The trains to the eastern

[32] Presser, *Ondergang*, 1: 254–55, 284.

[33] B.A. Sijes, *Studies over Jodenvervolging* (Assen: van Gorcum, 1974), 141. In France, "throughout the French administration the general rule, when confronted with anti-Jewish measures, seems to have been business as usual." German decrees against the Jews were enforced, even "beyond the letter," by "bureaucratic momentum." Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, 126, 243.

[34] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 6: 34, 243. The Germans had given strict instructions to the Dutch press to ignore the Jews: it was "entirely uncalled for" that Jewish issues be discussed or even mentioned, especially not any of the German measures against the Jews. The underground press did some reporting on the plight of the Jews, but its knowledge of that plight was most incomplete. Ibid., 5: 495; 6: 10–11. Presser, *Ondergang*, 1: 107.

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extermination camps ran directly from the transit camps at regular intervals (weekly from July 1942 to July 1943).

Westerbork was the transit camp for the Jews from the Netherlands. It was the biggest such establishment in the West and delivered the largest number of western Jews to the gas chambers. For many of the Jews in the Netherlands, there was a sort of pre-concentration stage. As mentioned earlier, many families were forced to move to neighborhoods where Jews had traditionally lived in Amsterdam. These Amsterdam neighborhoods were not ghettos, and non-Jewish families continued to live in the same streets and apartment houses as the Jews. Most transports to Westerbork originated in Amsterdam.[35]

On 26 June 1942, at 10 P.M. (a Jewish Sabbath), the co-leaders of the Amsterdam Joodsche Raad, David Cohen and Abraham Asscher, were called to the office of Ferdinand aus der Fünten, the German chief for Jewish questions in Amsterdam. He informed them that "*polizeilicher Arbeitseinsatz*" (labor service under police auspices) in "work camps" in "Germany" would be required for all the Jews in the Netherlands. The Joodsche Raad would have "to prepare" 600 Jews per day for the journey to the East. Three days later, on 29 June 1942, the Germans announced in the Dutch press that all "full" Jews would be deported from the Netherlands. They added, ominously, that "they would return as poor to the place of their origin as when they had arrived."[36] This announcement was most unusual. Never before, nor ever again, had the public been informed about measures against the Jews. There was no follow-up to the announcement; there was no explanation why the Jews had to go to the East nor was it revealed what was supposed to be in store for them there. The implication was, as many of the Dutch bystanders apparently perceived it, that the Jews would be put to work under harsh conditions to help exploit the conquered regions in the Soviet Union.

Previously, on 1 November 1941, the Germans had inquired from the secretary-general of the Ministry of the Interior, K. J. Frederiks, what he would do if the Dutch Jews were to be deported from the country. Frederiks replied that all the secretaries-general would resign immediately. He was then asked whether they would also resign if the Jewish refugees from Germany were deported, and Frederiks responded negatively; these Jews were really German subjects, not a Dutch responsibility. In late February 1942, Frederiks was informed—quite suddenly, but "very politely"—that the Dutch Jews were not really Dutch subjects and could not be considered to fall under the jurisdiction of the Dutch authorities. Regardless of Jews' "nominal" citizenship, the Dutch officials did not have the right to involve themselves with measures against them. Henceforth, the Dutch Jews too were to be considered as falling "beyond the legal and consti-

[35] At one time the Germans had considered establishing a Polish-style ghetto in Amsterdam, but decided against it after protests from the pro-German mayor, the secretaries-general, and several German officials. De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 5: 974.

[36] Ibid., 5: 1053; 6: 1–2. Presser, *Ondergang*, 1: 247.

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tutional system of the Dutch people"; any measures against them were to be seen as merely "*politioneel*" (police-related) in character. The secretaries-general responded by submitting a note of protest, which the Germans termed "entirely redundant." The secretaries-general did not resign, and apparently resignation was not even discussed among them as an alternative. In de Jong's words, the Dutch Jews were now being thrown to the wolves by the highest Dutch authorities, as the German-Jewish refugees had been some months earlier.[37] The deportation of the Dutch Jews was announced publicly soon thereafter, and the secretaries-general issued another protest.

Following their superiors' example, lower Dutch officials did not resign when they were asked to help implement the removal of their fellow citizens. From lists given them by the Germans, regular Amsterdam police began to pick up Jewish persons in their homes for shipment to Westerbork. Many of the police did not like this work, not only because it was "unpleasant" but also because it involved night shifts. Yet de Jong discovered that only two policemen refused the pick-up duties. One was dismissed from the force, but not otherwise bothered; the other was transferred to other police duties. Nevertheless, since quite a few of the Amsterdam police were suspected of purposeful inefficency in connection with the pick-ups, special pick-up teams were introduced that consisted of German police, Dutch Nazi auxiliary police, and other "specialists." All in all, some 90 percent of the regular Amsterdam police appear to have been involved in some sort of duty relating to Jewish deportations. In other Dutch communities, only a handful of mayors and even fewer police chiefs refused to participate in the removals of Jews. One of these officials was arrested, but the other "refusers" were merely dismissed from their job.[38]

Regular Dutch streetcar and train personnel handled the Jewish transports to the transit camp and from there to the German border, where German train crews took over for the remainder of the journey to the East. Dutch police guarded the trains to Westerbork, and the camp itself was secured by the illustrious corps of the Royal Constabulary (Maréchaussée).[39] A Westerbork inmate, Philip Mechanicus, depicted the men of the Maréchaussée as "efficient" as they patrolled the periphery and stood on guard towers. However, after the German defeat at Stalingrad in 1943, the Maréchaussée may have become less stringent in their controls, and a few escapes were possible. One of their commanders was apparently arrested by the Germans for assisting Jewish escapees in the neighborhood of the camp.[40]

Although the public had been informed about the deportations, it remained generally passive. A few exceptions to this passivity are documented. A German

[37] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 5: 996, 1021–22.

[38] Ibid., 6: 29–36, 232–40.

[39] Ibid., 8: 714.

[40] Philip Mechanicus, *In Dépôt; Dagboek uit Westerbork* (Amsterdam: Polak and van Gennep, 1964), 33, 37, 50, 156, 176, 193.

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army report of October 1942 cites evidence of sympathy shown to Jews. In the towns of Alphen and Gouda, Jews were accompanied to the railroad station by non-Jewish friends, and there were tears and emotional embraces, even on the part of police guards. A civil servant at Zwolle described in his diary his "boundlessly sad" impressions of the removal of his Jewish "neighbors," including one eighty-year-old blind lady and a three-year-old child: "I have to leave, I can't look at it any longer." At a few railroad stations, refreshments were handed out to departing Jews. Most of the time, however, according to de Jong, their fellow citizens hardly took notice as processions of Jews heavily loaded with baggage, guarded "like dangerous criminals" by Dutch and German police, passed through the streets on the way to the station.[41]

A major public protest against the removal of the Jews was planned by the churches. The national organization representing virtually all the Protestant churches as well as the Roman Catholic church, Interkerkelijk Overleg, sent a strongly worded telegram to the Germans on 11 July 1942. In it, the churches denounced the deportation of "the Jews in the Netherlands"—not just the Dutch Jews or the "Christian Jews," although the latter were mentioned separately. Moreover, Interkerkelijk Overleg announced that the text of the telegram would be read in all churches on Sunday, 26 July 1942. The Germans, worried about "waves" at the very beginning of the deportations, did not want to engage in open conflict with the churches. They discerned a tactical opening in the special reference to "Christian Jews" in the telegram. They let it be known that those "Christian Jews" who had been baptized before 1 January 1941 would be exempted from deportation to the East—but only if the churches would forego further protests and especially the reading of the telegram in public. To make the deal even more attractive, the Germans hinted that the mixed-married Jews might also be exempted, although it is questionable that the Germans had seriously considered the deportation of this group.

The German tactics were successful in dividing the churches; most of the Protestant denominations decided not to read the telegram in their churches. The telegram was read in the Roman Catholic churches and also in the most fervently pro-Jewish and anti-Nazi of the Protestant churches, those of the Gereformeerde Kerk. The Germans reacted immediately. There were about 700 "Catholic Jews" in the Netherlands, of whom the majority were mixed-married. The remainder, approximately 245, were picked up on 2 August 1942, and shipped to Westerbork. There, approximately 100 of the "Catholic Jews" were put on the next train to Auschwitz and gassed upon arrival. Among them were a number of monks and nuns in clerical garb, wearing the cross and the star. The great majority of the "Protestant Jews" were taken to Westerbork later, but they were sent from there to the "privileged" camp at Theresienstadt, where they survived.[42]

[41] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 6: 34, 243.

[42] The churches had considered opening a large Protestant church in the heart of Amsterdam as a place of refuge for Jews about to be deported. This plan was not carried out—because, according

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At certain orphanages, hospitals, and mental institutions, administrators refused to obey the German order to identify and surrender the Jewish patients or inmates. Dutch police were sent to enforce the German demand, but a number of Jews in these institutions were never discovered and survived the war.[43]

The Jews must have felt utterly deserted by their countrymen as they faced the horrors of the removal from their homes and the shipment to Westerbork. Typically, during a large-scale pick-up action at Olympia Plein (a square in the heart of fashionable Amsterdam-South), the victims could hear a tennis game in progress on the courts at the square. Those continuing their game were not Dutch Nazis but represented "the majority of the Dutch people; one had become accustomed to many things." As young Moshe Flinker observed in neighboring Brussels, the Jews were being "shoved off," but the "Aryans" continued their parties and their fun.[44]

Catching Jews for Westerbork

The collecting of Jews for the reservoir at the Westerbork transit camp proved to be a demanding task. "Waves" were hard to avoid, as entire families, children as well as the aged, were dragged from their homes in plain view of their non-Jewish neighbors. Initially, the Germans had the Joodsche Raad send out registered letters with instructions to individual Jews to report to the local German authorities at a specified time for transport to Westerbork. These letters did not produce results, not even when they were delivered by policemen. Almost 80 percent of those called up refused to report despite threatening editorials in the Joodsche Raad's weekly. In response to this remarkable feat of Jewish noncompliance, the Germans experimented with various schemes for the pick-ups. Ultimately they did develop an efficient system, the so-called *meteen meenemen* (taking along immediately). Police pick-up teams went to the homes of those on their list, arrested the entire family, and sent them directly to Westerbork. The system worked because the Germans had also issued the decree that all Jews had to be in their own residence from 8 P.M. until 6 A.M. The pick-up teams always appeared after 8 P.M. During the daytime hours, the teams went after larger concentrations of victims in Jewish orphanages, old-age homes, and hospitals. During the very last phases of the deportations, the Germans used the crudest method—simply grabbing all "starred" persons right from the street or from the

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to de Jong, the Protestant churches were probably too afraid to engage in public acts of protest in behalf of the Jews. Ibid., 6: 13–21. Conversion to Christianity was infrequent among Dutch Jews: only 1 percent had become Protestant, and 0.5 percent Roman Catholic. Herzberg, "Kroniek," 3: 53, 133–34.

[43] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 6: 305–306, 314–15.

[44] Herzberg, "Kroniek," 3: 115; Moshe Flinker, *Young Moshe's Diary* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1965), 71.

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apartments in a designated neighborhood. The Westerbork reservoir was always filled, and the trains to Auschwitz and Sobibor never had empty spaces.

The cruelty of the pick-ups can hardly be imagined. De Jong has written: "Evening after evening these people . . . were waiting for the moment that the pick-up team would ring their bell . . . . Each approaching car could be *the* car. Many were not able to bear the everlasting tensions."[45] The residents of the old-age homes tried desperately to avoid the daytime pick-ups; they roamed the streets, sat on steps (benches and parks were taboo), and in panic asked any "starred" passerby whether the next street was "quiet" (not infested with pick-up teams). Especially during the earlier waves of deportation, youths from the age of sixteen were called up individually for Westerbork, and their parents were not permitted to accompany them to the station. Jacob Presser described a danse macabre as these boys and girls trekked through the dark streets of Amsterdam (streetcars were not authorized for them). Presser, a high school teacher then, recalled how his class started out with twenty-eight pupils in the fall of 1942; by May 1943, there were only four left.[46] Some Jewish parents became so desperate that newly born babies were put out as foundlings. Accordingly, the Germans decreed that all foundlings would be considered Jewish, sent directly to Westerbork, and from there put on the trains in their cribs to the gas chamber.[47]

Possibilities for Onderduik

The inevitable publicness and blatant cruelty of the pick-ups did have an effect on some of the Dutch bystanders. Increasingly, there were attempts to assist Jews by finding, or offering, "*onderduik*" ("diving") addresses for them. A considerable number of these *onderduikers* were caught by the Germans, such as the family of Anne Frank (whose Amsterdam hiding place was discovered only in July 1944). Nevertheless, an estimated 18,400 Jews did manage to stay in underground shelter until the end of the occupation, including some 4,500 children.[48] Non-Jewish bystanders obviously played crucial roles in these efforts at the risk of their own lives.

However, the Germans were not always eager to inflict the heaviest penalties on non-Jews who had been caught sheltering Jews—again, to avoid commotion among the non-Jewish bystanders. For example, a farmer near Haarlem was caught three times with dozens of Jewish children hiding on his farm before he was sent to a German concentration camp (where he died). Such relative German leniency could hardly have been anticipated by those hiding Jews, or by the Jews themselves. Jews were often reluctant to endanger the lives of non-Jewish friends

[45] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 6: 244.
[46] Presser, *Ondergang*, 1: 262, 298, 496.
[47] *Joodsche Weekblad*, 15 January 1943.
[48] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 6: 344.

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by asking for "diving" facilities rather than submitting to the "labor duties" in the East. There is no way of determining how many additional Jews would have sought underground shelter if the risks had seemed less.

There is also no way of knowing how many additional Jews could actually have been hidden in a densely populated country like the Netherlands. Shelters were difficult to find for Jews. Children were most easily hidden, usually by simply being absorbed into a non-Jewish household. The most appropriate regions for hiding Jews were the rural provinces, in the traditionally rebellious Friesland province, or among the strict Protestants and Catholics of the Gelderse Achterhoek region. A Protestant clergyman complained that one could more easily place ten escaping English pilots in one house than one Jewish person in ten houses—even if the Jews looked "unpronounced" rather than "very typical" in appearance. Jews had to move from shelter to shelter more frequently than non-Jewish "divers." Presser recalled that he had to use five different addresses, and his parents-in-law as many as twenty-six. The small Gereformeerde church was the most determined among the Dutch bystanders. Although the denomination comprised only 8 percent of the population, its followers sheltered perhaps 25 percent of the Jewish *onderduikers*. During the height of the deportations, from mid-1942 until mid-1943, the Dutch resistance movement was neither strong enough nor organized sufficiently to aid many Jews. Jews were persecuted too early to benefit from what later in the war became an effective opponent of the German occupiers. Many of the most likely Jewish "divers"—those in their twenties and thirties—refused to leave aged parents or younger brothers and sisters as the family faced the dreaded removal to Westerbork and the trip East. All of them, Jews and non-Jews, exaggerated the dangers of going into hiding—and underestimated the dangers of deportation.[49]

[49] Ibid., 6: 326–33; 8: 846–47. Werner Warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German Occupation 1940–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 174. There had been an earlier occasion during which Dutch bystanders came to the assistance of Jews, many months before the Germans decreed the removal of the Jews. The so-called February Strike of February 1941 had been organized by Amsterdam workers and the underground Communist party in part as a protest against an early wave of German and Dutch-Nazi brutalities against Jews in Amsterdam. Apparently these brutalities were staged against the wishes of at least some of the higher German officials. The Germans were not able to contain for one or two days widespread strike actions and massive demonstrations on the streets of Amsterdam. Like the German *Kristallnacht* of November 1938, these early events in Amsterdam taught the Germans that "noise" had to be avoided at all cost, that anti-Jewish measures had to be staged carefully and with "cool" tactics. Typically, most of the non-Jewish demonstrators of February 1941 were hardly punished, but the 425 Jewish persons arrested were all killed at the German concentration camp of Mauthausen. The February Strike was the only occasion during the occupation in which Jews and non-Jews, side by side, demonstrated publicly against German and Dutch Nazi excesses. See B.A. Sijes, *De Februari-Staking* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954); Henry L. Mason, *Mass Demonstrations against Foreign Regimes* (New Orleans: Tulane Studies in Political Science, 1966), 4–7, 20–22, 35–36, 47–48, 60–61, 72–76; Herzberg, "Kroniek," 3: 80, 83, 89–92, 99.

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The Joodsche Raad

In addition to Dutch government officials, officials of the "Jewish government," the Joodsche Raad of Amsterdam, made it feasible for the Germans to carry out the Final Solution. During the definition stage, the Joodsche Raad participated significantly. On 30 October 1941, David Cohen and Abraham Asscher informed their colleagues on the governing board of the Joodsche Raad that they had been instructed by the Germans to produce a complete file of all Jewish persons in the Netherlands from the data of the Dutch civil authorities. Cohen and Asscher considered this effort in behalf of the Germans "a routine matter." A group of some fifty Jewish typists from the Joodsche Raad went to work in the offices of the Dutch population registry, bringing their own typewriters, chairs, and tables. The Joodsche Raad offered special rewards to those typists who could handle a particularly large number of entries. Four of the typists were assigned on a permanent basis to the main German office of Jewish "emigration" in The Hague, where they kept current the Jewish files, noting changes of address as well as dates of arrival at Westerbork. Their German boss stated after the war that they had been his best workers; they remained at the German headquarters until September 1944, when they were deported on one of the last trains to the East.[50]

The *Joodsche Weekblad*, published by the Joodsche Raad from 11 April 1941 through 23 July 1943, is a testimonial to the perplexing roles forced on the Jewish leadership.[51] The weekly became the journal of record that informed the Jews about the increasingly brutal measures affecting their lives. The *Joodsche Weekblad*, in effect, became the compliant "house-organ" of the Final Solution, preaching submissiveness and warning its readers of dreadful penalties if they tried to disobey the German decrees. Abel J. Herzberg, one of its editors, argued after the war that the weekly had been indispensable to the Jews; the decrees had to be published somewhere so that the victims could at least know what they were supposed to do. He maintained that in a period of unimaginable hardship and total abandonment, the *Joodsche Weekblad* served as the "last means of communication among the deserted and isolated."[52] Others believed that the journal should not have been published by the Joodsche Raad—it was a "fatal error" that "confirmed the isolation of the Dutch Jews" and forced them into a "printed ghetto."[53]

The most controversial roles of the Joodsche Raad related to its tasks in the concentration stage, the removal of the Jews to Westerbork. Ferdinand aus der Fünten, the German specialist for Jewish affairs in Amsterdam, had informed

[50] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 5: 1000–1001; 6: 258.

[51] The issues of the *Joodsche Weekblad* were reprinted in a complete edition in 1979, by Omniboek in The Hague.

[52] Herzberg, "Kroniek," 3: 182–183. See also Herzberg's appendix to the *Joodsche Weekblad* reprint, "Een andere visie."

[53] Dick Houwaart, introduction to the *Joodsche Weekblad* reprint.

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Cohen and Asscher that 600 Jews per day would have to be "prepared" by them for removal. Their first reaction was to protest the "labor service" in the East; such labor was against international law and could not be required from civilians in an occupied country. Aus der Fünten replied that it was up to the Germans, as the victors, to decide what was legal. Cohen and Asscher then tried, in vain, to reduce the number of "preparations" to 350 per day. The Germans did offer two "concessions"—families would be deported as units, and "very many Jews" (not further defined) would remain in the Netherlands while the deportations were proceeding. The officers of the Joodsche Raad deliberated for four days. They were greatly disturbed by the notion of "police-related" labor duties, although they had no way of knowing what "duties" this "police" would require. They considered resignation, but ultimately they submitted. Eventually, the Joodsche Raad's task was, in effect, to select the individual Jews who would be sent to Westerbork. The Germans instructed the Joodsche Raad to issue "safe" permits—the "*stempels*" (stamps) with "safe" numbers on identity cards—to those whom it (the Joodsche Raad) considered "indispensable to the life of the Jewish community in the Netherlands." Those without such permits were picked up and shipped to Westerbork. The Germans periodically decided how many of the permits could remain valid. Initially, in July 1942, they authorized 35,000 permits; their number was gradually reduced, to zero by September 1943. The Joodsche Raad had to list the permit holders "in order of their indispensability," and it was up to the Joodsche Raad to reduce the number of permits in accordance with the total permitted by the Germans. Thus, by not granting or by invalidating permits, the Joodsche Raad decided who would be shipped to Westerbork next. The ensuing battle for the permits was desperate and corruptive; it destroyed whatever integrity and harmony there had been within the Jewish community as presided over by the Joodsche Raad. The system of the permits was of the greatest convenience to the Germans; it enabled them to destroy the Jewish population by installments, without the "noisy" disruptions that would have been the consequence of deporting "at random," without the permits.[54]

The Joodsche Raad had no jurisdiction over the Jews once they reached the transit camp. It was the Jewish camp administration at Westerbork that was given the responsibility for selecting the individual Jews for the next train to the East from the reservoir of "Auschwitz material" at hand—after the Germans had specified the size of the "batch of Jews" required for the particular train. The Jewish camp police at Westerbork assisted German and Dutch police in many ways, including participation in mass pick-up actions throughout the Netherlands and the prevention of escapes from Westerbork.[55]

[54] Presser, *Ondergang*, 1: 293; de Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 6: 74, 218–220.

[55] At the French transit camp, at Drancy in the Occupied Zone, it was the non-Jewish French camp administration that selected the individual Jews for the trains to the East. Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, 254.

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The Jewish authorities at Amsterdam and Westerbork were the target of severe criticism after the war. Herzberg described how Cohen and Asscher went ever further in their cooperation with the German measures—but "further also went their isolation." There were no instructions for the Joodsche Raad from the Dutch government in London or from the Dutch officials in the occupied country. Public opinion had "atrophied." The Germans were totally effective in their tactic of isolating the Jewish leaders; they had no telephones, no transport, and no meetings or other contacts with non-Jews. For the Jews there was no more Dutch community, in fact no more human society. The Germans needed the Jewish Councils for the implementation of the Final Solution, in Holland and elsewhere. But, posited Herzberg, the Jews, too, could not carry on without the Jewish Councils. Entirely cut off from their fellow nationals, the Jews had to bear the unbearable as the Jewish "folk," as they had done in so many locales and periods in the past. For that kind of "regression" the Jews needed a Joodsche Raad.[56] De Jong agreed; the Joodsche Raad appeared as the only "government" available to the Jews after the Dutch governmental authorities in The Hague turned their back on them during 1941. The Joodsche Raad became the government for the Jews at a time that government assistance was more desperately needed than ever, when all of them had been reduced to welfare cases. The "horrible truth" must be recognized that many Jews could not imagine life without the Joodsche Raad, even as in its ultimate tasks it made Jewish life impossible.[57]

David Cohen and Abraham Asscher were the co-leaders of the Joodsche Raad until their own removal to Westerbork in September 1943. Cohen, a professor of ancient history at the University of Amsterdam, had been a respected figure of the pre-occupation period. Since 1933, he had been the chairman of the Dutch organization aiding German-Jewish refugees. He was given the chance to escape to England before the Dutch capitulation, but refused to leave the refugees.[58] Asscher had been the owner of one of the largest diamond firms in Amsterdam and was a leader in synagogue circles, as well as in the Dutch Liberal party. He displayed considerable courage during the occupation; a few weeks after the capitulation he personally confronted a diamond-hunting Hermann Goering in his office, where Queen Wilhelmina's (forbidden) portrait was brazenly displayed. He privately advised Jews to go "underground" and gave financial support to the Orde Dienst, one of the earliest resistance organizations. He engaged in a fistfight with a German policeman during the mass pick-ups of 20 June 1943, and told Germans to their face that they had lost the war and that their rulers were "archvillains." He was given the chance to escape to Switzerland during the occupation, but he too refused to go. (His wife had committed suicide

[56] Herzberg, "Kroniek," 3: 153–54, 164–68.
[57] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 7: 370–71.
[58] Ibid., 5: 491–493.

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when the Dutch army capitulated.)[59] Cohen and Asscher were not "quislings" but legitimate members of the Dutch Jewish establishment.[60]

Cohen and Asscher survived in the "privileged" camp of Theresienstadt. After the war, they asserted that they would have resigned immediately if they had known what fate awaited the deportees in the East. They claimed that they had expected the return of most of those deported to the East after the German defeat. Yet Cohen told Louis de Jong shortly before Cohen's death in 1967 "that no night went by during which he did not pose to himself the ever recurring, tormenting question how he *could* have done what he did." According to de Jong, both Cohen and Asscher had been "totally deaf" to a number of "signals" that did come through of the disasters in the East. In November 1947, Cohen and Asscher were arrested by the judicial authorities in Amsterdam on charges of collaboration with the Germans. Soon thereafter, however, the minister of justice ordered their release. The case was dismissed, and there was never a trial. A spokesman for the ministry remarked that "innumerable" non-Jewish Dutch officials had helped the Germans with the implementation of the Final Solution, yet none of them had ever been brought before the courts.[61]

The Trains to the East

Centuries of Jewish life in the Netherlands came to an end at the Westerbork camp. For almost all the inmates, it was also the penultimate stage of their earthly existence. The mysterious East turned out to be unimaginably more horrible than even the most pessimistic had feared. However, the Westerbork sojourn itself was still bearable to its transients. It was part of the German tactic of camouflaging the next (and final) stage that Westerbork not be perceived as anti-life. "Natural" death did not occur at Westerbork: apparently no one was beaten, nobody starved, and medical care was surprisingly good. At the height of the deportations, the camp hospital had 1,725 beds, 120 physicians, a staff of 1,000, and complete equipment and supplies. As Jacob Presser has noted, this entire apparatus was established "in behalf of people who were to be annihilated further up the line." Death, further up the line, was made to appear impossible and insane—"it turned out to be insane and possible."[62]

Life at Westerbork was at all times under the impact of the transports to the East, that "next camp" from which no news had ever come back even after tens of thousands of Westerbork inmates had been shipped there. Westerbork meant

[59] Ibid., 5: 488–491; 7: 294.

[60] On the German preference to work with legitimate officials, Jewish as well as non-Jewish, see Fein, *Accounting for Genocide*, 123–24.

[61] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 5: 495–97; 6: 252–53; 7: 345–51, 366–68, 376–80. For an exemplary analysis of the predicament and roles of the Jewish Councils in Poland, see Isaiah Trunk, *Judenrat* (New York: Stein & Day, 1977).

[62] Jacob Presser's introduction to Mechanicus, *In Dépôt*, 7.

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the inexorable rhythm of the trains. They ordinarily left on Tuesday, usually with a "batch" of 1,000 Jews. Panic was at its height during the weekend when the train lists were made up by the Jewish camp administration. Philip Mechanicus described the chaos, the total lack of homogeneity among the inmates, the profound rivalries, and the corruption. Whoever was able to save himself from "the train of the week" knew that he would be replaced on that train by a fellow Jew who had not been able to pull the right string. Even the best strings assured only a few weeks' delay, at most.[63]

The trains from Westerbork to the East were operated by the Reichsbahn, the German state railroad, with Dutch crews for the short leg to the German border. Overall arrangements were made in Berlin by Adolf Eichmann, whose section (the Reichssicherheitshauptamt [RSHA]) managed transportation to the death camps. The trains usually consisted of sealed freight cars, with one passenger coach for the guard detachment of one officer and twelve men from the regular German police. The freightcars were entirely bare except for one barrel per car for toilet needs and one barrel of water. The Reichsbahn charged the RSHA half a regular one-way fare per person for these "accommodations," which was considered a group fare. The fares were carefully accounted, and collected from frozen Jewish accounts in Holland. The victims thus paid for their own transportation to the gas chambers. During the height of the deportations from Westerbork, from 15 July 1942 until 23 July 1943, there were fifty-two trains to Auschwitz, with 42,945 "pieces of Jews" (of whom 30,944, or 72 percent, were gassed immediately), and nineteen trains to Sobibor, with 34,313 arrivals. From at least fourteen of the Sobibor trains, every person was gassed immediately. The last train from Westerbork to Auschwitz departed on 3 September 1944, the day Brussels was liberated. The trip from Westerbork to Auschwitz took from 36 to 44 hours; the trip to Sobibor approximately 72 hours. The usual arrival time at the ramp was between midnight and 4 A.M. By 6 A.M., the majority of a train's occupants had been killed.[64]

Few of the Dutch bystanders knew anything about the trains. Dutch policemen

[63] Mechanicus, *In Dépôt*, 8, 107. The Westerbork administration was in the hands of German Jews who had already inhabited the camp when it was still a Dutch internment camp for "illegal" German-Jewish refugees. The Germans exploited the considerable amount of hostility at Westerbork between German and Dutch Jews. On attitudes in the Netherlands toward German Jews, see A. Hiemstra-Timmenga, "De wettelijke positie van de Duitse en statenloze Joden in Nederland, 1939–1945," *Preliminary Report Nr. 50* (Amsterdam: Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation, 1954); also Fein, *Accounting for Genocide*, 264.

Mechanicus's masterful description of conditions at Westerbork is complemented, equally movingly, by Etty Hillesum's diary and letters from Westerbork. See Etty Hillesum, *Het verstoorde leven: dagboek van Etty Hillesum, 1941–1943* (Haarlem: de Haan, 1981) and Etty Hillesum, *Het denkende hart van de barak: brieven van Etty Hillesum* (Haarlem: de Haan, 1982). Mechanicus and Hillesum were both gassed at Auschwitz.

[64] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 8: 716, 724. For the Jews transported from the Netherlands to the East, the survival rate at Sobibor was 0.05 percent and at Auschwitz 1.75 percent. E.A. Cohen, *De Negentien Treinen naar Sobibor* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1979), 22. Although freight cars and locomo-

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did guard duty at the Westerbork ramp where the trains were loaded. Dutch crews serviced the trains on their Dutch leg. A number of railroad men had asked their union officials whether they should not refuse such duties; the reply was that if they refused, the Jews would still be deported, perhaps "in a more miserable way." The railroad management advised that a strike would be harmful for the entire Dutch nation. The Dutch railroads did go on a long-lasting strike in September 1944, but the Jews had been transported East before that time. De Jong has argued that the railroad men probably could not have known about Auschwitz or Sobibor.[65] The Germans spared no effort to cloak the ultimate phases; conditions in the East might perhaps be "strict, yet in any case not . . . inhuman" for the Jews. A RSHA memo to its Jewish specialists in Holland warned that the Jews about to be "evacuated" to Auschwitz were not to receive "disturbing revelations . . . about the place or manner of utilization which is in store for them." The train guards were warned not to voice in the Jews' presence "suppositions about types of quarters, etc." at Auschwitz.[66] Presser suspected that virtually all the Dutch victims remained "unknowing" literally until the lights went out in the "shower" room—at most "Communists" would be killed in the East, or those who had "provoked" the Germans.[67]

What happened after Westerbork was clearly not imaginable to the Dutch bystanders. Yet we know today of a number of "leaks" that could have led to greater awareness. Certain Dutch citizens, Nazis as well as anti-Nazis, did come back from the general area of Auschwitz after having observed the worst there. They talked about the horrors to others. Their stories were not believed, or were seen as reflecting sporadic acts by underlings affecting relatively few victims. It was suspected that "ten of thousands" of Jews might have died in the East, at a time when more than a million had already been gassed.[68]

The most heinous failure of the bystanders, and especially the officials, was their indifference to the fate of the Dutch citizens transported en masse into oblivion. Apparently no one cared to find out what happened to the trains at the "next camp." Even the Dutch Red Cross did not make a serious effort to communicate with the Jewish deportees—although it did send a fully equipped

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tives were among the major bottlenecks of the German war effort in the East, Eichmann was always able to secure sufficient rolling stock for the Jewish trains—"no Jew was left alive for lack of transport." Raul Hilberg, "German Railroads/Jewish Souls," *Society* 14 (1978): 70.

[65] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 6: 38–40. On the role of the Dutch railroads during the occupation, see A.J.C. Rüter, *Rijden en Staken* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960). French railroad men also cooperated with the deportations of the Jews. "Nothing interfered with the transports to Auschwitz," even when substantial sabotage affected other German trains in France. "Not one of the eighty-five convoys of Jewish deportees was derailed or otherwise impeded," not even in 1944. Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, 332.

[66] Raul Hilberg, *Documents of Destruction* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 222.

[67] Presser, *Ondergang*, 2: 119–21; de Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 8: 770. As late as March 1944, that elite among Jewish camp elites at Westerbork, the camp physicians, did not believe the rumors about mass gassings in the East.

[68] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 5: 1026; 6: 55; 7: 302, 327–33.

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ambulance to the Eastern front to comfort the Dutch Waffen-SS volunteers fighting there.

The Applicability of the Danish Reversal

The catastrophe of the Jews in the Netherlands appears even more paradoxical in the light of experiences in Denmark, where virtually all Jews survived the war. In Denmark, too, anti-Semitism had been minimal and Jewish integration into the national community thorough. However, the interactions there among Germans, Danish bystanders, and the Jews developed very differently. German officials in Denmark were not eager to carry out the deportation of the Jews. Many of them, including military personnel, looked the other way, or even assisted, during the mass escape of 90 percent of the Jews to Sweden. Only approximately 800 Jews were picked up in Denmark from orphanages and homes for the aged, but this typical "Auschwitz material" was sent to the "privileged" camp at Theresienstadt. There, as the only "national group," they were exempted from the death transports to Auschwitz. Moreover, again as the only national group, they were to receive entirely unprecedented "inspection" visits from Danish officials.

The Danish bystanders, from top officials to local police, from professionals such as physicians and nurses to ordinary individuals, came actively and in considerable number to the assistance of the Jews, the 6,500 Danish nationals, as well as the 1,500 German refugees. As Leni Yahil concluded, Danish national cohesion was perceived as requiring the continued inclusion of the Jews in the national community. Danish officials and the public found it natural to assist the Jews, particularly with their escape to Sweden. After the Germans had taken control of Denmark, the Danish Jews and the German-Jewish refugees remained the responsibility of Danish officials—Jews were not, as in the Netherlands, assigned to a Jewish Council. A Jewish Council was never instituted in Denmark, and the Jews in Denmark were not subjected to stripping. They were not barred from restaurants, public places, schools, cinemas, or theaters; their property was not confiscated and they were not dismissed from their employment. They did not have to wear the star. They were not removed from their homes or detained in a transit camp, and their movement was not restricted, by day or night. Thus, as Yahil noted, "they had not become outlaws amidst the people whose fate they shared." Their relationships with their fellow-Danes remained close in spite of the German presence. Even after the flight to Sweden and the removal of the remainder to Theresienstadt, Jewish properties were not confiscated. The keys to Jewish homes were turned over to Danish officials "in an orderly manner," and the funds of the Jewish community were administered properly by a Danish lawyer.[69]

[69] In January 1942, the German chief in Denmark had recommended that "for the time being" the Jews in Denmark should be excluded from the Final Solution. Later, German officials in

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Yahil has argued that the key determinant of German behavior in Denmark was "the firm stand of the Danes, leaders and people as one" on the Jewish question. Because of the "moral-political attitude" of the Danes, the moderates among the Germans were able to find excuses for letting the Jews escape. In Helen Fein's words, "the Danish consensus was a product not simply of the absence of Jew-hatred but also of the acceptance of the positive obligations of Christians toward Jews," as expounded by, among others, the Danish Lutheran church. After the Germans threatened to begin the deportations, every organized group in Denmark issued protests. Thus, the "response capacity" of the Germans was affected by the Danish consensus. As Helen Fein has written, "the Danish context [may have] enabled them to act out beliefs opposing Nazi persecution that they might have suppressed elsewhere."[70]

In comparing the Jewish fate in Denmark and the Netherlands, Yahil noted a number of disparities, in addition to the key determinant of the bystanders' behavior. First there was a small number of Jews in Denmark, 8,000 or 0.2 percent of the population, as compared to 143,000 (1.6 percent) in the Netherlands. Whereas 60 percent of the Jews in the Netherlands lived in Amsterdam, where they constituted 10 percent of the inhabitants, virtually all the Danish Jews lived in Copenhagen, where they were less than 1 percent of the population. A second difference was the unusual German occupation regime in Denmark, the so-called "model protectorate," that prevailed until August 1943 and preserved more or less intact the Danish government and king, the parliamentary institutions and political parties, and the bureaucracy. And even after the German "coup" of August 1943, the Danish civil service continued to function "more or less normally and independently." Third, Denmark was geographically close to neutral Sweden. Fourth, Adolf Hilter decided to deport the Jews in Denmark sixteen months later than the Jews in the Netherlands, by which time the Danish resistance had become quite strong and Allied victory appeared more certain. Yet one

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Denmark warned Berlin that the imposition of the star "would arouse the protest of tens of thousands of Aryan Danes. . . ." There did not appear to be anyone in Denmark willing to persecute the Jews. When Hitler nevertheless ordered the deportation of the Danish Jews, all the leading Germans in Denmark "cabled or flew to Berlin, or did both," to try to prevent the deportations. Yahil found numerous examples of German laxity, and even complicity, with respect to the mass escape of the Jews to Sweden. German naval vessels were out of action, "in need of repair," at the very time of the escape; trains crowded with Jewish escapees on the way from Copenhagen to the coast were ignored by German patrols; six German soldiers, disguised as fishermen, operated one of the escape boats to Sweden, where they deserted. As the English and Swedish press correctly reported at the time, the Jews were escaping from Denmark "with German connivance." Yahil, *The Rescue of Danish Jewry*, 51–54, 61, 81–82, 152–54, 166, 172–73, 183, 258–59, 266–68, 488–89, 504. See also idem, "Methods of Persecution; a Comparison of the 'Final Solution' in Holland and Denmark," *Scripta Hierosolymitana* 23 (1972): 285–87, 293, 299.

[70] Fein, *Accounting for Genocide*, 114, 146–50; Yahil, *The Rescue of Danish Jewry*, 61, 148. The "response capacity" of the Germans in Denmark may also have been affected because "they feared provoking disturbances that they could not quell thus exposing their impotence. . . ." Fein, *Accounting for Genocide*, 150.

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could observe, with respect to Yahil's first point, that Luxembourg and Norway had only 3,000 and 1,700 Jews, respectively, but most of them were exterminated. With respect to points two and four, in Hungary the Germans could not put their hands on the Jews until spring of 1944, yet succeeded in killing most of them. Finally with respect to her third point, the proximity of neutral Sweden did not help the Norwegian Jews much. Nevertheless, Werner Warmbrunn is correct in considering the timing of great importance: "the history of the extermination of the Dutch Jews might indeed read quite differently if the deportations had been initiated a year later, in the summer of 1943, when the spirit of anti-German resistance had spread into the countryside on a broad scale."[71]

Regardless of the merit of the above disparities, the degree of Jewish victimization throughout the German orbit was significantly affected by the degree of isolation of a Jewish community from its national community. In Denmark, that isolation had remained minimal; in Holland, it had become maximal. One prominent Dutch Jewish leader, Lodewijk Visser, had grasped the importance of maintaining close relations with the non-Jewish components of the nation. Visser had been the presiding judge of the Dutch Supreme Court, and had been forced to resign together with the other Jewish government officials. From the beginning of the occupation, he had rebelled against stripping measures, refusing, for example, to have the "J" put on his identity card. He publicly opposed the policies of the Joodsche Raad on the ground that they would isolate the Jewish community from its natural allies, the Dutch non-Jewish public, and particularly from Dutch government officials. Visser headed a nationwide Jewish organization, the Jewish Coordination Commission, which refused all contact with the German authorities. The Germans were concerned about Visser's stand, but did not dare touch him directly. Cohen, as leader of the Joodsche Raad, was ordered by the Germans to instruct Visser to discontinue all communications with the Dutch authorities. As the Cohen-Visser correspondence on this German demand was coming to a head, Visser suddenly died from a heart attack in January 1942. It was immediately after Visser's death that the Germans informed the secretaries-general that they were no longer authorized to speak for the Jews, since the Jews were no longer to be considered Dutch citizens.

Visser had insisted that it was altogether illegal for the Germans to bar the Jews from contact with their own national officials. Visser could not understand how Cohen and Asscher could submit to that kind of German demand. Such submissiveness on the part of the Joodsche Raad, he argued, would result in the Dutch authorities neglecting to do in behalf of the Jews what otherwise "they

[71] Yahil, *The Rescue of Danish Jewry*, xviii–xix, 32–33, 83; idem, "Methods of Persecution," 282–83, 299; Warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German Occupation*, 174. According to Fein, "the most significant aspect of German control relative to the Jews was the directness of SS control in 1941." She distinguished three types of such controls: "lowest SS grip," "some SS grip," and "highest SS grip." She placed Denmark in the first category, and the Netherlands in the second. Fein, *Accounting for Genocide*, 59, 78–79.

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would undoubtedly have done." In his final correspondence with Cohen, Visser had pointed out that in addition to the reality of the power of the German occupation regime, there was another power reality, the hostile attitude of the Dutch toward the Germans. This latter power reality was being altogether neglected by the Joodsche Raad. Cohen termed Visser's stand "heroic" and perhaps more principled, yet "impossible to maintain"; the Germans would not pay attention to Dutch public opinion where the anti-Jewish measures were involved.[72]

Although Queen Wilhelmina had always reflected a "Danish" attitude towards the Jews, de Jong emphasized that it was precisely this feeling that was not shared by the officials and public in the occupied country.[73] Neither was this feeling shared by many officials of the queen's government-in-exile in London, nor by officials in the Dutch colonies. For example, in the summer of 1940, the governors of the Dutch Antilles and Dutch Suriname, in the Western hemisphere, decided not to admit any Jewish refugees, not even those of Dutch nationality.[74] De Jong has noted that the Dutch officials in London were not inclined to pay much attention to the fate of the Jews in the occupied country, let alone to undertake special steps in their behalf. It was known in London that trains filled with Jewish deportees left regularly from Holland to Poland, but until 1944, according to de Jong, no Dutch official in London bothered to ask the Polish officials in London about the trains (although the Polish offices were right across the street). A Dutch official was given the title of Commissioner of Refugees, but he did little to help. De Jong found traces of anti-Semitism in his wartime diary. While some Dutch diplomats were helpful to Jewish refugees (particularly in the Baltic states and in France), others displayed a negative attitude toward their troubled Jewish compatriots. The official Dutch weekly in London, *Vrij Nederland*, was considered "too Jewish" by some cabinet members and officials, and within the Dutch army in England there had developed "a certain amount of anti-Semitism." Dutch-language radio broadcasts from London provided only sporadic and insufficiently detailed news about the killings in the East, although more precise information had become available to them. Typically, the Dutch government-in-exile accepted it "as self-evident" that financial aid to Dutch-Jewish refugees would come largely from American Jewish sources.[75]

Although the Jews in the Netherlands had been assimilating into the national community for many decades, if not for centuries, the "national universe of

[72] Herzberg, "Kroniek," 3: 144–150. Parts of the Cohen-Visser correspondence are translated in Fein, *Accounting for Genocide*, 271–72.

[73] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 9: 498–499.

[74] After March 1942, Suriname consented to admit a few Jewish refugees. Ibid., 9: 498, 525–26.

[75] Ibid., 9: 501–505, 510, 519, 527–34, 544–49, 601, 604. An editorial in a newsletter for Dutch Jews in London complained in September 1944 that many of its readers were perceiving the reports about Auschwitz as mere "horror stories" and refused to believe them. *Mededeelingen van den kring van Nederlandsche Joden in Engeland*, September 1944.

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obligation" did not protect them when their status was brutally challenged by an outsider who was also the conqueror. The crucial failure occurred in July 1942, when the secretaries-general, instead of resigning their positions, resigned themselves to the deportations and allowed the officialdom below them to render assistance. If the secretaries-general had resigned as promised, and if hundreds of other officials had followed their example, there would have developed what the Germans feared most—immense commotion in the Dutch bureaucratic apparatus, which in any case would have made impossible the "noiseless" implementation of the Final Solution in the Netherlands. If the churches had then taken such resignations as a signal, their outcry might have had a tremendous impact on the public. Another decisive act would have been a Supreme Court ruling that, since the Dutch constitution prohibited making distinctions between Jews and non-Jews, civil servants could not implement such distinctions. If the judges of the Supreme Court had at least refused to fill in the "Aryan declaration" and if that refusal had been followed by the secretaries-general and other higher officials, the German measures would have been adversely affected at a most sensitive stage. Without emphatic gestures against their tactics, with nothing really denied them in the implementation of the anti-Jewish measures, the Germans never had to apply force (except against Jews) as the stripping, concentration, and deportation proceeded, in de Jong's words, as a "normal and smooth social process." The ultimate in lack of national concern for the Jews was surely reached when the wounded Dutch-Jewish war veterans were deported to the East, right out of the military hospital, without any Dutch authority doing, or saying, anything in their behalf.[76]

The habits of a thoroughly bureaucratized society contributed to the cave-in. Fein wrote: "The habit of compliance to rules . . . was upheld by Dutch officials (and later Joodsche Raad officials) with rigor for the first three years of the occupation, preventing institutional opportunities between the law and its enforcement from developing. . . ." Bureaucratic compliance lasted at least until late 1943, long enough to enable the Germans to remove the Jews from the Netherlands. Where the Germans succeeded, as with the Final Solution in the Netherlands, it was "because of the lack of counter authorities resisting their plans, *not* because of the repression of such resistance. . . . It was never necessary to coerce anyone to do the 'dirty work'. . . ."[77]

Today, Amsterdam's once flourishing Jewish neighborhoods no longer recall their former inhabitants' presence. The three great synagogues near Waterlooplein stand in an urban desert. The square dedicated to Lodewijk Visser is dominated by an elaborate streetcar stop. The younger generations are likely to remain unaware of the incomprehensible dramas that took place in Amsterdam

[76] De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, 6: 41, 275, 312; 7: 355; 8: 866. Presser, *Ondergang* 1: 266.
[77] Fein, *Accounting for Genocide*, 65–66, 71, 75, 90, 265–67.

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and Westerbork in the years between 1941 and 1944.[78] As of August 1983, aus der Fünten, tottering and senile, was still serving out his life sentence at Breda prison, and at times the headlines still reflect some of the gruesome tales out of the period of the Final Solution. In 1981, a senior secretary-general voiced a deeply felt reaction to the times of his predecessors when he said, "we continue to feel ashamed." The national bonds did not hold for the Jews.

[78] There has been some delving into the histories of extinct Jewish communities. See for example, Jaap Bottema, *Ze waren onder ons; 300 jaar Joden in Delfzijl, 1642-1942* (Delfzijl: n.p., 1980). In April 1983, thirty-eight years after the liberation of Westerbork by the Canadian army, Queen Beatrix opened a memorial and museum near the site of the camp.

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Book Reviews

The Causes of Wars *by Michael Howard. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1983. 248 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $7.95.*

The title of this collection of occasional pieces by this distinguished military historian derives from the first essay, but it is misleading as a description of the book. The problem of the causes of wars occupies only the margins of a few essays. The main topics are the role of strategy in the contemporary world, the debate over the correct strategic and diplomatic stance for the West, and the value of military history as a subject of serious study.

There is much to praise in this well-written and interesting collection, but limitations of space lead me to concentrate on the essays on strategic and diplomatic questions of our own time. In this territory, Howard wishes to mark himself off from those he considers extremists of both sides. Thus, he writes "Two Controversial Pieces" (pp. 116–150), criticizing in turn unilateral disarmers like E. P. Thompson and theorists of nuclear war like Colin Gray. This claim to the middle ground is not convincing. Howard makes it clear that he stands with those who believe in a Soviet Union "aspiring to maintain its status rather than aiming at world hegemony" (p. 3) against unspecified others who compare it to Nazi Germany and think seriously about it fighting a nuclear war. His prejudice is revealed in the creation of this straw man, for the Russians need not be inherently evil or bent on world conquest to be a major threat to peace. Readers need only see them as dissatisfied with the status quo and willing to run risks to change it to seek an effective deterrent. That conclusion would allow us to look to the example of 1914 rather than 1939, as Howard prefers, but it would no less justify continued distrust and a determination to resist Russian imperialism. We need only think of England's likely fate had it failed to modernize its navy and lost the arms race before 1914 to learn the appropriate lesson.

Howard's vision of the Soviet record seems strangely blurred. He divides the postwar years into three phases: 1945–55, when Russia was a status quo power and the U.S. was not (this will come as news to the Czechs and Berliners); 1955–65; a decade of mutual

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acceptance (it is hard to understand the Cuban missile crisis under such a rubric); and the period since 1965, which has witnessed an increasing Russian unwillingness to accept Western global hegemony (that "hegemony" never challenged the security of Russia or its satellites, even when the U.S. had a monopoly of atomic weapons and has been on the beleaguered defensive for two decades). A better interpretation might be that the Russians have been doing the best they could, first to secure their own dominion and then to expand their control as their power has grown. Where Soviet military power gains a hold it does not recede, but imposes a tyranny that is almost total.

The same tendentious misreading may be found in Howard's account of American strategists seeking to change the suicidal and incredible strategy of mutually assured destruction (MAD), which targets civilian populations, for one using smaller, more accurate missiles aimed at military targets. They are accused of favoring a "war-fighting" strategy, but its most representative proponents believe it to be both less immoral and a necessary step for effective deterrence of war.

Howard makes several hostile references to such Americans and to the Reagan administration, with whom he claims they "enjoy high favor." Lest Americans think this is merely the anti-Americanism required in British academic circles, they should read the last paragraph of "War in the Making and Unmaking of Europe": "the old Europe . . . belongs to the past, and I cannot contemplate a 'New Europe' with either conviction or relish . . . . There is not really very much in the history of Europe that merits our regrets" (p. 168). Americans should not expect better treatment in the face of such indestructible British insularity.

DONALD KAGAN
Yale University

The Future of Central America: Policy Choices for the U.S. and Mexico *edited by Richard R. Fagen and Olga Pellicer. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1983. 228 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $11.95.*

This book provides an introduction to the way the Central America crisis looks to those who are not directly involved in the conflict but who are very much interested in the outcome. It makes available some fine work by Mexican scholars. There are nine papers, originally given at a conference in Guanajuato, Mexico, in the summer of 1982. Their persistent theme is the criticism of U.S. foreign policy in that region. As a final chapter, there is a summary of the case for the defense, presented at the conference by a representative of the U.S. State Department.

There are two surveys of U.S. policy, one by a Mexican (Luis Maira) and one by an American (William M. LeoGrande), two papers on Mexican policies (both by Mexicans, Olga Pellicer and Mario Ojeda), two papers discussing the regional economic situation (one by Isaac Cohen and Gert Rosenthal and the other by Pedro Vuskovic), an analysis of Nicaragua's dilemmas (by Xabier Gorostiaga), and two papers on Guatemala (one on Mexico's policies by Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, the other on U.S. policies by Piero Gleijeses).

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An acknowledged omission is a paper on El Salvador, which the editors say has been covered enough. Unacknowledged omissions are treatments of Cuba and Venezuela, surely two important actors in the drama.

There is a remarkably consistent viewpoint, summarized in the following quotes: "By 1982 it could be truly said that the reformist alternative was dead or dying in almost all countries of Central America" (p. 3), and "Reagan's administration obviously wants the stabilization of the area, but it intends at the same time to maintain American hegemony. Therefore, it is unwilling to accept profound social changes" (p. 138). The latter attitude was often contrasted with the Mexican willingness to accept change, and a secondary theme of the work is its plea to support Mexican initiatives in the area.

Highlights of the volume include: a very useful survey of Mexican foreign policies in the context of U.S.-Mexican relations by Ojeda (including more insights into U.S. policy than the article devoted to the U.S. by his compatriot Maira); a useful summary of economic trends by Cohen and Rosenthal of the Economic Commission on Latin America (showing among other things the remarkable growth of the region in the last thirty years); an outstanding paper by Aguilar analyzing the ambiguous Mexican policy toward Guatemala; and a useful policy memorandum by LeoGrande on the options confronting the U.S. In general, the tone is sober and realistic. Only a rather embarrassing paper by Pedro Vuskovic indulges in a rehearsal of out-of-date radical rhetoric.

There is unquestionably great merit in the main theme—that the U.S. ought to develop a much more sympathetic interest in the on-going processes of social change and the political forms that are carrying them through. There are two problems, however. First, there is no realistic assessment of the support for social change that the U.S. has fostered in the past, or, more importantly, what it ought to be, in the U.S.'s own interest. As the quote above indicates, there is an assumption that "U.S. hegemony" requires that no "profound changes" take place. This is a simplistic assumption shared by revolutionists and know-nothing conservatives, and ought to be attacked.

Second, there is a questionable faith that if the "reformist alternatives" are dead, the revolutionary ones are still alive. If this means more than the dangerous game of believing that something more drastic is the remedy for any policy failure, then some notion of a model should be present. The young, embattled and as yet really untried Nicaraguan attempt at rebuilding after the unusual wasteland of Anastasio Somoza's regime is implicitly assumed to be a generalizable alternative. The Cuban model is not discussed and the Mexican one studiously avoided.

DOUGLAS A. CHALMERS
Columbia University

The Cuban Threat *by Carla Anne Robbins. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1983. 351 pp. $17.95.*

This is a good, serious, and well-written study of many political aspects of revolutionary Cuba's foreign relations, especially of its relations with the United States. Robbins ana-

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lyzes Cuba's international activity from revolutionary victory in January 1959 to the early 1980s. She focuses in depth on U.S.-Cuban relations; she also thoughtfully considers various aspects of Cuban-Soviet relations and of Cuban relations with revolutionary states and revolutionary movements.

The main argument is that Cuba does not pose a significant threat: "the United States must stop overestimating the Cuban threat . . . . Except for the missile crisis, Cuba does not now and has never posed an objective threat to American power or security in the hemisphere. The few hundred guerrillas the Castro regime was able to muster and send to Latin America during the 1960s were not the cause of the region's instability. Nor has the limited amount of Cuban military aid sent to El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala been the cause of the instability in those countries" (p. 300). Robbins argues this case persuasively and with verve. Hers is a valuable book.

Four sorts of criticisms are appropriate. Some omitted subjects should have been included. Except for occasional references, there is no sustained discussion of Cuba's international economic relations, of Soviet economic support for Cuba, of Cuba's relations with industrial market-economy countries, or of Cuban foreign-policymakers (its diplomats, commercial agents, or armed forces).

Robbins is surprisingly uncertain about some central analytical issues. She criticizes, appropriately, some who have argued that the Soviet Union has established a hegemony over Cuba but that Cuba still retains a considerable margin of autonomy within that relationship. In this conception, hegemony is seen as setting policy boundaries, not policy details; when the boundaries are broken, the hegemon reestablishes them and the client capitulates, as could be said to have happened in Cuban-Soviet crises in 1967–68. Robbins at times rejects this analysis (pp. 205, 253), arguing that Cuba might have chosen its post-1968 course even more independently. However, she understands hegemony as requiring continuous hegemonic pressure and little client autonomy. On the contrary, a stable hegemony uses pressure rarely and permits much autonomy. Robbins at times also contradicts herself, endorsing the argument she criticizes: "even an observer sympathetic to the Cuban revolution finds it hard to avoid the impression of Soviet domination—because the changes in Cuba in 1968 were so great and so abrupt, and because the docile tone of the new Cuban rhetoric was so different from the Castro regime's earlier style" (p. 182).

Robbins's pattern of citations is puzzling. At times the documentation is admirably thorough, but at times it is absent altogether. For example, what are the sources for the 1966 Tricontinental Conference's internal details (p. 36), for the numbers on Cubans posted overseas supporting insurgencies (p. 58), for the claim that there were Cuban military throughout the Caribbean in the mid-1970s (p. 180), or for the view that the Cubans wanted to replace Ethiopia's revolutionary military regime with a more open, civilian-based party (p. 255), among many other assertions?

Robbins' policy analysis is also too uncertain. She convincingly argues that Cuba does not pose much of a threat, but is it any threat at all? Cuban support for Salvadoran guerrillas may not justify landing U.S. troops, but should it concern? The United States might not fight against Cuban forces in Ethiopia, given that the United States did not support

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the Somali invasion of that country, but what should U.S. policy be on Cuban overseas troop deployments? It was Robbins's intention, above all, to address these matters. She did half of that job very well; Cuba is indeed less threatening than is commonly believed in the United States. On how much of a threat it is, and to whom, however, she has not said enough.

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ
Harvard University

The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America *by Cole Blasier. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983. 213 pp. Cloth, $14.95; paper, $7.95.*

Cole Blasier is quite exceptionally qualified to write on the Soviet role in Latin America by virtue of a career divided between the Soviet bloc and Latin America and his fluency in both Russian and Spanish. His extensive use of Soviet sources distinguishes this book from more or less comparable earlier studies.

The treatment is factual, with little analysis. Blasier discusses four principal topics in some detail—Soviet diplomatic relations with Latin Ameria, trade, Communist parties, and the very special case of Cuba. An addendum treats the U.S. response to the real or supposed threat.

The picture that results is one of only middling success. The Soviets want diplomatic relations for prestige, information-gathering, and as the necessary backdrop for sundry cultural and economic programs. Latin Americans accept relations with the Soviet Union mostly to improve leverage with the United States. Trade has not thrived very much; it has been extensive (except for Cuba) only when the Soviet Union is prepared to spend much hard currency, as for Argentine grain. The Soviets have had no success in Latin American markets. Their purchases have recently been over ten times their sales. The Communist parties have been highly dependent on the Soviet patron and correspondingly obedient. The critical question since Fidel Castro appeared on the scene as would-be revolutionizer has been whether to engage in violence or try pacifically to gather strength within the system. This caused friction between Castroites and conventional Communists at one time (as when the Bolivian party turned its back on Ché Guevara), but has more recently seemed compromised. Communists take up arms where there is a revolutionary movement (as in El Salvador) or where they are repressed (as in Chile), but otherwise they plod pacifically along. In regard to Cuba, Blasier has nothing at all novel to report, but he gives perhaps as much information as one will want to have about the economic collaboration. There is a useful bibliographical note and an informative appendix on Soviet Latin American studies.

The Giant's Rival is thus useful and informative, but perhaps there really is not much to say on the subject. The book is rather repetitive even within its limited length. Though Blasier details Soviet diplomatic links, there is virtually nothing on the reactions of people, except of remark that Soviet diplomats are usually unsocial. There is perhaps a

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surplus of trade statistics but no explanation why Soviet salespersons are much less successful there than in India or Western Europe. Difficulties in Cuban-Soviet relations are chronicled but not analyzed.

The impression left by the book is that the Soviet Union, working opportunistically with very limited resources, has had some successes here and there because of disturbed conditions, but perhaps even more because of hamhanded and unsophisticated reactions by the United States. Like most Latin Americanists, he is critical of U.S. policy in the area. However, Blasier is not only critical but is offering his prescription. This is essentially that the United States should not concern itself with the internal political complexion of its Latin American neighbors but only insist quite firmly that there be no Soviet military foothold.

ROBERT WESSON
Hoover Institution
University of California, Santa Barbara

The Politics of Nuclear Balance: Ambiguity and Continuity in Strategic Policies *by William H. Baugh. New York, Longman, 1983. 276 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $17.95.*

It is essential to distinguish between counting strategic weapons and figuring out how they might be used. This book mainly counts. And because it does, a great deal of what is interesting—indeed, even critical—has not been considered at all. Such a result is not really this author's fault; hardly anyone else has been trying to figure out what counts besides numbers either.

Prevalent measures of effectiveness and assessments of the strategic balance rely heavily on relatively static concepts (such as throw weights, numbers of warheads and launchers, surviving equivalent megatonnage, kill probabilities) and overlook the dynamics of force employment—at least as much as one can imagine what those dynamics might entail. This problem is only recently coming to light, although its implications are stunning. Throw weight is not the issue, nor is surviving equivalent megatonnage; rather, what information is available to whom, under what time constraints, and at various levels of conflict. These and numerous other related questions emphasize problems of command and control, about which far too little attention and thought have been devoted, at least as compared to that expended on counting weapons.

Most of the U.S. strategic command structure is vulnerable, and has been so for some time (the tocsin sounded publicly with the publication of the Partridge Report in 1961). Many are beginning to realize that the survivability of the U.S. command structure is far more dubious than is the survivability of the forces that declared policies cause that structure to support. Significant changes in these policies over the last decade, resulting in a shift from a posture of massive response to Soviet nuclear provocation to one emphasizing selected and limited nuclear options (the so-called countervailing strategy) place extraordinary demands on the command structure. Less than ten pages of the book

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are devoted to this topic and issue (pp. 66–76), and even here the discussion concentrates on doctrinal fine points, not on U.S. ability to implement the doctrine.

Plans for strategic conflict assume that national command authorities (U.S. and Soviet) will be able to control their forces; in other words, both will have the capacity to coordinate and execute options, assess damage to both sides, and exercise diplomatic and political channels to bring hostilities to a conclusion. Mostly missing from the plans, however, is requisite appreciation of the fact that all these essential tasks and functions are only as good as the command structure and systems on which they depend. And here, the overwhelming emphasis on weapons and weapons characteristics has obscured essentials to a remarkable degee.

There is much more at issue, but the general point can be summed up concisely—when command and control fail, almost nothing else matters.

Having thus suggested that the book substantially misses the mark, that might be the end of it. However, there are positive judgments to be made. It provides a good summary of the standard arms control and international relations literature; it contains very clear descriptions of the weapons and the thinking undergirding their justification and procurement. Moreover, the book illustrates the techno-rational style of analysis, including heavy reliance on missile exchange calculations and models, that has so long defined and dominated national security debate.

GARRY D. BREWER
Yale University

The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine *by Andrew Cockburn. New York, Random House, 1983. 338 pp. $16.95.*

Cockburn's book is one of the most provocative of a number of current efforts by journalists, academicians, and defense analysts to puncture what they perceive as an overinflated image of Soviet military preponderance over the West. The effort is certainly a commendable one. Much of the discussion of Soviet capabilities in recent years has tended to be unbalanced in its portrayal, emphasizing the Soviet Union's strengths to the exclusion of its weaknesses, and projecting a contrasting and erroneous image of the United States and its allies as grossly inferior to its rivals in fighting ability. Any effort to inject balanced and cogent analysis into the debate on Soviet capacities and intentions is to be welcomed.

Balanced analysis, however, is not something that *The Threat* provides. Cockburn has indeed produced a well-written and informative book. It contains an abundance of interesting facts and anecdotal material, and there is no question that he casts light on many Soviet shortcomings that deserve more attention than they have received in recent reportage. This is particularly the case in his highlighting of examples of poor Soviet equipment reliability and weapons lethality, and the indifferent quality of Soviet officers and fighting men. Unfortunately, Cockburn reverses the practice of individuals in the defense establishment (whom he criticizes for exaggerating Soviet strength) by producing exclu-

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sively a record of Soviet incompetence, ignorance, and ineffectiveness, while ignoring many Soviet assets.

For example, as Cockburn sensibly points out, accounts of the grim Soviet superiority in conventional forces on the European front, often portrayed in the Western media, stand rather wide of the mark. When an accurate net assessment is made of the deployed capabilities on both sides, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact appear more evenly matched. However, apart from a surprise attack that fortuitously catches NATO forces in their barracks—about which serious differences exist as to its feasibility—the main problems facing NATO are the gross imbalances that would occur after big mobilizations (twenty deep or larger) in which the Soviets would bring their less ready divisions up to strength. The prospect of over 100 divisions directed at NATO defenses after sixty days is an unpleasant eventuality for which the West is as yet ill-equipped to deal.

Soviet divisions, as Cockburn also points out, have equipment that is unable to endure for prolonged periods because of the low reliability of the equipment itself and the inadequacy of Soviet maintenance capabilities. This is certainly true, and indicates that in a prolonged war the Soviets would be seriously disadvantaged. Unfortunately, it is the shorter war scenarios that bedevil NATO—precisely the type of war that the Soviets, whether through design or default, are best configured to fight. It provides little comfort that Soviet divisions cannot perform for two months, if the campaign is victoriously concluded in three weeks.

Again, Cockburn is right in pointing out that Soviet officers appear generally unimaginative, and demonstrate little initiative and an inflexible command structure. The same thing was evident in the World War II, and Cockburn's text is sprinkled with assessments by Wehrmacht generals such as Hermann Balck and General von Mellenthin to attest to Soviet crudeness and inadequacy in command performance.

It has become altogether too easy for Western observers to exhibit a certain chauvinism in dismissing the quality of Soviet commanders, or to assume that the tactical virtuosity for which Western commanders are presumably better suited will prove decisive in winning the war for Europe. One must, however, remember who won the last European war and why. The Soviet forces, crude and inflexible, with a poorly prepared command element, and re-emerging from the effects of a disastrous surprise attack, destroyed the Germans. This was because, all things being equal, the overwhelming Soviet superiority in ground forces ultimately produced by the Soviets overcame even the best tacticians of the German army.

One must be aware that, essentially, modern war is a very crude and brutal contest of attrition in which substantial superiority in firepower and reserves tends to outweigh tactical finesse. The assumption that Soviet commanders are grossly less capable than the United States or NATO of fighting such a war is not a very useful one for planning purposes.

None of this criticism should take away from Cockburn's excellent research. But what distorts *The Threat* is that, at its core, it is a polemic. It can be argued that a certain amount of bias can serve as a corrective to the excessive overestimation of Soviet capabili-

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ties. However, what Cockburn produces is instead a one-sided picture, indeed a caricature of what is in fact a potent military machine.

ANDREW C. GOLDBERG
The Brookings Institution

Soviet Power and Western Negotiating Policies (Vol. 1: The Soviet Asset: Military Power in the Competition Over Europe; Vol. 2: The Western Panacea: Constraining Soviet Power Through Negotiation) *edited by Uwe Nerlich. Cambridge, Ballinger Publishing Co., 1983. Vol. 1, 365 pp. $30.00. Vol. 2, 434 pp. $38.00.*

Do allies communicate with each other any better than do adversaries? In the era of megaphone diplomacy between the superpowers it might be reasonable to assume that the allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) might band closer together against the fierce winds of the new cold war. But while NATO is not yet falling apart, it does seem to be as riven by splits as it has ever been. The United States' European allies remain largely unconvinced that the Reagan administration has done everything it reasonably can do to keep Europe at peace. While many Europeans share Washington's concern with Soviet power, they also see the need to coexist with the Soviet Union. This competitive coexistence has always been a difficult process to manage, and never more so than at present. Therefore, the two books under review could not be more timely.

Uwe Nerlich has gathered together an impressive array of European and American scholars of Soviet foreign policy and NATO politics. The contributors were first organized by West Germany's prestigious Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik to study "the political instrumentalities of Soviet military power and how negotiations affect arms competition" (1:xiii). Unfortunately, the original papers are nearly three years old, but they retain much of their original concern with then current events. The recent important changes, including the Andropov and then Chernenko presidencies, cruise missile deployment, nascent Sino-Soviet détente, and the calming of the Polish crisis, all cast a shadow over the punditry of some of the contributors. Most importantly, the deep pessimism of the editor and many of the contributors does not stand up well in 1984, when NATO's medium range nuclear forces are being deployed and the peace movements seem to be on the wane.

These criticisms are in some senses minor, for the core of this book is remarkably sensible. On a topic so often marred by extreme judgments, these volumes are at their best when they adopt a mid-Atlantic common sense that rejects the extremism of America's Right and Europe's Left. Two chapters among several stand out as exceptional in this regard. While some of his fellow contributors seem mesmerized by Soviet hardware or the mass of protesters on the streets of NATO countries, John van Oudenaren concentrates on the Soviet conception of Europe and arms negotiations. He notes the basic flexibility in Soviet objectives and the limits of Moscow's peace appeals to a far more sophisticated European electorate. Hedley Bull looks back to the classical approach to arms control,

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and argues that many of the modern arms controllers have lost their way. Preeminently, they have lost sight of the primacy of politics and the need for a guiding strategy beyond the nuts and bolts of weaponry. Arms control cannot create a complex structure of détente when the political ground is too marshy. For Bull, sensible arms control will emphasize the basic elements of deterrence, and leave aside any hopes for reestablishing United States dominance.

These balanced judgments are also well illustrated in the editor's introduction. Nerlich argues that NATO must not ignore improvements in Soviet military power, if only because the credibility of NATO's old policy of flexible response is now undermined. He urges increased spending on conventional weapons so as to avoid the necessity to move to an "early first use" of battlefield nuclear weapons. Nerlich also argues that selling such a policy to democratic electorates in Europe is far from easy, especially to a new generation that has not known a European war. Most importantly, Nerlich argues for a shift from a strategy of merely "managing" relations with the Soviet Union to one that sees détente and arms control as part of a broader political strategy of competitive coexistence. Arms control should not be an end in itself. This may be a tough message for supporters of détente, but it is sensible.

Nerlich is less impressive when expressing his deep pessimism about the power of the peace movements to handcuff politics in democratic states. To be sure, democracies do operate at a disadvantage when negotiating with autocratic regimes. But it is also a strength of NATO that its members share similar democratic political systems that earns widespread popular support. NATO would undermine its own survival in a much more basic way if it refused to tolerate its own democratic protests. The strength of the alliance is in the end in its common political heritage, not merely the size of its nuclear arsenal. Nerlich and some of his contributors seem convinced that a rational defence policy could not be made so long as the protestors were present, and certainly that they rendered NATO seriously vulnerable. With the advantage of hindsight, we know these pessimists were wrong. NATO has begun its deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles, and initial steps have been taken to strengthen conventional defence. More radical alternatives have been clearly rejected.

But these volumes remain important statements of the problems facing NATO strategies. Above all, the contributors have set the agenda for modernizing NATO's political as well as military strategy. With the latest round of the peace movements protests behind us, it is now time to construct a more plausible defence strategy. Failure to do so will only ensure that there will be another round of protesters, and next time the fears of the pessimists may be realized.

GERALD SEGAL
University of Bristol

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U.S.-Asian Relations: The National Security Paradox *edited by James C. Hsiung. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1983. 208 pp. $22.95.*

Ever since Chinese hegemony collapsed in the early nineteenth century, the Pacific powers have been searching for a new system of order for East Asia. The imperial power balances that replaced Chinese hegemony led to a series of wars, while Japan's drive for hegemony ended in costly failure. A short attempt at collective security under the Washington Treaty system foundered for three reasons: the arms control treaties did not create a stable military balance; there were no international economic arrangements to maintain and foster growth; and the system excluded the Soviet Union. From 1945 to 1969 the United States tried to maintain a system of bipolar balance through its policy of containment, but in the era of the Nixon doctrine and the Vietnam collapse, the Americans called on their Asian allies and the Chinese to help them match a continuing Russian buildup. After the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, Ronald Reagan declared the Richard Nixon-Jimmy Carter approach bankrupt and assumed office promising to revive containment.

James C. Hsiung and his collaborators assess the first thirty months of Reagan's Asian policy and find it wanting, though they recognize that Reagan has faced difficult problems. Hsiung points out that the U.S. Navy cannot match the growing Soviet fleet in the Pacific and simultaneously fulfill its new responsibilities in the Middle East. Norman D. Levin of the Rand Corporation is somewhat too optimistic in suggesting that the Japanese will rearm rapidly enough under Reagan's prodding to take over patrolling the western Pacific north of the Philippines in peacetime and bottle up the Soviet northeastern fleet in wartime. Robert G. Sutter of the Congressional Research Service and Carol Lee Hamrin of the State Department point out that the Chinese have been reluctant to establish a quasi-alliance with the United States, and have moved back toward a policy of independence, in spite of Reagan's offer to sell them weapons. Sutter and Hsiung stress the argument that the American military buildup has eased China's fears sufficiently to allow China the luxury of an independent foreign policy, but they may underestimate the effects of Reagan's fondness for Taiwan and the influence of Sino-American trade troubles. John W. Garver of the University of Nevada at Reno warns that Reagan's policy of cooperating with China to defend Thailand has led to Soviet bases in Vietnam and may eventually lead to Chinese dominance in Southeast Asia. In short, Hsiung and his colleagues conclude that the attempt to reestablish perimeter containment in Asia by military means has encountered roadblocks in China, Japan, and Southeast Asia. Consequently, Asia still lacks a system of order.

Hsiung and his contributors have made a stimulating critique of Reagan's Asian policy, and it is hard to argue with their warning that militarized containment will lead to arms races and possibly wars. But they are better at posing the problems than suggesting answers. They seem to prefer a return to multipolar diplomatic balances, though it is hard to see how such a system could deal with a modernizing China, an increasingly fearful Russia and Japan, and a series of potentially violent disputes in the Korean and Southeast Asian peninsulas. What is to be done? Perhaps the best solution would be a new Washington treaty system that includes all of the Pacific powers—a system that would

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control military balances, provide economic development regimes, and establish forums for settling disputes. In any case, the volume makes a fine contribution to the debate on Asian security by exploring the problems inherent in the Reagan approach.

STEPHEN PELZ
University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Society and Politics in Hong Kong *by Lau Siu-kai. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983. 205 pp. $25.00.*

Hong Kong is a city that works. We may have something to learn from it, but not many years remain for study. Fortunately, Lau Siu-kai, a sociologist at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, has produced a well-researched and provocative monograph about the colony's society.

One can well imagine Hong Kong in tumult. The place is non-egalitarian, undemocratic, and an affront to Chinese nationalism; it has a lively independent press, no natural resources, and has had to absorb waves of refugees. The basic question Lau addresses is why there has been such a high degree of social and political stability. His answer, which seems incongruous in view of modernization theory, is that it has all been made possible by Hong Kong's *lack* of integration—within society, and between the society and the polity.

The author sees Hong Kong society as characteristized by utilarian extended familism. The word "family" is used loosely, and sometimes includes non-relatives. The extended family is both an affective and an economic unit. The family is autonomous and little involved with the larger society. In emigrating from China, Hong Kong people were choosing to escape from politics, and they have shown no desire to enter the political arena in their new homeland. That arena is a tiny one, monopolized by bureaucrats. (The chapter on the bureaucracy is excellent.) In this laissez-faire city-state, it is possible for the polity and the society to function with a minimum of interaction. It is seen as in the interests of all concerned to respect the boundaries between them.

There are questions that could be raised about the thesis that a low level of social integration accounts for the Hong Kong miracle. It is doubtless true that a highly politicized populace that played a major role in the affairs of state would render Hong Kong a different, and perhaps less affluent, place. More "public" politics might even have provoked China to reclaim the place before the treaty expiration date of 1997. But one wonders if Lau does not claim too much for his theory. Does not the peculiar nature of this self-selected population say at least as much about the society as do polls designed to measure integration? Lau mentions this aspect almost as an afterthought at the end of the book; in general he insists that social structure is more explanatory than political culture. But a person who leaves his or her homeland is not a typical human being, and possesses an unusual mix of daring and prudence. This fact may go far in explaining Hong Kong's dynamism and "success," and therefore its stability.

One also wonders whether Hong Kong does not enjoy more extra-familial integration

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than is indicated in this study. In the villages of the New Territories, it appears that lineage solidarity coexists harmoniously with community solidarity. (See Judith Strauch's study of village Hong Kong, *Journal of Asian Studies* [November 1983].) In urban Hong Kong there has recently been some political mobilization effected by a variety of organizations. To be fair, this is probably a development that came after Lau's research, and that is also somewhat anticipated in his conclusion. Thus, though this book represents social science at its best, we have not heard the last word on these subjects.

Lao's path-breaking work should benefit not only those who are fascinated by Hong Kong, but also social scientists who want to test their theories against a novel situation.

JAMES D. SEYMOUR
Columbia University

The Nuclear Future *by Michael Mandelbaum. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1983. 131 pp. Cloth, $19.95; paper, $5.95.*

Writing an introduction to the nuclear arms race and to the arcane intricacies of nuclear deterrence theory that simultaneously informs the lay public in an intelligible manner yet avoids the rhetorical heat and polemicism of the nuclear freeze debate is clearly a formidable undertaking. Enshrouded in its highly technical language, concepts, and relationships, the task of translation for the uninitiated (those who, to use the author's own phrase, are not members of the "nuclear priesthood"—a group largely undefined) runs the very real risk of distortion and oversimplification. Since much of the debate over deterrence is more theological than it is scientific, maintaining analytical dispassion is no easy job.

Despite these potentially difficult obstacles, such an analysis is precisely the purpose of this slender volume. In large measure, it succeeds. Certainly *The Nuclear Future* is timely; both sides in the freeze debate have inundated the public with a flood of literature that is alarmist, hysterical, misleading, brazenly ideological, or some combination of those attributes. The expert can dismiss such rhetoric for what it is worth. But the nonexpert (a category in which I would include most political scientists who do not follow and research the subject regularly) may lack the necessary perspective. A reading of Mandelbaum's newest work will provide a healthy skeptical view of the extremes.

Mandelbaum's position and thesis occupy the middle ground between what he sees as the polar extremes that the future might hold. These extremes are total disarmament (the likelihood of which, despite its desirability, he dismisses as utopian in a world of sovereign nation-states) and general nuclear war (which he believes, given the knowledge of the consequences, is equally unlikely). Rejecting these extremes, he posits an incremental future: "The nuclear future will be like the past. It will follow a middle path between nuclear war and nuclear disarmament. There will continue to be nuclear weapons, but they will not be used, at least not by the two most heavily armed countries against each other . . . . The reasons . . . may be simply summarized: the alternatives, disarmament and war, are either too difficult to achieve or too terrible to risk" (p. 121).

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This basic thesis and the way it is elaborated will likely not find great favor among the extremists in the nuclear debate (which is probably a back-handed compliment). I personally find Mandelbaum's position reasonable (in other words, it more or less matches my own prejudices), but I also feel he has left himself open to criticism on several grounds. The first of these is his failure to cite the available evidence that supports or contradicts his positions. For instance, he states that "it may be predicted that neither side will have sufficient confidence in the idea of escalation dominance to launch an attack" (p. 67). Of course, anything can be predicted, but this whole notion is considerably more complex and contentious than the treatment suggests. In a similar vein, his style is occasionally too airy and assertive on some issues; his dismissal of ballistic missile defense possibilities (p. 43–45) is rather cavalier. Finally, he continues, at least implicitly, to judge the value of events and trends against the criterion of assured destruction as if that concept remains the basis of policy (which, of course, it does not).

Despite these shortcomings, *The Nuclear Future* is the best introductory overview on the subject I have seen in recent years. It is not a book written for experts; Mandelbaum's nuclear priests will find no new contributions or new knowledge here, but that is not a criticism. This is an introduction, and it is a quite good one.

DONALD M. SNOW
University of Alabama

Mimicking Sisyphus: America's Countervailing Nuclear Strategy *by Louis René Beres. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1983. 142 pp. $11.95.*

The author, a political scientist specializing in strategic and world order studies, has long been a recognized voice in the anti-nuclear war movement. The major objective of this volume is a passionate attack on the perceived risks of nuclear counterforce and limited war doctrines, especially as planned and programmed by the present administration. In specific, he examines five central assumptions of U.S. countervailing nuclear strategy: "the USSR might decide to launch a limited first strike on the US or its allies" (p. 15); "the USSR is more likely to be deterred by the threat of limited American counterforce reprisals than by the threat of overwhelming, total nuclear retaliation" (p. 27); "survival is possible in a nuclear war" (p. 45); "a major arms buildup can be undertaken without compromising the prospects for vertical and horizontal arms control" (p. 67); "peace can be maintained indefinitely via nuclear deterrence" (p. 83).

Each of these is analyzed, assailed, and refuted in separate chapter-length critiques, followed by a final chapter on recommended solutions. Reduced to essentials, Beres claims that unless it is reversed, the present U.S. move away from reasonable mutual assured destruction (MAD) requirements towards more sophisticated counterforce, "tit-for-tat," limited, and protracted nuclear war fighting capabilities will in fact lead to nuclear war. To him the move is provocative and destabilizing, inviting a preemptive Soviet first strike, and thus counterproductive to U.S. security. This is certainly not a novel idea, but rarely has it been stated more concisely and uncompromisingly, within the general context of

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a concerned humanist's plea that the world must pull back from the brink of nuclear war towards safer and saner forms of global coexistence. The argumentation is aggressively polemical with no pretense at detached and dispassionate weighing of pros and cons. It is also well documented and supported by a wide range of literature.

Clearly, the author is both engaged and informed. Readers learn that Beres is vehemently opposed to MX, Trident, Pershing II, the neutron bomb, Mark 12A warheads, improved communications, command, control, and intelligence (C^3I), and to Civil Defense Crisis Relocation Plans, among others. All of these he considers accessories to counterforce and eventual first-strike nuclear war initiation. This interpretation may not be shared by all his readers, but it is consistent with his overall thesis. His own repeatedly expressed preference is for an immediate return to the promising tenets of minimum deterrence. This is to be achieved not only by disengaging from nuclear war fighting preparations and counterforce targeting but also by U.S. support for and acceptance of a Comprehenisve Test Ban (CTB), No First Use Pledge, Joint Nuclear Freeze, and the creation of Denuclearized Zones (see ch. 7).

Somewhat surprisingly, given his stated distaste for *realpolitik*, Beres is opposed to world government, which in order to be effective would still have to perpetuate the "threat system" of reliance on the deadly logic of deterrence. He is also skeptical about the prospects for meaningful disarmament, at least in the near future. Though Beres is opposed to political realism, the rationale offered here (p. 119) is about as sobering and "realistic" as any defender of *raison d'état* and power politics could wish for. Even George Kennan's call for an across-the-board reduction of fifty percent of all superpower nuclear stockpiles is rejected as too drastic and given no chance of adoption. Yet having thus convinced readers of his reasoned belief in incrementalism, expressed by the call for quite plausible and sensible changes in strategic nuclear policy and doctrine, suddenly the world order reformer takes over. The world's only hope, the epilogue concludes, for avoiding extinction is to reach out for new and higher forms of planetary consciousness.

Aside from limitations imposed by space, this reviewer admits that he would find it utterly impossible to explain or to summarize the ensuing enigmatic mystifications about planetary identity, planetary responsibility, and other kinds of planetization (pp. 124–26). I also feel compelled to state that in spite of my substantial concurrence with Beres's anguished rejection of nuclear war prevailing and escalation dominance theories, I found some irritating and annoying qualities in this book. Among these are unnecessarily murky and ponderous language (such as the inimitable description on p. ix of the growing number of people joining the peace movement), a marked degree of intellectual dogmatism and absolutism (opposing opinions are habitually treated as logical absurdities and imbecility, or simply denounced as incorrect reasoning), combined with a general tone of self-righteousness. Very little suggests that the key issues presented are all complex problems about which reasonable persons might well have reasonable doubts and disagreements. There is predictable hyperbole (nuclear deterrence cannot possibly survive the century) and alarmism (such as a description of the potential consequences of a *one million megaton* exchange of nuclear explosives!). Some readers will also note the selectivity of supporting testimony. Beres has his heroes, most of whom appear to be associated with the Center for Defense Information, a favorite source of quoted materials,

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and his villains, notably Colin Gray et al. But that is to be expected, perhaps necessitated by the very style of advocacy argument. The broad message that this book conveys is not only stated with urgency and conviction, it is also timely. The book deals with an issue of the highest importance, and it deserves the widest possible audience.

RICHARD H. BALD
Ohio University

The Birth of NATO *by Sir Nicholas Henderson. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1983. 130 pp. $17.50.*

Sir Nicholas Henderson's diplomatic career led him in 1979 to become the British ambassador to Washington. On a much earlier posting there, in 1947–49, he had served in the drafting group for the North Atlantic Treaty and promptly thereafter had written an authoritative, brief, insider's history of those negotiations. Now, a generation later, it has been allowed to be published. It will be an important research source for future historians of that era. The book is of interest to students of international relations as a succinct case study of successful diplomatic negotiations.

It must be noted that Henderson's concentration on the negotiations, while broad enough to encompass the executive-legislative dealings in the United States, as well as the bargaining among the participating Western governments, is too narrowly focused to contribute much to resolving broad controversies about the origins of the cold war. Henderson is rather patly unreconstructed in his anti-revisionism, content to dismiss in a few sentences any challenge to the conventional wisdom of his generation. He does succeed in underscoring usefully the degree to which British urging (especially from Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin)—not American pressure—gave essential impetus to the North Atlantic Treaty as such. But the cold war as a whole was well under way even before 1947 (when Henderson's account basically begins) and was mounting in intensity in France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Germany in most of the ensuing two years as the treaty took shape; this struggle repeatedly eased acceptance of the NATO treaty provisions, as Henderson notes. The cold war was not the product of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but rather the foundation of NATO—and the Anglo-American share of responsibility, along with that of the Russians, in the self-righteous, inexorable interaction that set that foundation, had been and continued to be greater than Henderson's narrow focus observes.

One may also be slightly irritated by the bouquets he repeatedly tosses to this own former superiors among the British negotiators. Were they really so often much abler than the Americans and the others? And were the French quite such pretentious nuisances as Henderson depicts? If not, and if he is letting a few prejudices show through, at least the reader benefits somewhat from the enlivening of what is inevitably in most respects a rather dull recital of successive negotiating positions and drafts of agreements. Henderson is convinced that the personalities of diplomats and ministers do count in essen-

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tially cooperative negotiations of this kind, and he arrays interesting examples that support that view.

Readers today whose concern for the birth of NATO is mainly for what light it may shed on what became of the alliance later may be struck by three features of these first negotiations: the relative absence of attention to concerns about Germany; the "un-Gaullist" eagerness of the French for very close military ties; and, therefore, the limited relevance of the treaty drafts and discussions to the issues that eventually did arise in NATO.

Thus, after a few references to early mention of possible eventual West German participation, this idea simply drops out of Henderson's account; apparently it was given scarcely any consideration in the actual drafting negotiations, at least in Washington. (There were some parallel talks, more military in focus, going on in Europe that were outside the treaty as such and hence outside Henderson's focus; conceivably Germany's prospective role was already getting some attention there.) The French, for their part, were striving to hasten the day when United States military materiel would flow across the Atlantic to rebuild France's forces; and with de Gaulle out of power the French were pressing hard for intensified military planning in which the Americans would be key participants along with France and the United Kingdom. Indeed, Henderson claims that this premature French importunateness risked alienating the Americans from the idea of joining the treaty alliance at all. None of this foreshadows much (or can have much to teach) about the main saga of NATO's ensuing thirty-five years—how to manage West Germany's changing moods and keep it fully aligned as NATO's chief redoubt, and how to cope with the prideful opting out by the Gaullist French.

H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD
Yale University

Who Rules America Now? A View for the '80s *by G. William Domhoff. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1983. 230 pp. Cloth, $15.95; paper, $6.95.*

Sixteen years after having published his well-known book, *Who Rules America?*, Domhoff now returns to the subject. As he points out, the new book is not a simple update. It is much more carefully reasoned, it does not have the same strongly polemical bend, and it tries hard to be reasonable, poised, and willing to grant some of the objections that were raised in regard to the first version. The documentation is fuller and considerably more balanced.

Despite all sorts of new qualifications and despite more modulated formulations, however, Domhoff still maintains the main lines of his previous thesis. He still believes that there exists a fairly cohesive social upper class in America that is dominant in the economy and in the government. This upper class as a whole is not a ruling class, but a major fraction of that class constitutes a power elite, even though some members of the power elite may not necessarily belong to the upper class.

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While his general thesis has not changed much from the earlier formulation, Domhoff concedes that "domination does not mean total control" (p. 151). Nor does he deny that "under certain circumstances the electorate has been able to place restraints on the actions of the power elite as a whole" (p. 4). Unfortunately, such efforts to be "reasonable" and undogmatic often lead Domhoff to have recourse to rather elastic formulations. It is hard to falsify or accept formulations such as that the upper class "wins much more often than it loses" on a variety of issues. Nor is it helpful to be told that "domination by the power elite does not negate the reality of continuing conflict over government policies" (p. 150). After all, much of the earlier criticism of Domhoff's thesis hinged on the contention that he neglected major policy differences among the powers that be. If he now concedes that such differences are indeed pronounced, but contends that this evidence does not hurt his major thesis, his response seems to muddle the debate rather than to clarify it.

Despite such difficulties, when it comes to major theoretical issues, this book is surely valuable in its presentation of a great deal of empirical data, some coming from the author's own investigations and some from other studies. This volume provides access data on, among other things, family backgrounds and socialization of members of the upper class, corporate networks, interchanges between positions in the corporate world and government positions, and patterns of ownership, wealth, and income. Yet the data Domhoff displays here are not always as convincing as he seems to believe. Thus, when he reports that 30 percent of the corporate elite is upper class in origin (p. 68), he seems not to be aware that others might conclude with satisfaction that 70 percent are not.

I must admit to a measure of ambivalence about Domhoff's work here and elsewhere. On the one hand, one must be grateful for the energy he has devoted to documenting in great detail that American society is a society of unequals, be it in terms of power, income, wealth, or any other major dimension of stratification. On the other hand, he is at least in part battering in open doors. After all, even his "pluralist" critics are not obtuse or naive enough to deny that America is a highly stratified society. Moreover, if Domhoff now admits that "the American upper class is a mixture of old and new members . . . [and that] there is both continuity and social mobility" (p. 37), that is, if he now thinks that the upper class is *not* constituted by a largely hereditary and self-perpetuating stratum, what is all the quarrel about? A conclusion that in the United States as well as elsewhere (including in George Orwell's *Animal Farm*) some are more equal than others is not exactly a novel finding.

LEWIS A. COSER
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Quick Analysis for Busy Decision Makers *by Robert D. Behn and James W. Vaupel. New York, Basic Books, 1982. 415 pp. $18.95.*

Behn and Vaupel have written what may soon become *the* introductory applied decision analysis textbook. It is intended for three audiences: decision-makers from all walks of public and private sector professional life; students preparing to enter or advance in these fields; and persons who wish to improve the quality of their personal decisions.

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"Quick analysis" is a selective application of the mathematical theory of how decisions should be made and the psychological theory of how they are in fact made by people with limited time, limited information, limited attention spans, and limited tolerance for detail.

Part I, "The Fundamentals of Quick Analysis," develops a framework for choices between two alternatives with no more than two outcomes per alternative. Topics include how to: represent the logical structure of decisions as decision trees; evaluate the consequences of different outcomes in terms of explicitly stated preferences; estimate the probabilities of different outcomes; integrate this information to make decisions; and assess the sensitivity of decisions to changes in their underlying assumptions. Each topic is presented in terms of realistic examples, such as whether an individual should give up an existing position to run full time for public office, whether a district attorney should prosecute a case, whether an individual should undergo surgery, which of two local transportation proposals should be submitted for federal funding, whether a firm should attempt to take over another firm, and many others.

Part II, "Range-of-Risk Dilemmas," extends "quick analysis" to decisions with continuous ranges of possible outcomes. For example, instead of simply considering whether a product liability law suit is won or lost, the analysis now considers the full range of potential damage awards. The authors explain how to: use numerical forecasts; interpret information about probability distributions; apply elementary principles of utility theory; and avoid some of the pitfalls commonly encountered when using these concepts.

Part III, "Complications and Dynamics," extends "quick analysis" to decisions with outcomes that lead to further decisions. One such example is the dilemma of whether a pregnant woman should undergo testing whose outcome will affect subsequent decisions about terminating her pregnancy. The authors introduce Bayesian updating ("tree flipping"), the value of information, and dynamic decision-making. Next, they consider decisions with multiple competing consequences (economic, social, psychological, and moral) and introduce techniques for facilitating trade-offs among them. Lastly, they offer some general guidance about when "quick analysis" can be helpful and how detailed it should be.

To master "quick analysis" requires an ability to read simple graphs and understand elementary high school algebra. Because the book is so personal, witty, straightforward, and engaging, it is ideal for readers who are convinced that quantitative thinking is beyond them.

For introductory graduate or undergraduate decision analysis courses, the entire book could be assigned and supplemented with more complex cases. For short-term executive training programs, Part I could be used as a self-contained unit. In addition, because the book is so clear and entertaining, it could be used for self-study.

In summary, *Quick Analysis for Busy Decision Makers* is a gem, and is must reading for persons concerned about the quality of their decisions or the quality of decisions made by their clients. I plan to use the book for my courses and recommend it highly to others.

HOWARD S. BLOOM
Harvard University

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Studying the Presidency *edited by George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne. Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1983. 312 pp. $9.95.*

This book comes out just at the right time, as the renaissance in public law studies of the 1970s is being supplemented by the outpouring of research on the presidency conducted by behavioralists. The editors number themselves in the camp of the model-builders, hypothesis-testers, and number crunchers, but they have published a work that is bound to be useful for everyone in the field.

The book is divided into two sections; the first consists of several essays on methods, while the second deals with sources. Stephen Wayne wrote the introduction to the book and the first essay, which makes an eloquent case for the use of behavioral methods in research on the presidency. His criticisms of the existing literature are bound to raise hackles; perhaps anticipating howls from gored oxes, he has also offered a critique of the "process" literature within which his own work rests, as well as an aside on the weaknesses in his own work. (He is as unfair to himself as he is generous to others—specifically this author—in his comments.) The second essay, by Norman C. Thomas, consists of a case-by-case recitation of the specific studies on the presidency. While the essay serves as a useful introduction to the major works in the field, it would have been better to organize the argument analytically and comparatively rather than descriptively—common criticisms of the case method. John H. Kessel offers a most useful and highly personalized account of what it was like to write his book on the Nixon administration's domestic council. "Your work is driven by doubt" he suggests (p. 90), and then explains why doubt can sometimes be a useful thing. "When I begin a research project, I do not know what I am going to find, how I am going to find it, or how long it will take" (p. 96), he tells us, and his article should give comfort to our graduate students, as well as to ourselves.

George Edwards, in "Quantitative Analysis," provides a skillful discussion of the uses and misuses of data sources and models, especially time-series on presidential popularity. I found his claims for behavioral research a bit overblown, considering the somewhat trivial generalization thus far established. Edwards argues that studies have tested propositions "about the extent of presidential coattails, the pull of the president's party affiliation, the influence of the level of the president's public approval and electoral support, and the significance of presidential legislative skills" (pp. 103–104). Edwards himself, in several monographs, has contributed much to the understanding of these areas. But he points out that even some of his own generalizations are likely to be contradicted by more closely focused and narrow studies (p. 120), and that the field is going through its growing pains. He also devotes several pages to detailing the limitations of the behavioral approach, and I found these the most compelling in his article. The behavioral revolution is upon us, and will no doubt provide better descriptive generalizations than have been possible before, some of which will be counter-intuitive and will thus make a real contribution. But it does seem presumptuous, if not downright vainglorious, for the editors to insist that "the time is ripe" for quantitative analysis because "professional standards call for it" (p. 120). Here a famous law of survey research comes to mind, to wit, "some do, and some don't."

Part II, on information sources, will help adherents of every approach, especially and

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perhaps ironically students of public law and institutions. Jennifer DeToro provides an excellent compilation of information sources, and is especially useful on the computerized data bases. G. Calvin Mackenzie does a similar job on congressional sources. Louis Fisher, decrying the "artificial wedge" that has been driven between political science and legal studies, has written an essay that is partly a rejoinder to the Wayne and Edwards essays, and partly a tour of legal resources in a good law library. He also provides some fascinating insight into the relationships between federal courts, members of Congress, and presidential powers, offering what is in effect a research agenda for the entreprising public-law graduate student casting about for a dissertation topic.

Other articles are equally useful, including two by Martha Joynt Kumar and Larry Berman on the use of presidential libraries, and interviewing techniques from the perspective of the journalist (Dom Bonafede) and graduate student (Joseph A. Pika). All in all, the book is a worthwhile though controversial endeavor, which treats authors scrupulously fairly, but never hides its behavioralist bias. It will be most useful in graduate seminars on the presidency, where it should find an appreciative audience.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
Barnard College, Columbia University

The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't *edited by Vincent Blasi. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1983. 326 pp. $25.00.*

This book, sponsored by the Society of American Law Teachers, examines the effects of the Burger Court on the doctrines of the Warren Court. Nine chapters by leading scholars trace the post-Warren Court development of doctrine in as many areas of the law and assess the effect of the appointment to the Court of "conservative" justices. Many areas of the law are not covered and the decisions of the 1981–82 Term of Court are the most recent to be considered, which means that Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's impact on the direction of decisions is not clear.

Each chapter carefully examines the decisions before concluding that the conservative revolution has not taken place. Yes, there have been changes in the Warren doctrines but not ones of "epic proportions or obvious import" (p. xii). Thomas Emerson reaches the most pessimistic conclusion that "under the Burger Court there has been a constant deterioration of First Amendment doctrine" (p 26). On the other hand, Richard Markovitz is enthusiastic about the changes he finds in the developments in antitrust. The other authors locate themselves somewhere between these two extremes.

Chapter 10 by Blasi and Chapter 11 by political scientist Martin Shapiro (the only nonlawyer in the group) provide overviews and attempt to explain the failure of the counterrevolution. Both conclude that the Burger Court has by any measure been an activist Court. Blasi offers a plausible multifaceted explanation of the phenomenon. The Court is activist to counter the destabilizing influence of the "rampant growth of government bureaucracy" (p. 209) and the conversion of the legislative and electoral processes into an arena for single-issue politics. And it is activist because the "centrist" justices are also the

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intellectual leaders of the Court, whereas other Courts have been led from the right or left of the center. The "swing" justices, by leading and by trying to counteract other forces in society, are indeed activist; but that activism is so pragmatic that it is also rootless. Blasi asserts that this Court lacks the moral vision of the Warren Court and has not found another vision to replace it.

Shapiro is not so sure that the Court lacks a vision. The Warren Court was guided by a vision of equality—the New Deal vision. The Burger Court is guided by a vision of autonomy—"with limiting the scope of government activity" (p. 228). Most of Shapiro's chapter is devoted to demonstrating that most but not all of the Burger decisions fit this mold. His analysis cannot be summarized in a brief review; suffice it to say that he does have trouble explaining why some decisions do not fit the autonomy value. One aspect of his analysis is not sufficiently developed; had it been, he and Blasi might have come out at about the same place in their analyses. Shapiro argues that the end of the Warren era was coterminous with the final breakup of the New Deal consensus. The equality value of that consensus has been replaced by a "jurisprudence of policies" (p. 237), in which competing values now have to be weighed in a pragmatic fashion because there is no new value consensus. The responses therefore are not likely to be consistent, and the Court is engaged in Blasi's centrist rootless activism.

This volume is a substantial contribution. The first nine chapters put the various areas of the law in focus, while the last two provocatively raise larger questions about the Burger Court's performance.

ROBERT H. BIRKBY
Vanderbilt University

The Truth About Supply-Side Economics *by Michael K. Evans. New York, Basic Books, 1983. 294 pp. $17.95.*

Michael Evans has written a schizophrenic book. One half of it amasses substantial empirical and analytical evidence in behalf of supply-side econmics. The other half argues that supply-side economics failed when implemented by the Reagan administration.

Evans's book was published in May 1983, two months before the second 10 percent reduction in marginal income tax rates went into effect. Considering the time it takes to write and publish a book, Evans must have begun the book at least a year earlier. That would be May 1982—two months before the first 10 percent reduction in tax rates! It seems premature to declare a program a failure before it ever went into effect.

Evans is at his worse when he caricatures the Reagan experience. He attacks four myths that he mistakenly believes to be the basis of Reagan's program. It is true that the administration's forecast for 1981–82 badly missed the mark, but so did everyone else's. This was not because of any shared myths, but because the Federal Reserve deviated from the program and supplied, unexpectedly, one of the tightest monetary policies in the postwar period.

Economic policy in 1981–82 was not dominated by Reaganomics, much less by tax cuts,

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which were delayed. Policy was dominated by the Federal Reserve, which closed down the economy in a classic attempt to break the back of inflation. The Reagan administration had ruled out this approach for two reasons, accepting instead the gradualist approach of monetarists. The administration did not want a liquidity crisis, and it wanted to end that roller coaster cycle of fighting inflation with unemployment and vice versa. The administration believed that this cycle kept interest rates high even in recession, because financial markets had been taught to expect reflation as the policy response to unemployment.

The Federal Reserve deviated from the program, because it was convinced by the administration's critics that the tax cuts would be inflationary. So were business people, who maintained high debt while the economy collapsed. The consequent desperate need for liquidity together with tight money kept interest rates high. No myths are needed to account for the facts.

Evans claims that "Laffer curve" forecasting was responsible for the myth that the budget would be balanced in 1984. However, the administration never based any of its forecasts on the "Laffer curve." It was able to project a balanced budget only because budget director David Stockman promised unidentified spending cuts that he never delivered. When these missing cuts are added to the original projections, the administration's deficit estimates fall between those made at the time by Chase Econometrics and Data Resources, Inc. The unexpected deficits are not due to any supply-side myths. As the U.S. Treasury has shown, 75 percent of the deficits are due to the revenue shortfall from the recession and the unidentified spending cuts.

The serious part of Evans' book deals with what he calls "the enduring truths of supply-side economics" (p. 105). Here he presents theoretical and empirical evidence on behalf of supply-side tax policy. It is no longer possible for any serious person to ignore the fact that supply-side economics has carried the day. Demand-oriented Keynesians like Evans have broadened their perspective. Regardless of whether President Ronald Reagan succeeds or fails in his attempt to establish a supply-side policy, the empirical evidence that Evans presents suggests that the U.S. is destined to have a supply-side policy.

PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS
Georgetown University

Why Teachers Organized *by Wayne J. Urban. Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1982. 202 pp. $17.50.*

Wayne J. Urban tells us that teachers organized unions in the Progressive Era for much the same reasons as other workers. Teachers, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) complained in 1919, received lower wages than unskilled laborers and had less influence than skilled workers (p. 140). If on occasion teachers were moved to champion "immigrant gifts" or campaigned for quality education, more often teachers were mobilized on the low but solid grounds of wages, seniority rights, and pensions. This result is not very surprising. As one may well have learned in a block club, union hall, political cam-

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paign, or from Mancur Olson, organization is a costly undertaking that requires either coercion or powerful incentives if it is to succeed.

Urban's survey of the first generation of teachers' organizations makes a historical contribution by telling a part of the story of school reorganization and reform that has for the most part been neglected. Accounts of school reform in the Progressive Era have had two foci. First, the reorganization of public education was informed by admiration of business methods, management, and individuals. These values implied both curriculum changes (making school more directly preparation for work) and organizational changes (centralizing control of schools). Second, the campaign for school reorganization and reform was part of broader political battles in the nation's cities. In education conflict, bosses, political machines, and immigrant parents were on one side, and municipal reformers, educational reformers, and the newly created profession of school administrators on the other.

To these familiar portraits Urban adds the perspectives, interests, and the fates of public school teachers. Teachers did not easily choose sides in the battle of city politics. The AFT, following the lead of some locals, supported initiative, referendum, recall, and woman suffrage, thus aligning themselves on those issues with reformers. At other times—especially since teachers were, after all, employees who had secured jobs under existing regimes—teachers ranged themselves with immigrant parents and the political machine. In the school system the question of self-interest was more straightforward. School reorganization meant a loss of autonomy, closer supervision, and the threat of wage increases determined by supervisors' evaluations rather than by seniority.

As school reform succeeded, teachers steadily lost ground to the burgeoning ranks of supervisors and administrators. Similarly, in the National Education Association (NEA), teachers' perspectives and interests gave way to the dominance of school administrators, and the NEA's success relative to the AFT bespeaks the same distribution of organizational resources. Organized or unorganized, teachers were ill-equipped for self-defense. For the most part young and badly educated themselves, teachers were not in a strong market position even in the educationally expansionist Progressive Era. In addition, the men who taught high school and the women who taught in the grammar schools were differently trained, saw their interests differently, ended up in separate organizations, and had difficulty coordinating their efforts. Finally, since the overwhelming majority of teachers were women (and women were not yet entitled to vote) they were without political resources to secure their interests. The contrast to contemporary municipal employees could hardly be more striking.

In these circumstances, teachers did well to win modest improvements in their standard of living, and a modicum of security on the job and at retirement. By adding their story to the story of school reform in the Progressive Era, Urban has told us not only why teachers organized, but also what they were up against, what they won, and what they lost.

AMY BRIDGES
Harvard University

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The Visual Display of Quantitative Information *by Edward R. Tufte. Graphics Press (Box 430, Cheshire, Conn., 06410), 1983. 197 pp. $32.00.*

At one level, Tufte has created and published (having founded Graphics Press) a visually attractive book on the history and art of graphic design. It is filled with beautiful graphics both old and new, mostly in black, white, and shades of gray. The reading is easy, because the graphs are perfectly positioned within the text (as Tufte recommends), and because there are equal spaces between words and letters. This reviewer would suggest that the book is suitable for the livingroom.

At another level, Tufte has written neatly, although less rigorously than some might expect, about the methodology of presenting and communicating quantitative information. This is not a trivial matter in this day of computer graphics and other new technologies, which can at times be either exciting or irritating.

The first half of the book examines graphical methods and graphical excellence, and in the second half Tufte develops a theory of data graphics. Tufte is not interested in simple displays intended to teach or persuade the young and the ignorant. Rather, he is concerned with complex graphics that can clearly, precisely, and efficiently communicate detailed information to intelligent and sophisticated people.

Using striking and carefully presented examples, Tufte persuasively argues that graphic displays should meet high standards. They should make the observer think about the substance of the data being presented and not about particular graphic designs or their technology (a warning here to artists and computer buffs). They should not distort the data (nor deceive), and they should be clear; since things should be aptly called, terms like "chartjunk, vibrations, grids, and ducks" should be avoided. More importantly, graphics should "present many numbers in a small space, make large data sets coherent, encourage the eye to compare different pieces of data, and reveal the data at several levels of detail, from broad overview to the fine structure" (p. 1). Tufte stresses this multivariate character of graphics, especially graphics that can be more precise and revealing than a large number of statistical calculations (such as several bivariate scatterplots versus case listings of data).

Tufte's theory of data graphics suggests how these standards can be met and how new graphic designs can be created. A concept central to the theory is "data-ink," the core of any graphic, the non-redundant and non-erasable ink representing variation in the quantitative information (p. 93). In short, the theory's essential principles are: to show the data above all else; to maximize within reason the ratio of the data-ink to the total ink used to present the graphic, erase non-data-ink, erase redundant data-ink, maximize data density and the size of the data matrix, and shrink graphics way down; and to revise and edit.

Applying these principles leads to a number of inferences (some not surprising) about graphics, such as: words and labels can provide extremely useful information on graphs; tables are best for data sets of twenty numbers or less; super-tables are invaluable; pie charts usually should not be used because they have low data density, among other things; maps are perhaps the best graphic designs; *Pravda* publishes very little data in its graphics, although U.S. magazines and newspapers (including the *American Political Science Review*) do not do very much better.

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Tufte develops new graphics by modifying stem-and-leaf plots, scatterplots, box plots, Chernoff faces, bar charts, small multiples, and other designs. He erases non-data-ink or turns it into data-ink (for example, by adding ranges and frequencies to scatterplots, producing "range-frames" and "dot-dash-plots"), and he combines separate graphics (such as "rugplots"). Although most of these designs look very strange at first, Tufte argues that people will become accustomed to them with use. Of course, should these graphics still seem awkward, they can be revised, as Tufte's rules would presumably be open to any improvements consistent with his goals of visual display.

Whether or not readers appreciate the new graphics or the author's principles of design, Tufte's book is likely to make them more sensitive to the way any data are presented and to how complex quantitative information is communicated.

ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO
Columbia University

Channels of Power: The Impact of Television on American Politics *by Austin Ranney. New York, Basic Books, 1983. 207 pp. $14.95.*

Over the Wire and on TV: CBS and UPI in Campaign '80 *by Michael J. Robinson and Margaret A. Sheehan. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1983. 332 pp. $24.95.*

Television Coverage of the 1980 Presidential Campaign *edited by William C. Adams. Norwood, N.J., Ablex Publishing Corp., 1983. 197 pp. $24.50.*

The literature on media coverage of presidential elections is growing lustily, not only in quantity but in quality and diversity as well. The Robinson-Sheehan and Adams books, and several portions of the Ranney volume, are valuable additions to this wealth of information about an important phase of American politics. At long last research, including the books reviewed here, is focusing attention on media content as a prerequisite for understanding media impact. Previously, researchers largely ignored the stimulus that presumably produced profound effects in media audiences. An important added benefit of content studies is their practical payoff. News professionals are apt to heed scientifically based adverse criticism that suggests how they can improve their product.

Each of these books fills a special niche. The Adams volume will be of interest to scholars and practitioners because it provides new research findings about a wide variety of aspects of presidential election news, as viewed by experts drawn from many fields. These include political science, speech communication and journalism, news broadcasting, campaign handling, and professional public relations. The richness of these varied perspectives adds greatly to the value of the book. Among major topics are the role of energy policy in the campaign, the controversies swirling around election night television coverage, the media's self-criticism of the quality of election news, basic differences between print and television election news, and the impact of various forms of news presentation on the successes and failures of candidacies. There are also essays about the

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crucial role played by election news in the nomination and elimination of candidates and about the fading role and newsworthiness of the presidential nominating conventions.

An intriguing study by C. Anthony Broh explores the genesis, development, and impact of election polling, while Robert G. Meadow deflates the informational significance often ascribed to broadcasts of presidential debates. Thomas W. Benson deals with implicit communication theory in campaign coverage, examining the unexpressed assumptions that underly such coverage. Altogether, the Adams volume contains ten chapters, most of them written expressly for this volume. Though readers may differ about the strengths and weaknesses of particular essays, this is a fine collection overall.

The Robinson-Sheehan volume presents the results of a massive, year-long study of campaign coverage. Chapters are arranged so that the lay reader can review the findings without plowing through the extensive data sets that make the book extremely valuable for the expert. The book's primary focus is on quantitative and qualitative comparisons of various aspects of print and televised news. Some 5,500 election-related CBS (Columbia Broadcasting Service) network news and UPI (United Press International) wire service stories were used as prototypes for television and print media coverage.

Not unexpectedly, Robinson and Sheehan conclude that print and television provide substantially different images of the campaign and therefore have different effects. Television stories, for example, contain more interpretations and appraisals and fewer descriptions and facts than print news. Televised news clusters around well-defined themes, dwells more on personalities, and is generally more negative about the behavior of politicians. In tone, television mirrors the Eastern liberal press. In fact, there appears to be a new version of the two-step flow phenomenon for television—from the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* to the networks and thence the American public.

Neither print nor televised news conveys "truth"; each medium, in its own way, distorts and partially conceals reality. But print comes closer to the truth than television. However, the media are objective when that term is used to indicate that journalists refrain from presenting their own opinions. It does not mean that they were impartial in selecting news items that reflected favorably or unfavorably on particular candidates. News stories were fair in 1980 in allotting equal space to major candidates, but they neglected minor candidates and parties as well as candidates for the vice-presidential office. On the whole, coverage was superficial in both print and electronic media. It emphasized hoopla and horse-race stories, and placed comparatively light emphasis on public-policy issues. However, additional information about policy issues was available from non-campaign news.

Robinson and Sheehan argue that the effects produced by media realities are incidental and unplanned, and therefore do not reflect media power. Of course, that does not make these effects any less real or consequential. They identify growing cynicism about politics as the most significant effect of current campaign coverage, particularly the network television version. Delegitimization of politics is reflected in unwillingness to reelect incumbents and to support them while they are in office. Thus, while the rich diet of political drama offered by network news to American audiences satisfies their taste buds, it leads to painful ulcers in the body politic. I find it difficult to agree with the authors that this is a case of caveat emptor, so that the providers of such fare can rightfully disclaim responsibility because no harm was intended.

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Channels of Power by Austin Ranney is an expected version of his William W. Cook lectures on American Institutions at the University of Michigan Law School, presented in November 1981. Unlike the other two books, the discussion covers media impact on a broad range of American political problems beyond presidential elections. Reminiscent of its origins, the book still carries the crisp flavor of the spoken word, addressed to a high-brow lay audience. *Channels of Power* is therefore ideal for lay readers who want a quick and painless introduction to the mysteries of television news. Ranney explains the rationale behind television news and its impact, and suggests feasible ways to improve it. He puts newsmaking into its political context, discussing its manifold problems fairly and sympathetically, without any grand theories or reforming zeal. As an extra benefit, Ranney's heavy reliance on quotes from well-known authors introduces readers to the major writers in the field.

Ranney considers television the most important factor for change in American politics since World War II. Like the authors of the other two volumes, he contends that televised news has produced political disillusionment, making it more difficult for political leaders to complete programs. Continuous criticism, almost from the start, forecloses trading early losses for later successes. Gruesome pictorial coverage has become a bar to fighting limited wars. By shortening the political life span of incumbents, televised news has enhanced the importance of bureaucrats who face neither the hazards of elections nor the glare of continuous media publicity. Television has also reduced the status of political parties and has led to the emergence of a new breed of telegenic, independent politicians, largely beyond the control of the parties whose labels they carry.

Altogether, these three volumes constitute a treasure trove for the student of political communication. They do not advance grand theories or turn up radically new findings. They exhibit a number of mostly minor faults in research design, execution, and even statement of facts. But their advantages far outweigh their problems. These studies supply massive amounts of new information about media coverage of politics. They raise many important questions about communication effects that should spur and guide future inquiries. Above all, they make readers wonder to what extent televised news, in its current form, is a menace to the effectiveness of America's democratic institutions.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

Beyond Separate Spheres: Intellectual Roots of Modern Feminism *by Rosalind Rosenberg. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1983. 288 pp. $9.95.*

The apparent failure of women to make dramatic gains following the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment has been the subject of much discussion. For the women's movement, the 1920s were characterized by the intense and often bitter conflict between those who lobbied to retain protective legislation and those who advocated an equal rights amend-

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ment. Until now, explanations for the failure to resolve those conflicts have focused on political and economic factors, such as the decline of the reform impulse following World War I and the inability of women to transcend class barriers in order to lobby for specific reforms. Rosalind Rosenberg demonstrates that these explanations were incomplete, however, in her important new study of the intellectual origins of modern feminism.

Rosenberg traces the roots of a new feminism that emerged in the late nineteenth century to the publication of Edward Clarke's *Sex in Education* (1873). His treatise denied women's ability to withstand the intellectual rigors of university training. Unintentionally, his work did the women's movement a great service. Others before Clarke had expounded on the same topic, but they did so in religious and moral terms that, by their nature, were less susceptible to rebuttal. Clarke stated his views in scientific terms that could be—and were—tested for reliability and verifiability. Clarke's work, Rosenberg asserts, stimulated a series of empirical studies on sex and gender that appeared over the next fifty years.

The meat of Rosenberg's book is the parallel development of scientific studies of sex and gender and the growth of the social sciences as rigorous academic disciplines. In a well-documented and lively discussion, she demonstrates with what efficiency women not only could adapt to a university when given half a chance, but also could become the leading investigators in pathbreaking studies conducted at places like the University of Chicago, Columbia University, and Barnard College. The women who pioneered this work constitute a "who's who" among social scientists: Marion Talbot, Helen Bradford Thompson, and Leta Stetter Hollingsworth (psychology); Jessie Taft, Virginia Robinson, and Katherine Bement Davis (sociology); and Clelia Duel Mosher, Elsie Clews Parsons, Ruth Benedict, and Margaret Mead (anthropology). They trained and worked with equally pioneering men in these fields, including John Dewey, James McKeen Cattell, George Herbert Mead, Franklin Giddings, and Franz Boas, some of whom were only reluctant mentors at best.

Much of the work accomplished by these women on the psychology and sociology of gender roles, intelligence, and social structure was nurtured and supported by the growing women's movement. The coalition of women engaged in the suffrage campaign helped to create an atmosphere more receptive to women academics. It is therefore ironic that the social scientists found themselves effectively cut off from the majority of American women by the 1920s precisely *because* of the results of their groundbreaking work. The cumulative effect of several decades of gender studies led them to reject the idea of women as special—neither superior nor inferior. And although most of them were not particularly political, when asked they had little choice but to reject all forms of protectionism for women. The results of their studies became the ammunition used by equal rights advocates. Thus, the lines were drawn and not easily crossed over by either side. To do so required a fundamental change in one's beliefs regarding the way society was structured. As Rosenberg observes: "Most early women social scientists thought that, once the arbitrariness of sexual classification was recognized, separate sexual spheres would fade away. Only a few understood that this recognition would have to be accompanied by a social revolution that would make separate spheres unnecessary" (p. 246).

Rosenberg's study sheds much light on the reasons for the lag between the political acti-

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vism that led to the Nineteenth Amendment and the acceptance of the fundamental changes implied by this activity. As such, it is an important contribution to the literature of both the history of women and political movements.

CHRISTINE A. LUNARDINI
Princeton University

The Republican Right Since 1945 *by David W. Reinhard. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1983. 294 pp. $25.00.*

Up to a point, this book is a useful chronicle of the right wing of the Republican Party from 1945 to 1980. It covers a broad array of subject matter—from party factional squabbles to divisions on foreign-policy matters—not usually discussed in one place. And the book is reasonably well written.

Not surprisingly, the years from 1945 to 1964 are covered best. These decades are already history, not current affairs. In the opening pages, I found myself remembering how even the first names of some of the Grand Old party (GOP) right-wing stalwarts of the late 1930s and 1940s (Homer, Zales, Chauncey, Noah, and so forth) epitomized what was essentially a politics of recapturing the kerosene lamp era.

The post-1964 portion is less effective, although Reinhard has avoided a common problem of academicians dealing with this subject matter—an anti-conservative bias. My overall criticism is twofold. First, there are recurring minor mistakes in election data and misidentification of politicians' home states. Second, there is a lack of historical perspective and a willingness to grapple with the all-important question as to why the right wing of the Republican party was able to move from the ignominy of the defeat of Barry Goldwater in 1964 to the triumph of the victory of Ronald Reagan in 1980.

To be sure, young political scientists who seek to go beyond chronicling this phenomenon are putting their feet on soft ground. Nevertheless, the processes of history call for an analysis beyond Reinhard's useful thirty-five year narration. For example, he should have briefly profiled the pre-1945 Republican Right, thereby pointing out an irony. As late as the 1920s and early 1930s, the geograpical locus of "Mossback" Republicanism was in the Northeast. Liberal or populist Republicanism prospered in the Farm Belt and in the West. So how did it come to pass, by the Thomas Dewey-Dwight Eisenhower era, that the liberal Republicans were in the Northeast while the rightists were in the Midwest and West? I would suggest that with the success and entrenchment of the New Deal view of government and foreign policy in the late-1930s and 1940s, the historically populist or outsider parts of the United States (the South and the West) began to react against key policies and attitudes.

Indeed, much of what has happened in American politics over the last forty years makes greater sense if one thinks of New Deal liberalism as institutionalizing itself during the 1940s, experiencing trial and reaffirmation in the 1950s, then peaking with the Great Society effort of the mid-1960s and thereafter losing force and creativity. Realistically, the

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rise of the various anti-liberal insurgencies and movements from 1948 on – from Strom Thurmond's Dixiecrats to Goldwater, to Richard Nixon's "New Majority," to George Wallace, to the New Right and to the triumph of Ronald Reagan – all draw at least partially on regional or outsider politics or on populist resentment in the South, West, and Sun Belt. At least as much "radicalism" as "conservatism" has been involved.

Because American academics participated in the New Deal coalition to an unprecedented extent, they have had a vested intellectual interest in generally declining to analyze its maturation, atrophy, and ebb. Nor has there been much willingness to admit that since the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1945, only one Democratic presidential candidate – Lyndon Johnson in 1964 – has been able to win over fifty percent of the total presidential vote. By contrast, Republican contenders have won absolute majorities four times.

Sooner or later, it will be necessary to explain all of this, not just to chronicle events and personalities.

KEVIN PHILLIPS
The American Political Research Corporation

Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues

by D. Roderick Kiewiet. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983. 176 pp. $15.00.

The relationship between economics and politics has long been a topic of interest. Recently, the topic has attracted research efforts that are more and more methodologically sophisticated and theoretically well developed. Roderick Kiewiet's book provides an excellent example of this development and, with Morris Fiorina's recent research on retrospective voting, indicates that previous research can now be integrated and built upon. The particular relationship with which Kiewiet is concerned is between macroeconomic outcomes and voting behavior.

Kiewiet notes that there is disagreement concerning the appropriate variables for these two concepts, but that two types of possibilities have been considered for each of them. First, macroeconomic outcomes have been considered in terms of the individual personal experiences of or national assessments by the individual. Second, voting behavior has been evaluated as a response to the performance of the incumbent or the promise (and past performance) of the political parties. Kiewiet then posits four types of hypotheses consisting of the possible combination of these two pairs of variables. All too often, researchers have failed to state their assumptions or to develop all the theoretically related propositions, but Kiewiet's development of these hypotheses is exemplary. It is thorough, well reasoned, and utilizes the existing literature intelligently. The important scholarly debates are elucidated by cutting through the more petty arguments to the differences that are important theoretically and that will aid his study.

The testing of these hypotheses (personal experiences-incumbency, personal experi-

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ences-policy, national assessments-incumbency, and national assessments-policy) is done carefully and thoroughly. For the uninitiated, Kiewiet discusses with clarity the reliability and validity of various items, the construction of the probit analysis equations, and other methodological matters. A pleasant surprise is that Kiewiet is candid about the limitations of the data and the statistical analyses. He recognizes the need for side evidence and rarely exaggerates the strength and importance of his findings. Furthermore, he makes interesting efforts to deal with some of the methodological difficulties, such as extensive checks on various findings using competing variables or different sources of data. The findings are presented so that even those ignorant of probit analysis will be able to understand and appreciate them.

On the individual level, Kiewiet finds that national assessments have a greater impact on the vote than personal economic experiences; the kind of vote response effected is slightly more likely to be incumbency-oriented than policy-oriented. There is no asymmetrical relationship as some have suggested, for example V.O. Key, Jr. in *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*; the economy serves as the "god of vengeance *and* of reward" (p. 568). Finally, the impact of the macroeconomic factors is greater in presidential elections than in congressional elections. In discussing the findings, Kiewiet consistently keeps sight of the forest and the trees. The effects of these individual-level relationships on the aggregate level are noted, and he also discusses intelligently the political importance of the findings—a valuable contribution. This is demonstrated throughout most of the book, but it is particularly important in the chapter on election outcomes.

The book's shortcomings are few and minor. For example, the conclusion is weak in terms of building on the book's earlier findings. However, this is probably the result of the thoroughness of the preceding chapters. Another flaw is one of omission. It would be helpful to know what kinds of voters engage in each of the retrospective types of voting behavior; unfortunately, Kiewiet does not get to this matter. Nonetheless, he has conducted an excellent piece of research that is accessible to the statistically literate and illiterate. The book is a model of scholarship, building constructively on existing research, and should be read by everyone interested in the short-term effects of macroeconomics on voting behavior.

PATRICK A. PIERCE
Saint Mary's College

Rental Housing in the 1980s *by Anthony Downs. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1983. 202 pp. Cloth, $26.95; paper, $9.95.*

In this eminently readable book, Downs presents a bleak forecast of rental housing. He predicts: relatively more Americans renting rather than owning their own homes, because they will not be able to afford to own; rapidly rising rents; little construction of new rental housing; a shortage of rental housing; and more rent control (with its short-term political allure and its devastating long-term effects).

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Like many forecasters, however, he offers policy prescriptions to avoid the gloomy future he otherwise foresees. Among his suggestions; an economic climate that results in lower interest rates; prohibition of rent controls; housing vouchers for the poor, paid for in part by reduced tax advantages for homeowners (a brave recommendation, not likely to get far because two-thirds of all households are homeowners); and, importantly, deregulation of housing by local governments.

The book neatly skewers some of the costly nostrums offered (and, alas, all too often adopted by profligate Congresses) in the past, such as subsidized construction programs. It is timely in citing, and implicitly agreeing with, some elements of the Reagan administration's housing policies, specifically with respect to vouchers, reform of public housing, cutbacks in wasteful new construction programs, and emphasis on the dominant role of local governments in influencing the supply of housing.

One wishes that more legislators would heed his call for housing vouchers. This reviewer is aware that close to $200 million has been spent over the last decade on experiments with vouchers. The results have been quite clear—money spent to build new housing for low-income households can house almost three times as many people if vouchers are used instead. Moreover, the families would have greater freedom of choice about their housing, instead of being relegated so often to building earmarked "for poor people only." What accounts for the marked reluctance of the Congress to endorse a voucher plan on other than a demonstration basis? One cynic has noted that builders make larger campaign contributions than do voucher recipients.

Other than the sudden "seeing of the light" by public officials, other factors may be at work to brighten the rental housing picture. The book does not give enough attention to them.

For example, the condominium craze is creating many rental units, and the conventional construction statistics do not readily capture this fact. Furthermore, this process produces more landlords, thereby increasing the ratio of landlords to tenants and altering the political balance between them.

A more subtle factor has to do with changing life styles. Strained economic circumstances prevent young singles from moving out of their parents' dwellings and also cause them to move back in. (As a result, vacancy rates rose for rental units in 1983.) But this development is by no means all bad. Many are rediscovering the pleasures of a prolonged family life together. Moreover, this is a strong cultural pattern among many immigrant groups, particularly from Asia, the Middle East, southern Europe, and Latin America. If the social pattern of family-centered living reassumes even a fracton of its historical prevalence (if the balance of "familyism" versus individualism is tilted even slightly), then the problems predicted by Downs may not materialize.

Finally, some officials have seen the light and have proposed reducing federal housing aid to cities with rent controls, on the sensible grounds that spending taxpayers' money to build housing there is like trying to fill a leaky bucket; it is better to repair the bucket. This means eliminating the controls whose ultimate and unintended effect is to reduce the quantity and quality of rental housing.

E. S. Savas
Baruch College, City University of New York

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Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act *by R. Shep Melnick. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1983. 404 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $11.95.*

One view of the regulatory process asserts that agency officials cannot be trusted to implement their statutory obligations in an effective and responsible manner. According to this view, such officials are prone to a narrow parochialism, to ignoring emerging problems, to engaging in bureaucratic foot-dragging, and frequently to neglecting the public interest. For the many critics of such a stance, conventional wisdom suggests that an activist and assertive judiciary offers an opportunity for redress, effective public participation, and an overall improvement in regulatory policymaking.

Melnick's goal is to examine the validity of this assumption. He does so by assessing the federal courts' institutional capacity to oversee regulatory policymaking and by analyzing the long-term consequences of judicial action affecting the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) implementation of the federal Clean Air Program. Instead of examining individual cases and the development of legal doctrines, Melnick focuses on "how court decisions taken as a whole have influenced environmental regulation" (p. 344).

Advocates of increased judicial activism are unlikely to find much support for their position in *Regulation and the Courts.* Melnick's detailed and comprehensive analysis of more than 100 cases from 1970 through 1982 leads him to conclude that the administrative process and environmental quality have suffered substantially because of judicial intervention, however well intentioned.

To support his thesis, Melnick argues that judges are ill-equipped to decide environmental controversies. In the author's words, in some of their environmental decisions federal judges have demonstrated a "primitive understanding of the issues before them" (p. 153). Melnick cites cases in which judges have disapproved of the EPA's actions without indicating how deficiencies can be remedied, have required the agency to develop aggressive pollution control strategies and then refused the EPA's requests to help enforce them, have avoided, delayed, and impeded enforcement against some of the country's worst polluters, and have consistently ignored issues of administrative feasibility and concerns about the political and economic implications of their decisions.

The consequences of such institutional failures are neither benign nor beneficial. In some instances, the EPA became so apprehensive about the likelihood of judicial intervention that agency policies were designed less to control air pollution in an effective manner than to survive subsequent judicial review. In turn, this review encouraged the EPA to adopt a legalistic orientation and to place an excessive reliance on lawyers who were relatively unconcerned with political feasibility. As Melnick notes, EPA officials have often defended their programs, not by explaining their merits, but by claiming "that's the law." Such a stance is a virtual guarantee of diminished credibility and effectiveness.

Melnick's findings obviously suggest that he is not at all enamored with judicial intervention in the regulatory arena. Indeed, he concludes that the courts have increased the distance between administrative promise and accomplishment and "have formed an integral part of a policymaking system that has bred cynicism, muddled debate, created se-

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rious inequities and inefficiencies, and kept pollution levels high in the most heavily populated areas of the country" (p. 387). If one accepts this conclusion, it means that the EPA's critics cannot ignore the courts and the Congress when assessing blame and responsibility for the agency's actions.

In sum, for readers interested in policy implementation, judicial activism, or environmental protection, they will find *Regulation and the Courts* to be a superior and stimulating contribution. Melnick writes well and in an interesting manner; likewise, he raises important questons and effectively marshalls his evidence to answer them. Equally important, Melnick has provided an extraordinarily well-researched volume that skillfully and analytically integrates scores of legal decisions, data from personal interviews conducted over several years, and material from thousands of pages of EPA records and congressional hearings and debates.

RICHARD J. TOBIN
State University of New York at Buffalo

Allies: Pearl Harbor to D-Day *by John S. D. Eisenhower. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday and Co., 1982. 500 pp. $24.95.*

Churchill and de Gaulle *by François Kersaudy. New York, Atheneum, 1982. 476 pp. $19.95.*

In their respective books, John Eisenhower and François Kersaudy offer complementary accounts of the Allied leaders who created and sustained a common front against the Axis powers during World War II. Neither author takes the Alliance for granted; both see the conduct of the war as primarily determined by the interplay of strong personalities who were forced in the end to reach accommodation for the sake of a victory that none could gain alone.

Eisenhower, son of Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower and author of an earlier work devoted to the Battle of the Bulge, here directs his focus to the Anglo-American war effort in the European and North African theaters during the two and a half years that preceded the Normandy invasion. His principal aim is to chronicle the major events, both diplomatic and military, that marked the slow maturing of an alliance that "despite its imperfections, became without question the most successful in modern history" (Eisenhower, p. xxi). The younger Eisenhower's military and diplomatic training render him an informed observer of the interpersonal and interservice rivalries that continued to plague the Allied war effort, and give his battle descriptions the bite of authenticity. Not surprisingly, some of his best pages deal with his father's crucial role in coordinating the intricate logistic and command requirements of the D-Day landings in Normandy. He is also sensitive to the atmosphere of mutual distrust and ill-concealed arrogance that infected relations between the Pentagon and the British military establishment. As late as 1944, Eisenhower observes, "the British had lost none of their feeling that they supplied the brains and experience to the Alliance while the Americans supplied

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the resources" (Eisenhower, p. 394). The gradual American displacement of Great Britain as the senior military partner, symbolized by General Eisenhower's assuming supreme command over the Normandy invasion, was redeemed in British eyes only by the American's willingness to subordinate the war in the Pacific against Japan to the drive against Adolf Hitler, as Winston Churchill desired.

Despite these strengths, however, Eisenhower's account suffers from a diffuseness that betrays the lack of a unifying argument or major thesis. Rather than offering an explanation of how and why the Alliance worked, Eisenhower is all too often content merely to record the actions and presumed feelings of the major participants, whether in the conference room or on the battlefield. Set pieces such as the landings in North Africa, the Casablanca Conference, and the Battle of El Alamein are dutifully, almost mechanically paraded before the reader with little comment. Eisenhower's prose style conveys this same sense of careful but colorless exactitude, with few inflections that alter its tone or increase its drama, even in the heat of combat.

The same cannot be said of François Kersaudy, whose informed and often witty double portrait of Churchill and Charles de Gaulle during the war years manages to be both entertaining and psychologically acute. He stresses Churchill's "permanent affection and compassion for France" (Kersaudy, p. 63) as the sentimental ballast that steadied their often stormy partnership. Observers then and since have commented on the two men's similarities in character and background—a shared romantic temperament, a common passion for military affairs, a love of leadership, and a past role as unheeded critics of the defense posture of their respective countries between the wars. But while Kersaudy joins Eisenhower in presenting this alliance as a success story, he clearly relishes as well portraying the theatrical heights reached in the quarrels between two such consummate political actors. Both, indeed, used rhetoric as their chief weapon. But Kersaudy's greatest respect ultimately goes to a less flamboyant figure: British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, whose own understanding of de Gaulle's "rather crowded private demonology" (Kersaudy, p. 192) and unsentimental appreciation of the general's usefulness to the British cause made him an effective go-between.

Kersaudy has done a great deal of patient archival work in reconstructing the minutiae of itineraries and the minutes of diplomatic encounters; his research is superior to Eisenhower's in most respects, relying on a broader range of sources more scrupulously checked against one another. Yet in the end he too falls prey to the allure of anecdote and detail for their own sakes. Both books show how policy was influenced by immediate needs rather than by immutable principles, how in a shifting, uncertain way the Allies groped their way toward victory. Neither does more than hint at the weight of social and material factors such as the available work force or the pace of armaments production in affecting battlefield strategy, on the one hand, and the role of ideals and common values in sustaining the coalition on the other. The theme of the "difficult alliance" was first explored by diplomatic historians such as Herbert Feis and Milton Viorst over two decades ago. Its main outlines are merely confirmed here.

Both these books tell a good story; neither will substantially alter our understanding of the outcome. Both are history of an old-fashioned sort, focusing on momentous events and a handful of characters who still have the power to fascinate. Taken together, they

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remind us that Allied unity was more difficult to maintain than to achieve. They also point, if only indirectly, to the mixture of short-term military and long-term political objectives that so complicated relations among the Western powers as they sought to win the war while at the same time positioning themselves advantageously for the coming peace. Given the current strains within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance, it may be instructive to review the storms successfully weathered by its predecessor. As Churchill himself observed, in a remark that John Eisenhower has chosen as the epigraph for his book, "There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them."

JAMES D. WILKINSON
Harvard University

The Changing Anatomy of Britain *by Anthony Sampson. New York, Random House, 1983. 476 pp. $17.95.*

"Anatomy IV" is only a shadow of its original self, which first appeared more than twenty years ago. It is only two-thirds as long and considerably less comprehensive. With only one of the twenty-nine chapters exceeding twenty pages, most topics receive only brief and usually superficial treatment. Contrary to the claim of the book jacket—"A Major New Analysis of the Workings of British Power"—the book contains little analysis and consists mainly of descriptive commentary. When an author says, "I have tried not to impose any single theme or thesis . . . [but] to let people and facts speak for themselves," (p. 418) readers know that the author has no idea what to do with the information that he or she has gathered. At the same time, although it provides a good deal of information, the book's ratio of factual detail to author's opinion has shifted a good bit toward the latter.

Such a shift would not be objectionable if Sampson had some new insights to offer, but his main points are the same old complaints of adversarial politics, of schools producing a class-divided society, of hide-bound civil servants resistant to any reform, and of an anti-commercial ethos impeding economic efficiency. Insofar as Sampson has a central concern, it is the extent to which "Britain's institutions and rulers stood up to their historic challenge to revive and modernise a nation" (p. 418) in their adaptation to the loss of imperial glory. (This concern was only one of several themes in "Anatomy I.") And even here he gives no very clear answer, mainly suggesting that there are pressing problems about which something needs to be done.

Sampson makes no use whatsoever of research findings from articles in academic journals, and he appears to be familiar with the results of such studies only from the occasional popular article that a scholar may have published in the quality press. Perhaps this is an unfair criticism of an author who is a journalist and whose main information gathering technique is the interview. He makes certain that readers know on the first page of the introduction (p. xi) that he has had personal interviews with at least four of the last six prime ministers. His many interviews, however, seem to have enabled him to pro-

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vide few inside details of political developments. Nor are most of the occasional quotes he provides from these interviews particularly telling.

Perhaps in a book of this type the occasional error is inevitable. Some of Sampson's are trivial—like being a day off on the date of the formal launch of the Social Democratic party (p. 108), although one would have thought that a person who was one of the original supporters of the party would have gotten that right. More importantly, he claims that Labour now reselects parliamentary candidates every two years (p. 17), a comment ridiculous on its face since that would be more frequently than elections occur. At times his judgments seem a bit strained. He criticizes the first Wilson government for having too many Oxford dons in the cabinet, specifically citing Roy Jenkins, Anthony Crosland, and Douglas Jay (p. 79). Jenkins, unlike Jay, was only an Oxford graduate and had not taught there. As for Crosland, he had been an Oxford don for only three years some fifteen years before he entered the cabinet. And at times Sampson's crystal ball betrays him. He says of Francis Pym at the time of the Falklands that "his position in his party was now almost impregnable, for the prime minister could not afford to disregard him" (p. 239). Little more than a year later, Thatcher had sacked Pym.

How much one can learn from this book depends on how much attention one has been paying to British affairs in recent years. If not much, then this is a more efficient way to learn what has been happening than reading 1,500 back issues of *The Times*. Sampson is rather better on economic and financial matters than on political and social affairs, but even here his coverage rarely is adequate. On the crucial question of whether the British economy has been injured by a failure of the banks to invest sufficiently in British industry, he does little more than provide a brief summary of the points made by those on each side of the argument; he offers no research of his own. Thus, for specialists, Sampson provides little of value.

JORGEN RASMUSSEN
Iowa State University

International Policy Formation in the USSR: Factional "Debates" during the Zhdanovshchina *by Gavriel D. Ra'anan. Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, 1983. 248 pp. $29.50.*

Westerners believed for decades that Andrei Zhdanov was Josef Stalin's evil genius in the years after World War II, a total ideologist, the suppressor of Russian culture, the author of the Cominform and implacable foe of the West, and Stalin's crown prince until the paranoid tyrant destroyed him in 1948. But first Loren Graham and then Werner Hahn gave us a very different Zhdanov, an ideological but moderate man who killed no opponents, who backed Western-minded scientists, who favored dialogue with the West and consumer goods at home, whom Stalin promoted over hard-liners Georgi Malenkov and Lavrentii Beria in 1946 and 1947, only to be finally cast down in a hard-left turn in 1948. Now the late Gavriel Ra'anan has revived the earlier view of the sinister, hard-left

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Zhdanov. The interpretation of Zhdanov is becoming the major historical controversy about the USSR just after World War II, embodying all other disputes.

Ra'anan has evidence that Stalin had heart trouble from 1944 through 1949 and was often away from Moscow for months, only sometimes intervening in the fierce, semi-overt succession struggle, and in major domestic and foreign policies that were subordinated to that struggle in those years. Hahn and Ra'anan (who could not have read each other while writing their books) mostly agree on the course of Zhdanov's rise to crown princedom from 1945 to 1947 and on how he fell in 1948 (though Ra'anan ignores Zhdanov's drinking problem). But they could not be more opposite in their views of Zhdanov's policies during his meteoric career.

Ra'anan insists that the Soviet chiefs subordinated genuine conviction about policy and certainly about ideology to the power struggle, adopting what might manipulate the ill Stalin or what their rivals opposed simply because they opposed it—and robbing defeated rivals' graves of policies for the next struggle—as Stalin had before them. Ra'anan's Zhdanov liked Germans, had strongly urged the Stalin-Hitler Pact in 1939, and after 1945 promoted reconciliation with defeated Germany, even trying to restrict the rape of Germans by Russian soldiers. Likewise, Ra'anan's Zhdanov hated the West; he thought it to be collapsing, and he wanted to press it hard. Zhdanov particularly hated America, Jews, and Israel, while making Machiavellian overtures to Britain.

Ra'anan grants Graham's evidence that Zhdanov supported the Western-minded philosopher B. M. Kedrov and backed scientists (including his own son Uri) against T. D. Lysenko's attack on genetics—but only because the Kedrovs were in a blood feud against Zhdanov's rival Beria and because Lysenko had earlier procured the purge of Zhdanov's client Sergei Vavilov. *Everything* was subsumed in the power struggle!

Ra'anan gives a lot of evidence about Zhdanov's empire-building in Eastern Europe, surprisingly in alliance with the then like-minded, hard-left, West-hating, Jew-hating Josip Broz Tito, with whom he plotted to shoot down American airplanes, start the Communist civil war in Greece, and prevent Israel from coming to be—all against the scheming of Malenkov and Beria and the unenforced advice of Stalin himself.

Graham emerges unscathed from all this, but Hahn's tragic, moderate Zhdanov simply cannot coexist with Ra'anan's vicious hardliner. Whose Zhdanov was the actual Zhdanov? Weakly, "academically," I find all this puzzling and fascinating. I praise both historians and urge further research into this major historical quarrel.

Whoever knows the true Zhdanov, Ra'anan's book has a disturbing implication. The power struggle *was* obsessive. Ra'anan, probably rightly, insists that its exigencies and twists determined Soviet foreign policy, not anything America did or might have done, either softer or harder against communism. As then, Ra'anan said before he died, so now.

FRANCIS B. RANDALL
Sarah Lawrence College

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National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation *edited by Christopher Hill. Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1983. 207 pp. $35.00.*

In recent years, numerous books analyzing the success of the various attempts at economic and political integration of postwar Europe have appeared. This volume, which grew out of a conference held at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in July 1981, is a welcome addition to the literature of the field. The essays focus on the national dimension of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the degree to which foreign policy traditions of the ten European Community member nations can be molded into a common European strategy, rather than on the progress of European integration.

No single theme ties the essays together; rather, they are organized around a series of questions concerning each country's attitude toward EPC. Among the issues to be addressed were the relationship between EPC and national economic interests, national security concerns, and domestic political or administrative factors. The distinctive national elements of attitudes toward EPC, the extent to which the attitude of governments and elites toward EPC had changed in the 1970s, and the degree to which national foreign policy was oriented to states and institutions outside the European Community were to be discussed as well. This forum both gives individual authors great flexibility and lends a degree of overall coherence to the work.

Following William Wallace's introduction, which provides an overview of the limits within which the the EPC functions, are essays on each of the European Community members, and a final chapter, editor Christopher Hill's thoughtful conclusions, deftly drawn from the preceeding articles. The essays on the individual nations are divided into two groups: "Major Actors" (Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy); and the "Smaller Countries" (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands). The egalitarian allotment of space gives rise to an obvious problem—one learns a great deal about the foreign policies of Ireland and the Benelux countries, while some foreign policy issues are given short shrift in the chapters on Britain, the Federal Republic, and France.

Although the quality of the various essays is, on the whole, very good, the spacial and topical limitations are noticeable regarding the Federal Republic and France. In each case, forces outside the European Community (relations with the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], and the Soviet bloc, for example) color foreign policy, and thus, attitudes toward EPC in ways which deserve more detailed discussion by the authors. Although Reinhardt Rummel and Wolfgang Wessels do an admirable job in their treatment of the Federal Republic, that nation's postwar foreign policy is complicated by recent history in ways that deserve further mention. Total defeat in World War II, continuing Allied occupation, seemingly permanent division, combined with a strategic location in Central Europe, combine to make the Federal Republic's relations with the United States and NATO the closest and the most complicated of all the European nations. The degree to which the above affect the Federal Republic's attitudes toward the EPC and limit truly independent maneuver are perhaps not strongly enough stated.

Among the essays on the smaller countries, that of Panos Tsakaloyannis, "Greece: old problems, new prospects," is the most thought-provoking. Tsakaloyannis clearly lays out

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the expectations of the most recent European Community member. His comments on Greek concerns in the Mediterranean serve both to stress that country's continuing focus on Turkey as the main threat to its security and to elucidate Greece's particular interests in the Middle East.

The scope of the book, and the competence of the authors in addressing the issues at hand, combine to make this a volume well worth reading. The particular method of organization, in addition, makes this a useful text for reference.

NANCY MERIWETHER WINGFIELD
Columbia University

The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Vol. 2, The Great Leap Forward 1958–1960 *by Roderick MacFarquhar. New York, Columbia University Press, 1983. 470 pp. $35.00.*

The impatience characteristic of revolutionary leaders such as Mao Zedong, a vital asset in successful seizures of power, too often expresses itself after victory in attempts to accelerate economic and social development beyond the limits of human endurance. In the second volume of a projected trilogy on the origins of the Cultural Revolution, Roderick MacFarquhar masterfully analyzes that grand and tragic expression of Chinese revolutionary will and Maoist willfullness—the Great Leap Forward (GLF). Using an impressive array of recently available Chinese sources, he skillfully interweaves strands of political, economic, and foreign-policy analysis to produce a work that is both authoritative and compelling.

MacFarquhar's rendering of the GLF highlights the centrality of Mao Zedong as the initiator of an epic undertaking designed to liberate China from its agricultural and industrial backwardness and to produce instantaneous wealth and power. The means were the harnessing of human labor in the people's communes and the exaltation of socialist spirit. Intoxicated by the chairman's vision, even his usually more sober associates such as Liu Shaoqi allowed themselves to be swept along temporarily by the current of Communist Left utopianism until reality could no longer be ignored.

Eschewing any explicit theoretical framework for analyzing the political conflicts of the GLF, MacFarquhar demonstrates the virtues of old-fashioned political history in the hands of a careful scholar and literary craftsperson. This is most evident in his meticulous narrative buildup to the high excitement of the Lushan Plenum in July 1959, when Defense Minister Peng Dehuai criticized the failures of the Great Leap, for which he rightly held Mao chiefly responsible. Stung by this challenge, Mao turned on Peng and destroyed him politically. The ironic result of Peng's intercession was the exacerbation of the GLF's errors, as Mao reasserted the radical line from which he had distanced himself before the criticism. MacFarquhar's book is rich in portraiture. His Mao in Lushan is a spiteful and vengeful despot who takes pleasure in seeing his adversaries grovel before him. The sketches of Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhang Wentian, and others are equally vivid and remind us of the degree to which revolutionary politics in the Maoist era were personalist.

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The drama of the GLF was played out against the downward spiral of Sino-Soviet relations—a subject that MacFarquhar also analyzes in depth. Critical of the drift of Soviet foreign and domestic politics, the Chinese leadership—again with Mao playing a pivotal role—rejected the Stalinist model of development and, by the spring of 1960, elaborated both an empirical critique and a theoretical challenge to Soviet leadership of the international Communist movement. Nikita Khrushchev's crude attempts to force Chinese submission merely strengthened Mao's hand as MacFarquhar demonstrates. However, the chairman's preoccupation with Sino-Soviet relations diverted his attention from domestic affairs and enabled his subordinates to begin emergency repairs to the battered Chinese body politic. By the end of 1960, MacFarquhar estimates, between 16 and 29 million Chinese had paid with their lives (through starvation and famine-related diseases) for the revolutionary hubris of the Chinese Communist elite.

For the most part, MacFarquhar leaves it to the reader to relate the events and issues of the GLF to the barely adumbrated cataclysm of the Cultural Revolution. One theme is clear. Mao's willingness to use all means to destroy those he mistrusted, and his colleagues' spineless acquiescence to the "first arbitrary use of personal power" (p. 233) at Lushan, prefigured the upheavals of the late 1960s. MacFarquhar's final volume, analyzing the remaining years that preceded the Cultural Revolution, will be anticipated eagerly by readers of this splendid second part of his trilogy.

STEVEN I. LEVINE
American University

Exiled in Paradise: German Refugee Artists and Intellectuals in America, from the 1930's to the Present *by Anthony Heilbut. New York, Viking Press, 1983. 506 pp. $20.00.*

There has been a growing interest in recent years in the study of German refugees to the United States during the 1930s. This latest contribution aims to be a social and cultural history of the more illustrious among them. It does not deal with "the more typical members of the bourgeoisie [who] were quite content to perform the functional role of doctor and lawyer, merchant and scholar" (p. viii). This emphasis on the elite diminishes the usefulness of the book and its conclusions. A further drawback is the lack of footnotes and a bibliography. Summaries of the sources for each chapter do not identify the many interesting quotations from the author's interviews with émigrés, and the absence of a bibliography makes one wonder if the author was aware of the substantial secondary literature on his subject. This book will appeal more to general readers than to scholars.

The study is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with: the émigrés' transition from Europe to America; their life in and contributions to the United States; and their post-World War II disillusionment with their adopted country. The first part describes the Berlin cultural scene of the 1920s, from which most of the émigrés are said to have come. This has been done before by other authors who knew that city better. There is too much stress on anti-Semitism. To say that "between 1919 and 1933 only five of the two hundred

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Reichstag representatives were Jewish" (p. 26) shows an ignorance of German history; and the statement that among "the titans of German scholarship, the vast majority . . . were Jewish" (p. 23) is clearly exaggerated. The refugees' difficulties of transition and adjustment are rightly stressed. But how meaningful are observations that "some émigrés, like [Albert] Einstein and [Bertolt] Brecht, preferred the informality of rumpled shirts and open collars; others, like Thomas Mann, were never seen without a jacket and tie" (p. 64); or that "refugee wives were often years younger than their husbands" (p. 69)?

The core of the book deals with the émigrés' experiences in the United States. It is stronger on cultural than social history and concentrates on celebrities—people like Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Thomas and Heinrich Mann, Brecht, Billy Wilder, Hannah Arendt, and others. Their stories have been told before, but there are some fresh insights and new anecdotes. The main emphasis is on artists (chiefly writers), film-makers (directors rather than actors), scientists (mostly physicists), and social scientists (mainly of the "Frankfurt School"). Among major omissions are historians and political scientists, whose analyses of German history and politics did much to shape America's image of Germany's past and present. A dominant theme is the failure of most émigrés to become truly assimilated. To what extent this was due to resistance on the part of the refugees or of American society is never examined in depth.

The final section, covering the years since 1945, is the most original. It is weak on the émigrés' role in the American occupation of Germany; but is better on the participation of émigré scientists in the development of, and subsequent debate over, the atomic bomb. It is informative on the effect of the postwar red scare on the émigrés. The resulting disillusionment, together with opposition to the war in Vietnam and fear of a nuclear catastrophe, turned some émigrés against their new country and made others return to the old. The postwar attitudes of Germany's émigrés are summed up in a statement that recapitulates the book's major theme: "The émigrés had arrived as enemy aliens, and often went out the same way . . . . " (p. 476). Like many earlier statements, this is far too sweeping and superficial a summary of the experiences of German exiles. Many émigrés will take exception to it.

HANS W. GATZKE
Yale University

Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966 *by Steven L. Burg. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1983. 365 pp. $37.50.*

Yugoslav politics has been and will continue to be a puzzle to the non-specialist and a challenge to the scholar. Burg's book will enable even the uninitiated to gain a degree of understanding and insight into this maze. His stay in Yugoslavia and his interviews and discussions with many Yugoslavs, including party and governmental officials at all levels, enabled the author to get a grip on the shifting scenario of that country's political process. He was able to utilize fully the vast resources available to him in Yugoslavia and

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at home to write a well-reseached, well-documented book. Though tedious in places, the book must be considered an outstanding contribution to the existing literature on conflict regulation in divided cultural communities.

By his own admission, Burg has based the first chapter essentially on the existing "classics" of literature on Yugoslavia and does not claim to have any new insights into the pre-1966 period.

In the next chapter, the author goes into great detail about how the uneven economic development in the various regions forced the regional leaders to "become embroiled in conflicts over domestic economic strategies" (p. 56) and other issues, and how between 1966 and 1969 the governmental power in Yugoslavia was federalized, while the control of the decision-making process on most important issues remained in the hands of the central party leadership.

After reading about the constant conflicts and disagreements among the various regions discussed in great detail in the next chapter, one is at a loss trying to find examples of the relationship of "mutual trust and confidence" that the author says was transformed into "one based on mutual suspicion and hostility" (p. 100). We know that Yugoslavia has been plagued by inter-nationality conflict for years and we can be sure that these conflicts will continue to flare up occasionally as they did in 1969 and many times since. These flare-ups cannot be explained solely as manifestations of uneven economic development and economic grievances of the less-developed areas.

In Chapter Four, the author presents an excellent analysis of the institutions established by the Yugoslav leadership in its efforts to create effective vehicles for the resolution of interregional conflicts. While the author makes frequent references to Josip Broz Tito's personal efforts to secure the cooperation of the regional leaders in these efforts, it is not until the end of the book that he acknowledges that Tito was the most important factor in the preservation of political cohesion and that he was the "authoritative arbiter of disputes" (p. 348).

Chapter Six is mainly an analysis of the last work by Edvard Kardelj and a discussion of the changes in the central party leadership prior to the death of Tito.

In his conclusion, Burg gives a glimpse of post-Tito Yugoslavia and writes that "the success of Yugoslav decision making requires regional leaderships that are highly committed to the preservation of the existing order" (p. 347). In a society where, as someone said, Tito was the only true Yugoslav and the rest are Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, and so on, this will not be easy.

FRANK DINKA
Southwest Missouri State University

The International Economy and Industrial Development: Trade and Investment in the Third World *by Robert H. Ballance, Javed A. Ansari, and Hans W. Singer. Totowa, N.J., Allenheld, Osmun and Co., 1982. 326 pp. $29.50.*

This is an ambitious book whose content ranges from industrialization in Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union, to policies followed by the developing countries and to

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changing conditions in the world economy. In view of the limitations of space, this review will focus on two issues: the economic effects of export-oriented policies; and the role of public manufacturing enterprises.

The authors take a rather negative attitude as far as the growth effects of an export-oriented strategy are concerned. They decry the supposedly static character of export promotion on the grounds that "its proponents made little mention of the possibility that structural changes or shifts in comparative advantage would occur as industrialization continued" (p. 53). It is further suggested that "domestic demand stands in the forefront of the growth process" (p. 60). Finally, the authors evoke "the weak empirical relationship between exports and growth" (p. 164) in individual industries.

A reconsideration of the evidence gives rise to different conclusions, however. First of all, it has long been understood that export orientation leads to structural change through the upgrading of exports, as happened in Japan and, more recently, in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Also, the contribution of exports to output growth is greatly understated in the estimates cited by the authors, who consider the direct effects of exports to the exclusion of their indirect effects, which operate through input-output relationships and increases in incomes. The same considerations explain the lack of a high correlation between the growth of exports and that of output in individual industries. In fact, the results of the studies cited by the authors show the importance of indirect effects that explain the high positive correlation between the growth of exports, and the growth of output less exports, observed in a cross-section investigation of developing countries.

The title of Chapter VII, "The Public Manufacturing Enterprise an Agent for Industrialization," reflects the authors' views as to the positive role played by three enterprises in industrial development. They submit: "Public industrial investment in LDCs [less developed countries] is, in our opinion, primarily an instrument to modify existing preferences and influence terms on which commodities and factors are made available to national producers. It is not primarily intended to maximize consumption flows over a given time, nor does it have an objective of transcending capitalism" (p. 276). This statement needs to be queried on several grounds.

To begin with, if political considerations regarding the transformation of capitalism are left out of account, the maximization of the present value of consumption will provide an appropriate objective. In turn, it is not clear why and how the public manufacturing enterprises (PMEs) should modify existing preferences. Finally, as far as traded goods are concerned, modifying relative prices will lead to distortions.

At the same time, the authors fail to consider accumulated evidence as to the inefficiencies of the PMEs. This is especially apparent in countries with a large public enterprise sector, such as Egypt and Turkey, as well as in socialist countries. Nor have public industrial firms been particularly successful in India, where the experience of the past quarter of the century does not bear out the validity of the claim that "Indian PMEs can play a significant role in achieving industrial restructuring in accordance with India's changing cooperative advantages" (p. 285).

The observed inefficiencies have to do with the lack of appropriate incentives. The PMEs tend to be sheltered from market pressures; their managers are generally not compensated for increases in profits; and they do not have to fear the sword of Damocles of bankruptcy. In turn, improvements in the operation of the PMEs, whether in developing

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or in socialist countries, would require them to behave in the same way as private enterprises. This is indeed the lesson of experiments with decentralization in Hungary that did not follow Yugoslavia on the road to workers' management.

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Military Service in the United States *edited by Lt. General Brent Scowcroft. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1982. 226 pp. Cloth, $14.95; paper, $7.95.*

The debate regarding how a democracy that values individualism can best meet its military personnel needs has been waged with particular intensity during the past two decades, and promises to become fiercer during the next ten years, as the baby-boom generation of the late 1940s and early 1950s is replaced by the "birth dearth" of the late 1960s and 1970s in the military personnel pool. In an effort to inform this debate, the American Assembly asked retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft to direct a project on military staffing policy. The papers in this volume are the background papers written for that project.

Most analyses of military personnel take as given Department of Defense personnel requirements. This collection takes a more enlightened position, and begins with a chapter by William W. Kaufmann on the factors that should shape U.S. military posture in the future. While most of these factors are beyond the military's control, Kaufmann describes a graded series of alternatives oriented toward fulfilling the deterrence function, and waging wars of varying intensity should deterrence fail.

The debate has focused on econometric, psychometric, and demographic considerations, almost to the exclusion of broader considerations of social and political structure and process. This orientation is reflected in three of the six chapters in this book. Chapters by John P. White and James R. Hosek, Richard W. Hunter and Gary R. Nelson, and Richard L. V. Cooper provide a good overview of the demographics, and a solid introduction to the econometrics, of the all-volunteer force (AVF). Their overview of the AVF experience pays more lip service than do most economic analyses to the importance of "intangibles" such as national will, but nonetheless emphasizes labor market factors in explaining the past successes of the AVF, and prescribing how to keep it healthy in the face of a declining labor pool. They downplay the "personnel problems" cited by other analysts and blame them on cutbacks in training. Their criteria for evaluating the AVF against other alternatives such as universal service or selective service are wholly concerned with personnel quantity and quality; no mention is made of performance. Their recommendation for the future is that the AVF can continue its success through economic incentives for service.

Nestled between Hunter's and Nelson's assessment of the first eight years of the AVF and Cooper's comparison of the AVF with policy alternatives is Charles C. Moskos's

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analysis of the social implications of the AVF. Some of the disagreements on matters of fact that characterize the debate are highlighted by this chapter. For example, where White and Hosek and Hunter and Nelson argue that the educational level of the force has increased under the AVF, Moskos suggests the opposite. The racial and gender composition of the force also receive somewhat different treatment here than in the other chapters. Much of the chapter is devoted to Moskos's institutional and occupational models of military service—developmental constructs that have captured the imaginations of the services and of civilian policymakers.

In the final chapter of the book, James L. Lacy argues that although the labor market has produced enough people to staff the AVF under peacetime conditions, there have been costs in terms of security, military dependability, and equity, and he argues in favor of a return to selective conscription. By assuming (incorrectly, I believe) that random choice produces equity, he sees the issue of who shall serve when not all serve as not particularly problematic.

Newcomers to the field of military personnel policy will find in this book a good introduction to the ongoing debate. Scholars familiar with the field will find that known vintners produce predictable wines.

DAVID R. SEGAL
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America and the Survivors of the Holocaust *by Leonard Dinnerstein. New York, Columbia University Press, 1982. 409 pp. $19.95.*

U.S. policy on refugees in the years following the end of World War II has been largely ignored by historians. Yet the problem of resettling the displaced persons—the liberated forced laborers and death camp survivors who refused repatriation, and others who streamed westward from the Soviet Union and Poland after the war—became an international issue as well as a thorny domestic one for President Harry Truman and Congress. Scholars have given far more attention to two closely related areas: the failure of the U.S. to aid the victims of Nazism during the war years; and the efforts from 1945 to 1948 to mobilize U.S. support on behalf of a Jewish state in Palestine. Since the case for a state was based largely on answering the needs of homeless Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, historians dealing with America's role in the establishment of the state of Israel have discussed the displaced persons question tangentially. Now Leonard Dinnerstein has focused specifically on U.S. attitudes towards the displaced persons.

In this thoroughly researched study, Dinnerstein has addressed a number of important issues. His detailed account of the passage of the 1948 and 1950 acts enabled over 400,000 displaced persons to settle in the U.S. (Together with those who arrived as a result of Truman's 1945 Christmas Day directive, a total of 450,000 refugees were resettled between 1945 and 1952.) The displaced persons acts constituted a major shift in America's immigration policy, as Dinnerstein makes clear, for it established the precedent for admitting large numbers of refugees under exceptional circumstances. The central concern of the

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book, however, is the grueling fight to gain passage of the displaced persons laws and the tensions and prejudices they mirrored as America moved from war against Nazism to the cold war, with its attendant fears of domestic Communist subversion.

Anti-semitic sentiments harbored by half of the American people (according to opinion polls) and blatantly expressed by such political leaders as Senator Patrick McCarran delayed the efforts to bring relief to displaced persons. For many, displaced persons became synonomous with Jewish refugees. The Citizens Committee on Displaced Persons, the non-sectarian lobby financed by the anti-Zionist Lessing Rosenwald and aided by the non-Zionist American Jewish Committee, went to great lengths to obfuscate the Jewish dimension of the problem. Ironically, though this strategy was intended to get a bill that allowed at least 100,000 displaced Jews to emigrate to the U.S., the final version of the act severely discriminated against them. To explain this result, Dinnerstein suggests a carry-over of America's wartime indifference to the plight of Europe's Jews, and to this, one should add, the timidity of some leaders of American Jewry. However, Dinnerstein also points out humanitarian sensibilities that were manifest in the administration and in Congress. The Displaced Persons Commission, charged with implementing a discriminatory law, found loopholes in the law and often circumvented its intent, thus expediting immigration and enabling many more Jewish refugess to reach America than had the letter of the law been implemented. About a quarter of the displaced persons admitted to the United States were Jews. In Congress, though the wheels turned slowly, a more humane law was adopted in 1950, despite the powerful opposition of McCarren and his confederates.

Dinnerstein's assertion that a pervasive anti-semitism was present in postwar America is an oversimplification. He has certainly documented how such sentiments influenced the drafting of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. However, one must also take account of Truman's vigorous action in appointing the Harrison Commission in the summer of 1948 and in responding to its findings. Nor can one ignore the overwhelming support in Congress and with the American people for the Zionist efforts to establish a Jewish state.

Dinnerstein's valuable study is in fact flawed by his failure to give sufficient attention to the competing campaign to win U.S. political support for a Jewish state. From the time Truman appealed to British Prime Minister Clement Attlee in August 1945 to allow 100,000 displaced European Jews to enter Palestine, he essentially accepted the Zionist solution for the Jewish refugee problem as the preferred one. The American public and Congress did as well. In the fall of 1947, Truman agreed that a Jewish state was necessary to implement this solution, and the U.S. played a crucial role in the United Nations decision to partition Palestine. In May 1948, the president extended recognition to the newly established state of Israel. The U.S. had thus helped create the instrument intended to solve the Jewish refugee problem. Surely these events influenced the degree of support liberal immigration legislation aimed at saving Jews received. Dinnerstein ought to have considered the correlation between the two struggles and probed into the reasons the American Jewish community threw its weight so massively behind the Zionist option.

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Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses *by Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1982. 171 pp. Cloth, $22.95; paper, $8.95.*

On one level, this book is a thorough, well-documented summary of what is known in the West about Soviet strategic forces and Soviet nuclear strategy. It should be an aid to students, researchers, and citizens who wish to better understand the Soviet side of U.S.-USSR strategic rivalry and its implications for American policy. Particularly useful are the book's five appendices, which analyze Soviet missile design and development, the characteristics of Soviet missiles, Soviet targeting, Soviet strategic defense, and the Soviet use of military reconnaissance satellites.

On another level, however, the book must be regarded, despite its admirably non-polemical style, as a part of the debate over Soviet intentions and capabilities that has raged in the West for the past decade or more. The authors have done an excellent job in banishing the rancor that has often characterized this debate from the pages of a book that aims to inform and to teach. The reader familiar with this debate, however, cannot help "keeping score" as the authors present points of view that have been and in some quarters probably still are hotly contested. On the basis of this score-keeping, it is difficult not to conclude that the authors adopt a pessimistic and what would once have been regarded a distinctly "hawkish" view of Soviet intentions and, to a lesser extent, Soviet capabilities.

In their opening paragraph, the authors state that "too often . . . the United States has tended to see Soviet military forces and strategy as a reflection of its own stance or simply to accept the worst plausible projections of Soviet intentions and capabilities" (p. 1). While the authors keep their promise and avoid worst plausible projections, the projections they do offer cannot be described as other than bad. Apart from the banal assertion that the Soviet leaders do not want war, it is hard to see what in this book might accomplish the authors' stated intention of alleviating unnecessary anxiety about Soviet intentions.

The possibility that Soviet leaders have accepted or are about to accept a concept of deterrence based on mutual assured destruction receives no mention in the discussion of Soviet nuclear strategy, which is seen as entirely geared toward damage limitation and defeating an enemy by military means. The Soviets are seen to be highly disposed to preemption and launch under attack. In the space of a few paragraphs, the authors assert that the Soviet General Staff requires forces to cover targets throughout Scandinavia, Iceland, Greenland, Turkey, Israel, Iran, North Africa and Saudi Arabia, all of continental Europe, Britain, the continental U.S., Canada, China, U.S. bases in Guam and Hawaii, the Philippines, Australia, and distant "countries that could prove politically hostile in a long war" (p. 20), such as South Africa and Brazil.

As the subtitle of the book suggests, the authors seek to demonstrate how Soviet military leaders have responded to the requirements of a changing international situation. It is left to readers to remind themselves on occasion that most (although not all) of the particular requirements of Soviet strategy follow from the general requirement to prevail, if necessary, in a nuclear war with the United States—a requirement that the Soviet

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leaders have set for themselves and that Western observers are in no way obliged to accept as legitimate, immutable, or in the best interests of world peace.

In the final analysis, there is nothing in this book that is even mildly reassuring about Soviet intentions. Where the authors reassure, it is on the level of capabilities—by demonstrating that in many areas the Soviet Union has not yet successfully fulfilled the (self-defined) requirements of its offensive and especially defensive doctrines. Such reassurances, however, depend entirely on implicit and sometimes explicit claims about American capabilities.

In concluding, the authors acknowledge the critical role American actions will play in determining the "requirements" to which Soviet leaders will seek to "respond." In their characteristically understated manner, they point to the dilemma facing the U.S.—namely how it can respond to the "distinctive" Soviet strategic posture without attempting simply to replicate it. One looks for future studies, by Brookings and others, that will tackle this question.

JOHN VAN OUDENAREN
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REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

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Correspondence

DOD's Office of International Security Affairs: The Brief Ascendancy of an Advisory System

To the Editor:

Geoffrey Piller has written an article on the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense (*PSQ* 98 [1983]59–78). Piller's research and interpretations warrant comment because his article appears in a respected scholarly journal and will be a reference in the years to come.

I will react specifically to Piller's section on "The Nixon-Ford ISA" and more exactly on ISA during the first Nixon term when Melvin Laird was secretary of defense. There are factual errors that should be corrected for the historical record and some conclusions that seem unfounded.

Piller states that Warren Nutter had a reputation as "opponent of arms control." What is the evidence to support this statement? Nutter did not believe in unilateral disarmament; rather, he wanted to negotiate realistically, always getting something in return for what was given up. He and I liked to use the New England Yankee term "dicker." He was concerned that the American propensity for an agreement too frequently pushed aside the terms or substance of the agreement.

By implication I am classified as a "cold warrior." What is the basis for this designation? Prior to my appointment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), I did not have a personal public record on defense and foreign policy issues.

Piller states as fact that ISA's top posts were filled with "cold warriors drawn largely from Stanford University's Hoover Institution." Of six deputy assistant secretaries one was a research fellow at Hoover (Y.L. Wu), but his full-time appointment was as professor of economics at the University of San Francsico. Another deputy assistant secretary of defense had been at Hoover (Dennis Doolin, a Democrat), but he came to ISA after a tour of several years with a special research team at the Central Intelligence Agency and with considerable experience

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in Vietnam going back to the early 1950s. He also had a detailed knowledge of Mainland China and of the Chinese language. The other four were a retired naval officer and Atomic Energy Commission official, a political science professor, an active duty Air Force general officer, and a retired foreign service officer (auxiliary). There were no other Hoover Institution personnel in the Laird-Nutter years among the almost 300 members of the ISA staff.

Morton Halperin is quoted to the effect that Nutter and his staff "saw their role . . . as protectors of the interests and positions of the Joint Chief of Staff." I do not know the basis of Halperin's opinion, since we did not talk to him and had fundamental differences with him. Nutter and I saw our role as providing secretary of defense the best information and advice we could obtain. We worked to develop a Department of Defense (DOD) policy position and by necessity we cooperated with the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff. Secretary Laird and Secretary Nutter sought professional military judgments and then applied, as necessary, the administration's policy input.

Piller overlooks the ISA-Joint Chiefs relationships prior to the Laird days and the improvement that took place. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson distrusted the Joint Chiefs. The civilian subordinates of these presidents (and of Secretary Robert McNamara) picked up that attitude and viewed Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) estimates and strategies as designed to protect reputations, if failure came. The JCS and the theater commanders were exercising their responsibilities for devising a strategy for military success. However, both JFK and LBJ allowed the civilians in ISA to take charge, to pick bombing targets, and so on. These civilians never had a plan to win the war. During a buildup in Vietnam from 60,000 to 268,000, President Johnson met only twice with his Army chief of staff. Laird and Nutter did not intend to repeat or continue this policy. (See Richard K. Betts, "Misadventure Revisited," *The Wilson Quarterly* 7 [Summer 1983]).

It is not true to state that "ISA made little effort to promote either the views of the Secretary of Defense or the goals of the Administration." Public speeches by Nutter and his staff, congressional testimony, classified briefings and reports all supported the Nixon policies. I believe the record on this is clear, but evidently Piller did not look. He seems to have accepted a journalist's judgment (Joseph Kraft).

"A lack of Washington experience" on the part of Nutter and his deputies is mentioned as the cause of an ineffective bureaucratic operation, or at least this is the opinion of I.M. Destler as quoted. Apparently, Piller did not check the biographical information available on Nutter, myself, and on Nutter's dozen or more appointees. Nutter and I had previous Washington service and all, but three of the appointees had worked in Washington at some time (several for many years). The three (Wu, Robert Pranger and James Noyes) had relevant professional or overseas field experience. Further, Nutter was instructed by the secretary of defense to keep a "low profile." Such a posture does not contribute to the perception of bureaucratic success! Nutter and I saw the ISA role as one

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for staffing Laird and David Packard—not winning bureaucratic wars or defending the turf of bureaucratic satrapies. We were quite content to know that almost a third of the policy papers that crossed the desk of the secretary came from ISA.

Piller's discussion of the National Security Council (NSC) operation and its impact on the DOD (and specifically on ISA) is more in keeping with the realities of the 1969–1973 period. That approach to defense and foreign policy apparently is what the president and Henry Kissinger desired. I do not presume to respond for Laird. We were aware of the "exercising of the NSC system" as a device to keep the bureaucracy occupied so the White House could do its own thing. However, at NSC Review Group and Washington Special Action Group meetings I attended Kissinger always asked me if the DOD position was stated fully and accurately. And whether the secretary, the deputy secretary, or others attended NSC meetings, the staffing was a function of ISA in cooperation with other DOD elements.

The article makes no reference to the ISA leadership role in the OSD Vietnam Task Force, the OSD Middle East Task Force, the prisoners of war–missing in action problem, or in its participation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) matters, Western Pacific developments, and the like. For the first time, there was an emphasis upon the economic problems of South Vietnam and on the economic and strategic aspects of East-West trade. ISA under the leadership of Laird and Nutter was no longer consumed by the operational problems of the Vietnam War.

My remarks are not in keeping with my usual practice of "no comment" on public policy issues with which I have been involved. However, Piller's research paper should not stand without comment as the historical record.

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Office of International Security Affairs, 1969–70

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